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Chapter 7 
Office Development in Central Edinburgh 1959-1978 
Introduction 
Having considered the formulation of the office restraint policy we 
now turn to examining its implementation. This chapter simply seeks 
to describe what development has taken place and what development has 
been proposed but resisted by the local authority. This is by no 
means an easy task with the data available. Therefore, wherever 
relevant, the limitations of the data have to be discussed. 
As can be seen from Figures 7.1 and 7.2, there has been an enormous 
amount of land changed to office use in central Edinburgh since the 
Second World War. Together, the figures show large increases in the 
amount of land in office use in the West End of Edinburgh, the eastern 
end of the New Town and some major areas of office growth in the areas 
to the south of Princes Street. However, as we shall see, the area to 
the north of Princes Street has remained the principal focus for 
office use. 
The history of office development will be viewed in five, four year 
periods. These periods have been chosen as the best approximation to 
conventionally defined periods of boom and slump in office development 
in Edinburgh (see Barras, 1979, and Catalano and Barras, 1978), but 
which are also equal sized time intervals. - In each period the type 















































Problems of Data 
As with most social research, one of the major problems encountered in 
preparing the following chapter has been the collection of accurate 
data. Since most data are collected to facilitate the study of known 
problems, new questions must either be tailored to meet available 
data or new data sets need to be assembled. The latter case applies 
to this thesis. Most of the data required to assess implementation 
was readily available, but was lodged in several different data 
sources (local authority valuation rolls, planning register, local 
press and estate agents reports etc. ), none of which were 
computerised. Hence, collection required much laborious cross- 
referencing. The variables for which data were collected and the 
sources from which they came are listed in Appendix 6. 
It was considered advantageous to group applications into time periods 
in order to examine more clearly the data for long-term trends. The 
slow transformation of the process of property development in a 
central city location requires study over along time in order that 
the magnitude of changes can be more fully appreciated. Therefore, a 
twenty year study period has been taken in order that changes in the 
types of applicants for office development, and changes in the 
development process itself, could be examined more fully. 
Catalano and Barras (1978) divided their data into four five year 
periods to illustrate 'boom and slump'. However, by examination of 
the data in Edinburgh, it was established that the divisions suggested 
by Catalano and Barras were not wholly appropriate to Edinburgh. 
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Therefore, this chapter uses the slightly different time division of 
five four-year periods. The regularity of the division of the study 
period allows statistical comparisons of different time periods. 
One of the major problems encountered in this thesis was the 
collection of data on the floor space of office developments. The 
planning records of City of Edinburgh District Council contained some 
computerised data relating to recent developments over the last six 
years of the study period. The size of other new developments had to 
be traced through the planning register and, where necessary, checked 
with literature produced by local estate agents, the local press at 
the time of development and the work of a limited number of previous 
researchers (Freeman, 1970, Clyne, 1973, and Smith, 1978). However, as 
will be seen, a significant element in the growth of offices has been 
the change of use and refurbishment of existing properties. The 
planning authority has no publically available data on the size of 
these applications. Neither the planning authority nor the local 
authority valuers would allow the present author access to files on 
individual applications. It was therefore necessary to devise a 
method for estimating the floor space of such developments. 
The method adopted was one which drew on the available data on 
property size and the Local Authority Valuation Rolls. Adverts placed 
in "The Scotsman" newspaper and "Business and Finance in Scotland" 
over a period'between 1976 and 1979 (when a business property feature 
was run), data collected from the leading estate agents in the city 
and data from field work in the central area, were all collected 
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together to give information on the size of approximately 150 office 
properties -throughout central Edinburgh. The corresponding rateable 
value for these properties in office use was then noted for 1979. In 
this way the rateable value per square foot could be calculated for 
each of the 150 properties involved. Since the rateable value of any 
property is based on the location, use and condition of the property 
(which combines to form an estimate of the rental potential of a 
property upon which the rateable value is based) then properties in 
similar locations, in similar uses and in a similar condition could be 
expected to have a similar rateable value per square metre. Hence, by 
calculating the rateable value per square metre for properties of 
known size it was possible to estimate the size of similar `office 
1 
properties by reference to their rateable value 
Apart from these practical problems, there are also conceptual 
problems in trying to use data on planning decisions to assess the 
implementation of a planning policy. For data on development control 
to simply and directly reflect the level of implementation of policies 
1. The method was only used where adequate information was not in 
existence. For estimation purposes most of the city centre was 
divided into five small areas and for each small area an average 
rateable value per square foot for offices in long-established 
built structures and new developments was constructed. A similar 
operation was also carried out separately for Princes Street, 
George Street and Queen Street. Hence, the size of any 
development for which data was not available could be estimated by 
knowing its type and its address. Data for redevelopments was 
usually available and therefore most of the estimates were carried 
out on changes of use. Pilot tests on known developments 
indicated that the method was reasonably accurate and there is no 
doubt that the regularity of Georgian architecture in the First 
New Town area of Edinburgh is important in this respect. Pilot 
tests did not seem to show any regular biases in the method and, 
since the majority of estimates were for small properties, the 
general picture is thought to be representative of the true 
situation. 
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in a plan, at least four basic assumptions would have to be made. 
They are that: 
(a) all pressures for development, however slight, 
entered the formal planning process through 
becoming planning applications; 
(b) all the pressures for development are made 
irrespective of the content of the plan. (i. e. the 
plan and planning applications are mutually 
independent); 
(c) all the decisions made on the "expressions" of 
development pressure are based solely on the 
policies in the plan; 
(d) and all policies have single, simple and clearly 
identifiable aims. 
McNamara and Healey (1984) have shown that all of these assumptions 
are difficult to defend. Many pressures for development are halted 
after the initial, informal contact of-the developer and the local 
planning authority. Developers, especially in city centre areas, are 
very conscious of the content of a plan document and in the case of 
strict restraint policies, may simply believe it unlikely that any 
application would be approved. As a consequence, they may not apply. 
This effectively means that the plan and its implementation are to 
some extent controlling development before- applications are even 
submitted. 
Once a formal application has been made to the local planning 
authority, it is simply unrealistic to conceptualise the development 
control procedure as one where a list of rules is produced and a 
decision is then "read off". Policies are rarely unambiguous or 
"water-tight" (see Kingsbury, 1982) and development is often 
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considered on many more scores than simple planning grounds (e. g. jobs 
created). In other words, as was stated in Chapter 3, the control 
process is to a large extent discretionary (Underwood, 1981b, 
Harrison, 1979) and, as such, data pertaining solely to decisions made 
can prove difficult to interpret. As a result, it is not possible to 
say straightforwardly that a policy was or was not effectively 
implemented by simply looking at data on development control. Further 
evidence, from case study applications, appeal decisions, interviews 
and plan inquiries has to be assembled in order that the findings from 
development control records can be interpreted. (This material is 
presented after the analysis of decisions in Chapter 10). 
However, the above critique of development control data does not 
render it useless since it remains the only data source to help answer 
2 
the type of question being asked in this thesis. If double counting 
is removed, then- it forms a good statistical base for starting to 
examine policy effectiveness. It has been used in many rural areas 
(Anderson 1981, Joyce 1977, Blacksell and Gilg 1977, Preece 1979, 
Brotherton 1982) and urban fringe areas (McNamara and Elson, 1981, 
Healey et al., -1982) to view restraint policy, but to the author's 
knowledge this thesis is the first thorough analysis of development 
control records in the city centre. 
2. A common procedure for gaining planning permission is to submit an 
outline application to establish the principle of a certain type 
of development on a site and then follow this with a detailed 
application, which obtains approval for the actual building to be 
developed. Obviously, if both applications are counted then the 
level of development will be grossly over estimated and, 
therefore, double counting must be removed before analysis. 
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Apart from the conceptual problems mentioned above there are also many 
practical problems concerned with data relating to how much 
development has been refused planning permission. One major problem 
is to assess, in absolute terms, exactly how much development has been 
refused. For example, how does one compare how much development has 
occurred over a period of time with how much has not? Obviously, the 
method of estimating the size of developed properties by rateable 
value and location cannot work in the same way for developments that 
did not occur. For large new developments that were refused, data 
exists in the planning register (and newspapers as a last resort), but 
this is not the case for small changes of use or smaller 
redevelopment. An estimation procedure has been established for such 
3 
methods 
3. In the case of changes of use that were actually refused one 
cannot compare the land use after development (office) of the 
developed property with properties of known size in similar use. 
Therefore one is forced to try and estimate the size of the 
property by examining pre-development uses. This is more easily 
shown by example. 
In 1959 two adjacent houses had rateable values of £73 and £69. In 
1972 one house was converted to office use. In 1975 developers 
applied for planning permission to develop the other house for 
office use but were refused permission. The resultant rateable 
values were £730 and £138 respectively for office and house. 
Clearly, in terms of the questions we are asking, the two 
properties can only be compared before the development took place. 
If the size of the converted property is known to be 250 sq. m. 
then the amount of refused space can be estimated as (69/73 x 250) 
sq. m., using the rateable value before development. 
Using known sizes only, rateable values were taken for a 
particular year, 1959, for accepted and rejected office 
applications. Their predevelopment uses were noted and as a 
result sixty estimates were made. 1959 was chosen in an effort to 
take the properties back as close as possible to their original 
condition. Without the embellishments of later alterations, 
properties could be more accurately estimated. 
Although there are bound to be small errors by this method, there 
seems to be no alternative; ' the errors are probably small and 
there is no reason why they should be skewed to one particular 
side of the, real figure. 
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It has been the present author's convention in organising data to 
assemble all the refusals given to one applicant on one site. This 
then establishes a "composite application". The final local authority 
decision on the application determined which data set (permissions or 
refusals) the composite application was placed in. If the final 
decision was an approval then the pressure for development was deemed 
successful. If a refusal resulted, then the composite application 
gives at least an approximate estimation' of the hidden pressure 
experienced for development. In this way permissions and refusals 
have some comparable base. It is acknowledged that problems still 
remain. 
Before proceeding, two further practical problems should be noted. 
Firstly, in the case of the submission of outline applications for 
planning permission for large office developments, only a vague 
address is given by the applicant and the basic purpose of the 
application is to establish the principle of development. In the list 
of refused applications there are'seven new developments upon which 
decisions have been made for which there is no possible means, without 
access to local authority files, to gauge the size of development 
proposed. These developments are submitted by English -Property 
Companies (three), a Scottish Insurance Company (one), a bank (one) 
and two were submitted by unclassifiable applicants. 
Secondly, there was also the problem of changing terminology amongst 
the planning profession and in planning practice. This is of 
particular importance when considering changes of use and 
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refurbishments. The term "refurbishment" was not used regularly in 
the planning register to describe developments until the 1970s. 
However, six major changes of use (over 1,000 sq. m) were refused by 
City of Edinburgh before 1970. Such large land'use changes might have 
required structural alterations within the building and would 
therefore technically constitute refurbishments. However, the records 
do not call them refurbishments and therefore they have been kept in 
the present author's data set as changes of use. Again, access to 
local authority files would have solved this recurring problem. 
Hence, we can see extensive problems in using this sort of data for 
analysing decision-making related to office development. Despite 
these problems, this data has facilitated a detailed study of how much 
delopment has occurred and the decisions made regarding office 
development. The rest of this chapter forms a desription of how much 
was built, when and where. The political decision-making is reviewed 
in more detail in the following chapter. 
General History of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1959-1978 
2 
Between January 1959 and December 1978, approximately 440,000 m (4.6 
million sq. ft) of new office space was completed in central 
4. 
Edinburgh .A seventh of this total 
is accounted for in two extremely 
4. Statistics given on sizes of developments refer only to those 
developments known to have been carried out after permissions had 
been granted. The reason for this stems from the amount of data 
available to the researcher being such that only the sizes of 
completed developments could be estimated. Data on the actual 
size of development existed for about 65% of all applications; 
estimates have been used for the rest. Despite all efforts, the 
data was so poor that ninety five cases proved impossible to 
estimate. However, using evidence on who the applicant was, and 
possessing information in the average size of developments put 
forward by such applicants, it was possible to estimate how much 




large developments (Argyle House, 26,291m and St. James Centre, 
25 
30,565m ) between the mid-1960s to the 1970s 
As Chapter 4 illustrated, developments are of two main forms, namely 
those requiring the demolition of the existing buildings and those 
which do not. If the latter category is sub-divided into those 
requiring substantial internal modifications (refurbishments) and 
those which do not (changes of use), then three different processes of 
office development can be seen to operate simultaneously. Figure 7.3 
illustrates the annual variations in three different types of 
development in central Edinburgh over a twenty year period for the 
year that the permission was granted. A three year moving average has 
been used to smooth out the annual changes. 
It is immediately apparent that the three curves do not vary together 
and that each type of development has its own distinct history. Not 
surprisingly, in terms of their sheer magnitude, redevelopments (or 
new developments)can be seen to dominate the provision of new office 
space throughout the study period. From the period of growth in the 
early 1960s, there is a decline until about 1967 when the trend 
is 
reversed. Large additions are made until 1972 but after this time 
4. contd. 
tables are based on the data that was available and could be 
relied on to be reasonably accurate. These problems affect the 
description of the levels of office development in central 
Edinburgh, but not the key questions relating to the decisions 
made on proposals by the local planning authority. Dates given in 
tables refer to the year of application rather than the year of 
completion for which data would be extremely difficult to collect, 
especially for smaller developments. 
5. Their inclusion in tables often hides as much as it reveals. 
Therefore, where appropriate, tables and figures will be shown 
with and without these two developments. 
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there is decline until 1975. A levelling off of development at about 
4,000 sq. m per annum illustrates the low level of redevelopment 
occurring in the final years of the study period. 
Notable features are the wavelength of approximately five years for 
redevelopments and the size of the differences between peaks and 
6 
troughs shown by the graph . It is also noticeable that, towards the 
end of the study period, the drop in redevelopment is partially 
compensated by a major increase in the amount of refurbishment 
occurring. Indeed, in the last few years of the study period, 
refurbishments produced twice as much office space as redevelopment. 
Therefore, in addition to the general slowing down in the rate of 
development, we can note a discernible change in the form of 
development process towards the end of the study period. 
In general terms there are no obvious cycles in the graphs for changes 
of use. Rather, there is a slow growth in such activity until the 
late 1960s, followed by a slow, irregular decline until the end of the 
study period. At its peak in the late 1960s, this form of office 
development (which in practice is composed of a large number of small 
developments) was producing twice as much office space as 
redevelopment. In the midst of the irregular decline there is a minor 
peak at about 1973 when, in common with almost all types of land 
development, it was affected by the property boom. The decline from 
6. It should be noted that the two big developments, both occupied as 
government offices were initially permitted at times when the 
level of activity was low. This reflects the findings of Barras 
and Catalano (1975) and C. D. P. (1976) that in periods of little 
activity, developments for "safe" tenants become relatively more 
attractive. 
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this minor peak corresponds to declines in the other two forms of 
office development.. Only the refurbishment process shows a recovery 
before the end of the study period. 
Refused Development in Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
Over the same period (1959-1978) approximately 95,000 sq. m of office 
space, applied for through the formal planning system, was refused. 
This represents over a fifth of the total floor space applied for. 
Before analysing individual time intervals within the study period for 
refusals, it is desirable to describe the overall levels of demand 
(with regard to all the difficulties outlined above) through time for 
the three different types of development. Figure 7.4 indicates that 
pressures for changes of use did not peak until the boom period of 
1971-1974 although, owing to the much greater levels of refusal in the 
1970s, completed changes of use actually permitted, peaked in the late 
1960s. 
Figure 7.5 shows the existence of a 1971-1974 boom period very well 
2 
(72,000 m ). If the St. James Centre and Argyle House are omitted, 
then the boom periods of the early 1960s and early 1970s are readily 
distinguishable. 
Both Figure 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that the rate of refusals for 
developments rose dramatically in the 1970s, lasting through the boom 
period until the end of the study period. No major developments 
listed as refurbishments were refused by City of Edinburgh and, 
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therefore, their history remains that shown in Figure 7.3. Hence, we 
can note that many more office developments were being refused in the 
latter half of our study period than in the first half. The following 
sections attempt to view the position more closely for each time 
period as a prelude to examining the implementation of the office 
restraint policy in more detail. 
Office Development, 1959-1962 
It can be seen from Table 7.1, that the predominant form of office 
development in this first time period was redevelopment. For reasons 
already explained, refurbishments can be considered to have been 
negligible. 




Redevelopment 58,035 87.9 
Refurbishment -- 
Change of Use 6,481 9.8 
Other (large extensions) 1,478 2.2 
Total 65,994 99.9 
Table 7.1: Forms of Office Development: Central Edinburgh 1959-1962 
Figure 7.6 shows that these new developments were spread throughout 
the central area but with a concentration in'the St. Andrews Square 
area (11,520 sq. m or approximately 20% of all new development in the 
time period). There were some minor redevelopments in the West End, 
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developments to the south of the Princes Street-Shandwick Place axis. 
Figure 7.7 shows that changes of use in this first time period have a 
different spatial distribution to that of new developments with the 
West End being the main focus. Indeed, changes of use are the 
predominant form of development in that area, being more important 
than the redevelopment. In the other parts of the central area the 
general lack of activity is very noticeable, especially when 
contrasted with later time intervals. There is some activity at the 
west end of George Street, and some at the very northern edge of the 
central area with only one minor development in the whole of the South 
Side. 
With the preponderence of new office space being generated through new 
development, it is not surprising to find that the total development 
picture (Figure 7.8) resembles that for redevelopment (Figure 7.6). 
The total picture shows development pressures occurred at both the 
east and west ends of the First New Town and the West End, with 
outlying redevelopments in the South Side. Much of the development in 
St. Andrews Square, was due to the relocation of the administrative 
offices of insurance companies from Princes Street. The time period 
as a whole was quite active. Indeed, if Argyle House and the St. 
James' Centre are not considered, this period would have been the 
second most active four-year period in the entire study period. 
The rate of refusal in this time period was very low indeed (Table 
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the refusals were issued on changes of use. These figures do not 
infer laxity in controlling development by the local authority since 
the redevelopments were not then contrary to any formal policy and the 
emphasis at that time in the city was on growth and evolution. 
2 
Permitted Development 65,994m 
2 
Refused Development 3,552m 
2 
Total Demand 69,546m 
Per cent Floorspace Refused 5.1% 
Per cent Applications Refused 8.3% 
Per cent of Refused Space 
which was Change of Use 100% (n = 9) 
,, 
Per cent of Refused Space 
which was Redevelopment 0% 
Table 7.2: Control of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1959-1962 
Figure 7.9 indicates that the refusals were all related'to changes of 
use in residential areas. The area to the west of Palmerston Place 
and a few locations on the northern edge of the central area were 
protected from office development. This is consistent with the 
existing restraint policies of the time which were designed to protect 
residential areas from incursions by office developments and resist 
the loss of residential units in the central area. 
Office Development 1963-1966 
Table 7.3 demonstrates the extent to which the decision to build the 
massive Argyle House distorts the statistics for this period. Argyle 
House, located close to Tollcross (West Port) accounts for over 40% of 




finally completed. As such, it masks all other trends. If is taken 
into consideration without qualification then this time period reveals 
an overall growth in office development. However, if Argyle House is 
omitted one can identify a drop in the general amount of development, 
representing primarily a reduction in the level of redevelopment 
occuring. In contrast, changes of use, as a form of development, have 
7 
more than doubled . Refurbishments'are noticeable for the first time 
as a form of development. 
Type of Development Floorspace Percentage of Percentage 
Approved Floorspace minus 
(m2) Approved Argyle 
(X) House 
Redevelopment 53,709 75.5 61.1 
Refurbishment 1,131 1.6 2.5 
Change of use 15,718 22.0 35.0 
Other (large extensions) 598 0.8 1.3 
Total 71,156 99.9 99.9 
Table 7.3: Forms of Office Development: Central Edinburgh 1963-1966 
Figure 7.10, shows only two major redevelopments in the whole of the 
central area in this period of lower development activity. 
Importantly, both of these major developments are in the 
environmentally less valued South Side . Both are now occupied by 
7. This is in tune with the national picture which identifies this 
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government offices . This difference in the scale of redevelopment 
between the area to the north and to the south of Princes Street 
should be noted. Indeed, only one major development is seen in the 
First New Town, on Queen Street. Otherwise there is a low level of 
activity. 
Figure 7.11, contrasts markedly with that for redevelopments showing a 
general spread of changes of use throughout the whole of the West End 
and First New Town. The lack of redevelopments in the West End 
contrasts markedly with the very high level of change of use activity 
there in this period. The overall pattern shows that the pressures 
for development were succeeding in residential areas. Along the 
northern and western edges of the central area (comprised mainly of 
Georgian residential terraces), changes of use were being permitted. 
Interestingly, Charlotte Square, the historical centre for the small 
office in Edinburgh, remains untouched by development pressures. This 
was largely because the area was already dominated by offices and it 
was the adjacent areas which were put under pressure by lawyers, 
advocates, small service businesses and the like seeking 
accommodation. As in the previous period, the South Side did not 
experience much pressure for changes of use. 
Hence, when the total picture is considered (Figure 7.12), the pattern 
of development in this period was one of widespread change of use to 
the north of Princes Street and two major redevelopments to the south. 
8. Argyle House is now a major headquarters for the Department of 
Health and Social Security, the other (Melbourne House) is the 
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The spread of pressure for changes of use shows that the whole of the 
northern half of the central area was of interest to the small 
developer and businessman and that the area was capable of satisfying 
their demands for accommodation. 
(Minus Argyle House) 
2 
Permitted Development 71,156m 44,866 
2 
Refused Development 7,582m 7,582 
2 
Total Demand 78,738m 52,448 
Per cent Floorspace Refused 9.6% 14.5% 
Per cent Applications Refused 20.5% 
Per cent of Space Refused which 
was Change of Use 48 (n = 13) 
Per cent Space Refused which was 
Redevelopment 52 (n = 2) 
Table 7.4: Control of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1963-1966 
Table 7.4 shows that the rise in the level of change of use 
development was only resisted, to a limited extent by the local 
planning authority. In absolute terms the amount of floorspace 
refused was very similar to the previous time period but in percentage 
terms (with the lower rate of development), the level of overall 
floorspace refused has risen. Some of this was owing to the refusal 
of two new developments 
4rwhen 
taken together, almost equalled 
the total amount of space in the thirteen refused changes of use. 
Figure 7.13 shows the distribution of the refusals. Very little 
restraint is exercised to the east of Palmerston Place (see Figure 
299 
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6.1) where, as Figure 7.11 has already established, the pressures for 
developments were quite high. However, the defence of the residential 
area to the west of the Palmerston Place axis is shown to have 
continued. Very little restraint was exercised in the Moray Place 
area, whereas there was a low level of restraint along the northern 
edge of the central area. Occasional refusals can be seen to the 
south of Princes Street, though all are small. Indeed, the only major 
refusal lies at the east end of George Street. The general pattern 
was, therefore, still one of a low level of restraint on development 
to protect residential areas from change of use to offices. 
Office Development 1967-1970 
The statistics for this period are, like the previous period, 
distorted by the existence of one major redevelopment. The St. James' 
9 
Centre forms the single largest office block in central Edinburgh 
representing nearly nine percent of all office space developed in the 
entire twenty year period under study. 
It is impossible to say what the impact of such a development was on 
general office development in central Edinburgh since, as Chapter 6 
noted, it was catering for an expansion of government activity. The 
most likely effect was to depress the market slightly, since a 
potential major office user of was taken off the "demand" side of the 
10 
equation 
9. See Chapter 6 for a brief history of this controversial development 
10. This is most certainly true for the retail element of this major 
development, leading to an oversupply of retail space and some 
shopping areas became quite delapidated (e. g. South Bridge). 
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Bearing in mind the effect of the St. James' Centre, the statistics in 
Table 7.5 still reveal an underlying trend of a decreasing amount of 
redevelopment being permitted. Whilst, in keeping with the trends in 
development until this time, developments retaining existing built 
structures became more important in both absolute and relative terms. 
Indeed, if the St. James' Centre is omitted from consideration then 
"change of use" was the single most important form of development in 
central Edinburgh in this period, doubling in importance for the 
second consecutive time period. Refurbishments can also be seen to 
have become relatively important, representing fourteen percent of 
total development. 
Type of Development Floorspace Percentage of Percentage 
Approved Floorspace minus (St. 
(m2) Approved James' 
(%) Centre) 
Redevelopment 51,189 58.4 36.1 
Refurbishment 8,219 9.4 14.4 
Changes of Use 27,864 31.8 48.8 
Other (large 352 " 0.4 0.6 
extensions) 
Total 87,624 100 99.9 
Table 7.5: Forms of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1967-1970 
The distribution of redevelopments in this period is shown in Figure 
7.14. As can be seen, there was a clearly defined focus for the 
limited amount of activity that did occur. The most developed area 
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obliterated by the new developments. Adjacent to it, in St. Andrew's 
Square and in the area between Queen Street and George Street (Thistle 
Street), there was some activity. There was virtually no development 
activity other than this, with the exception of two small 
redevelopments. 
Figure 7.15 again reveals the lack of interest shown by developers for 
changes of use in the South Side and the general interest shown by 
them in the area north of Princes Street. The general level of 
development is higher than that shown in the previous time period, 
with the most outstanding focus of development being along Palmerston 
Place in the West End. There was over 15,000 sq. m. of refurbishments 
and changes of use developed in the West End. This represents over 
half the total change of use for the whole twenty year period under 
study. Much of this was from residential property. Extensive change 
of use development also continued along the northern boundary of the 
central area. This was especially the case in Abercrombie Place which 
is close to the large offices of St. Andrew's Square. Charlotte 
Square is again unaffected by this increased level of activity. 
The general impression in this time period is one of a "wave" of 
pressure for development moving out from Charlotte Square during this 
and the previous time period. This indicates that developers were 
having to settle for sites further and further away from the prime 
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Figure 7.16, indicates that, in general terms in this period of steady 
growth, there was a general spread of development activity throughout 
the northern half of the central area. In absolute terms, the massive 
new developments at the eastern end of Princes Street and George 
Street, are revealed as the major focus for growth, but the really 
remarkable feature is the continued growth of development activity 
retaining existing buildings. 
Chapter 6 has described this period as one in which debates about the 
effects of new development on central Edinburgh were reaching a peak. 
However, Table. 7.6, shows that no single redevelopment project was 
ultimately refused in this period. The overall rate of refusal is 
very low, representing only 3% of the total floorspace applied for. 
Over 27,000 sq. m of property were converted by change of use to 
offices in this period whilst only 2,000 sq. m were refused. 
(minus St. James' Centre) 
22 
Permitted Development 87624m 57,059m 
22 
Refused Development 1,998m 1,998m 
22 
Total Demand 89,622m 59,057m 
Per cent Area Refused 2.2% 3.4% 
Per cent Applications Refused 10.4% 10.5% 
Per cent of Space Refused 
that was Change of Use 100% (n=8) 
Per cent of Refused that 
was Redevelopment 0% 
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This evidence indicates that the local planning authority was still 
only responding in a limited way to the mounting public pressures to 
curb office development in the late 1960s. Figure 7.17 shows the very 
low level of refusal is almost entirely focussed on the peripheral 
residential areas. The main emphasis of restraint was therefore still 
to protect residential areas from office development. Yet, even in 
areas to the west of Palmerston Place, refusals were limited. 
Office Development 1971-1974 
This time period was shown in Chapter 5 to have been a boom period for 
property development in Britain when money was made available to 
developers to press ahead with development projects. Table 7.7 
suggests (and Chapter 9 demonstrates) that in Edinburgh it was 
probably the large developers that took most advantage of the 
improved credit facilities since, in absolute terms, redevelopments 
doubled their importance from the previous period (if the St. James' 
Centre is omitted from consideration). In overall terms, this period 
is the busiest in the entire study period for non-comissioned 
redevelopments. 




Redevelopment 49,562 61.9 
Refurbishment 11,518 14.4 
Change of Use 19,024 23.7 
Other (large extensions) -- 
Total 80,104 100 
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Refurbishment continued to be important although, because of the 
general rise in development activity, its percentage of the overall 
total remained exactly the same as that for the previous period 
(14.4%). 
Possible reasons for the decrease in the overall amount of changes of 
use are that: 
(a) the demand for such offices had generally been 
" "soaked up" through the increased levels of such 
development in the early period; 
(b) the new developments were providing modern office 
space for let; 
(c) the increased activity in the land and development 
markets had pushed up the price of the land 
dramatically, meaning that the small developer was 
less able to buy property with office potential(11); 
(d) the local planning authority was beginning to halt 
such development in line with their policy to 
protect the level of residential properties in the 
central area(12). 
A combination of (a) and (c) is most likely since there is only 
limited evidence to suggest either (b) or (d). 
Although there has been an upsurge in new development in this period, 
Figure 7.18 reveals that such activity was not concentrated, as 
before, in the First New Town. Major developments were experienced in 
the South Side , the Haymarket area and at the eastern end of 
Princes 
Street. Within the First New Town itself there were only a few, very 
small, new developments. It should be also noted that the greater 
11. See Chapter 9. 
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financial support for developers in this period appears to have led to 
a resurgence of interest in developing more peripheral areas like 
those in the South Side (i. e. more speculative ventures). 
Figure 7.19 shows that, for changes of use, this highly active period 
in fact represents a "retrenchment", in spatial terms. The overall 
rate of this type of development was lower than the previous period 
but, in conjunction with this, the more central areas experienced a 
far higher proportion of the activity. (For example, there is little 
pressure to the west of Palmerston Place in the West End, whereas in 
1967 to 1970 this was a major focus). The major areas in this period 
were in close proximity to the existing foci of office activity (St. 
Andrews' Square, Charlotte Square and George Street which connects 
them). As Chapter 9 reveals, changes of use in this time period were 
very much influenced by speculative developers from outside Edinburgh. 
Such developers were mainly interested in prime properties. This 
would help to explain the retrenchment to more central areas. It also 
represents a change in the type of developers performing changes of 
use, namely that the local businesses developing residential 
properties in the late 1960s for their own use, were generally 
replaced in this time period by outside speculative developers. 
Because of the very different spatial distributions for new 
development and changes of use, the map of total development shows a 
spread of developments (Figure 7.20). St. Andrews' Square, the prime 
focus of office activity had virtually been developed before this 
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(although one proposal was refused). Otherwise, the pattern remains 
as before with a general spread of changes of use (mainly) in the 
northern half of the central area, with new developments in parts of 
the southern half of the central area. 
Table 7.8 indicates the greater pressure which was placed on the local 
planning authority to release sites for office development in this 
boom period. As can be seen, the demand for the right to develop 
offices in central Edinburgh ran at over 30,000sq. m of office space 
per annum (equivalent to one St. James' Centre every year). However, 
as Chapter 6 illustrated, this was also the period when the public 
pressure to resist development was particularly vocal, when concern 
for Edinburgh's architectural heritage was at its peak, and when the 
local planning authority's transportation plan was generating public 
fury. 
2 
Permitted Development 80,104m 
2 
Refused Development 41,964m 
2 
Total Demand 122,068m 
Per cent Area Refused 34.9% 
Per cent Application Refused 32.1% 
Per cent Space Refused that was 
Change of Use 43.8% (n=25) 
Per cent Space Refused that was 
Redevelopment 56.0% (n=8) 
Per cent Area Space Refused that 
was Refurbishment 0% 
Other (extensions) 0.2% 
Table 7.8: Control of Office Development, Central Edinburgh, 1971-1974 
Table 7.8, shows that 35% of all the floorspace applied for was 
315 
refused. The rate of refusal can therefore be seen to have risen 
dramatically from the low level of the late 1960s. (In fact, 16 times 
the rate of refusal for the previous time period). This jump in the 
rate of refusal had two main sources. Firstly, it would appear that 
public opinion against office development, and local authority 
hesitation over (and the likely failure of) the transportation 
proposals, was forcing the local authority to refuse more 
developments, even before the policy was formally introduced in 1973. 
Secondly, there was also a much higher level of speculative 
development occurring resulting in higher levels of development 
pressures being expressed through the formal planning process than in 
previous periods. Applicants with relatively secure access to finance 
were looking for sites and placing speculative applications before the 
local planning authority to test their reaction. This situation is 
markedly different to that where applicants with a definite plan for 
the long-term use of a site, feel some local responsibility as far as 
architecture is concerned (see Chapters 6 and 9) and negotiate with 
the local planning authority to establish a mutually agreeable 
proposal. Thirdly, there was a minority Labour administration in 
power between 1972 and 1974 which may have been less sympathetic to 
developers proposals. 
Figure 7.21 shows that the main area where pressure was resisted was 
around St. Andrews' Square and at the southern end of Leith Walk, 
where over 14,000 sq. m was refused in one grid square (representing a 
third of the total floorspace refused in this period). Streets 
running between Princes Street and Queen Street (Hanover Street, 
314 
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Frederick Street) and the eastern end of George Street, all saw major 
developments refused in this period. The West End and other, 
predominantly housing areas, saw many smaller changes of use refused. 
Major development proposals in the South Side and at eastern edge of 
the central area (Abbeymount) were also refused. It is noticeable 
that, again, no refurbishments were ultimately refused. 
Office Development 1975-1978 
This time period saw a general collapse in the national property 
market. However, Table 7.9 shows that this was only partly reflected 
in Edinburgh. The overall amount of development in this period was 
13 
half that of the previous period 
Floorspace Percentage of 
Type of Development Approved Floorspace 
(m2) Approved 
(X) 
Redevelopment 12,457 26.1 
Refurbishment 25,712 53.0 
Change of Use 9,636 20.2 
Other (large extensions) - 
Total 47,805 100 
Table 7.9: Forms of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1975-1978 
The reduction is readily visible in the redevelopment form of 
development which, between 1975-1978, was only a quarter of the amount 
13. Only a very small part of this was due to permissions being 
issued late in the period and not being completed, as completions 
since 1978 checked in 1980. 
317 
experienced in the previous period. Changes of use returned to the low 
levels of the early 1960s and it was only the refurbishment form of 
development that increased in absolute terms. Therefore, not only was 
there a palpable decline in the rate of development activity in this 
period, but the type of development being undertaken changed 
dramatically. This growth in refurbishment was very much in line with 
the aims of office restraint policy described in the previous chapter. 
Figure 7.22 shows the distribution of refurbishments in this last 
period. As can be seen, all the refurbishments took place either in 
the First New Town or selected parts of the West End. However, the 
most noticeable feature is that the refurbishments occurred mainly in 
those parts of the First New Town where properties were sufficiently 
large to accommodate wholesale internal restructuring, could attract 
reliable tenants and were prime sites capable of leading to rents at 
a sufficiently high level to guarantee a satisfactory return for 
Iu 
refurbishment. Less suitably located orb prime properties cannot 
facilitate such a return. Hence, it is the larger properties of 
George Street and the southern halves of Castle Street, Hanover Street 
and Frederick Street, running south to Princes Street, that proved 
most attractive for this type of development. Much of this 
development was related to an increased interest in the Scottish 
economy from English and foreign banks (also see Chapter 9) at a time 
when the establishment of a Scottish Assembly and the potential of 
North Sea Oil were keeping the office market alive. 
The low level of new development activity is revealed by Figure 7.23. 
318 
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Only four, minor, new developments took place in the whole of the 
central area. All of these developments would appear contrary to the 
policy of the local planning authority to try and halt new development 
in the central area. It should also be noted that, in this less 
active period, the South Side again appeared to be unattractive to 
developers looking to develop new premises. 
Figure 7.24 shows a continuation of the retrenchment for changes of 
use seen in the previous period. Again, the area around Charlotte 
Square experienced the most changes of use to properties. As with 
refurbishment, the western end of George Street was the area 
experiencing most development, with some further development taking 
place around St. Andrews' Square. Unusually, there were three changes 
of use to offices in the South Side . None of these were commercial 
offices but were connected with the provision of public services in 
the area. The total picture reveals a very marked concentration of 
activity in the First New Town, with the western end of George Street 
proving the primary focus of office development (Figure 7.25). 
Although this period represented a significant drop in development 
activity, this was far greater than the drop in development pressure. 
Table 7.10 reveals that the already high refusal rate experienced in 
the boom period of 1971 to 1974 rose to an even higher rate in this 
period. Nearly half of all the floorspace applied for 
(and the 
applications submitted) in this last period was refused planning 
permission. In total six major redevelopments were refused. This 
is 
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development property was not very easy to obtain after the property 
crash. It indicates that, the possibilities for development in central 
Edinburgh did remain much longer than was generally experienced in the 
rest of the U. K. These late pressures were resisted very strongly by 
the local planning authority. 
2 
Permitted Development 47,805m 
2 
Refused Development 39,538m 
2 
Total Demand 87,343m 
Per cent Area Refused 45.2% 
Per cent Applications Refused 43.4% 
Per cent of Space Refused that was 
Change of Use 31.8% (n = 35) 
Per cent of Space Refused that was 
Redevelopment 67.4% (n = 6) 
Per cent of Space Refused that was 
Refurbishment 0% 
Other 0.8% 
Table 7.10: Control of Office Development, Central Edinburgh 1975-1978 
Figure 7.26 shows that all the major redevelopments that were refused 
were located in the South Side . This represents the first major 
instance of the South Side being protected from office development. 
However, it must be noted that the major refusal, on the High Street, 
related to a very prestigious site on Edinburgh's most historic 
thoroughfare. The others were at crucial traffic junctions on the 
periphery of the city centre. 
To the north of the Princes Street/Shandwick Place axis, there is a 
324 
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general spread of refusals. The West End, experienced a high level of 
restraint throughout its area. This could reflect the office 
restraint policy and the housing ,. protection policies operating 
together (see the following chapter). 
Conclusion 
Given our interest in the impact of the office restraint policy, it is 
important to look at the period surrounding its adoption in greater 
detail. Figure 7.27 shows the level of permissions from 1968 to 1978 
'in the central area. There was a marked decrease in the level of 
consents from the time that the office restraint policy was adopted. 
this is particularly significant for 1973 when the property boom was 
reaching its zenith. The rapid decline in appro. v*ts, in 1974 and 1975 
is a combination of dropping demand and increased rates of refusals. 
The most significant feature of the period after the office restraint 
policy was adopted was the "mini-boom" of 1976 to 1977. As will be 
seen in Chapter 9, this was a period when both banks and other forms 
of office developer were interested in developing sites in central 
Edinburgh in connection with the possible economic spin-offs from 
North Sea oil and, to a more limited extent, the prospect of a 
Scottish Assembly with limited legislative powers. By 1978, the 
levels of permissions were again very low. 
The evidence from Figure 7.27 suggests that the office restraint 
policy was strictly implemented when first adopted in 1973. However, 
it could be suggested that the possibilities for increasing the city's 
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banks was too great for the local politicians. This hypothesis is 
tested further in Chapter 9. 
The chapter has provided a basic description of what office 
development has occurred in central Edinburgh between 1958 and 1978 
and what development pressures, formally expressed through the land- 
14 
use planning system, have been refused . It appears that different 
types of commercial property development have different spatial and 
historical distributions in central Edinburgh. Generally, one sees 
large scale, new development taking place in run-down South Side 
areas, mainly for government or other owner-occupiers (see Chapter 9), 
and a mixture of redevelopment and development within built structures 
in the First New Town, often being developed speculatively. The three 
types of development have markedly different histories, with 
refurbishments becoming increasingly important through time. The 
overall rate of development does tend to parallel national trends 
(albeit with local variations and idiosyncracies such as those 
relating to the form of development). A comparison of office 
development in Edinburgh to that in Manchester, Bristol and London is 
given in Appendix 7. 
14. It is difficult to gauge how much pressure is "put off" by 
existing policies in an area. In the early part of the study 
period there were no restraints and therefore, subject to 
negotiations, most pressures probably entered the formal 
planning system. In the later period, as the office restraint 
policy became known, it is possible that some pressure was 
deterred from entering the planning system. (This is discussed in 
Chapter 10). In recent years, Edinburgh has obtained the 
reputation of being a tough authority, and is, in fact, now 
worried that too many possible development opportunities are being 
lost. (See Appendix 8- Post Script). This is of interest 
because this would suggest that the refusal rate would have been 
lowered in later years. Hence, the increase in the rate of 
refusal is of more significance. 
328 
The key empirical problem for this thesis to try and resolve is the 
extent to which these spatial and historical patterns are related to 
the implementation of the local authority's office restraint policy. 
There are certainly features of the patterns, like the growth in the 
importance of refurbishments and the overall rise in the rate of 
refusals in the latter part of the study period, which suggest that 
the restraint policy has been implemented. Given that the office boom 
was over, that a policy was in existence to deter speculative 
applications and, for a time at least, there was a Labour 
administration, one might imagine that the level of speculative 
developments would have fallen and acted against the rise in the rates 
of refusal. This makes the growth in the rate of refusal even more 
spectacular. 
On the other hand, there is already evidence to suggest that aspects 
of the restraint policies (such as the protection of residential units 
from change of use to offices) have not been rigorously implemented by 
the local authority. The following two chapters examine this 
phenomenon more closely to see if it was related to applications by 
particular types of developers (e. g. foreign banks), and Chapter 10 
attempts to identify whether there were inherent tendencies in the 




The Implementation of Office Policy: Central Edinburgh 1959-1978 
Introduction 
The previous chapter indicated that there were marked changes in the 
form and level of office development going ahead in central Edinburgh 
in the period after the office restraint policy was adopted by the 
local authority. However, with only the data on the size of the 
developments that were permitted and refused, we are unable to say 
whether the changes observed were related to the actual implementation 
of the office restraint policy or whether the reasons for refusing the 
developments, related to the policy or to the nature of the proposals 
coming forward. This chapter concentrates specifically on the 
decisions made by the local planning authority on proposals for office 
development over the full study period. It examines the reasons cited 
for refusals and it establishes how the office restraint policy was 
used in conjunction with conservation and transport policies in the 
control of office development. Finally, this chapter addresses the 
question of whether the office restraint policy was implemented 
consistently or in a rather ad hoc manner as suggested by information 
presented in Chapter 7. 
The basic source of information for this chapter is the decisions made 
1 
by the local planning authority . In order to get an impression of 
1. It is immediately acknowledged that there are problems of 
interpretation here. Principal problems include the inability to 
make inferences about the decision-making process from analysing 
the decision itself. In this case the negotiation and bargaining 
which surrounds commercial development and policy implementation 
is omitted from consideration. Hence, this "black box" needs 
further examination. The necessary interpretation is provided in 
Chapter 10 after the information on decision-making has been fully 
presented. 
330 
the changing attitude of the local authority towards office 
development this data has been analysed for the full study period. 
Because of inherent problems in interpreting data on decisions, the 
statistical analysis has been kept relatively simple. The first task 
2 
is to assess the general implementation of policies . 
General View on the Implementation of Office Restraints, Central 
Edinburgh 1959-1978 
It is extremely difficult to determine, on the basis of an issued 
planning decision whether the approval of a planning application for 
office development was, or was not, contrary to policy. If one looked 
uncritically at the " decisions, viewed the office restraint policy 
as a moratorium on office development in the city centre and saw 
Development Plan zones as firm indicators of the types of development 
permissible in an area with others being distinctly contrary to 
policy, then one could view almost 75 per cent of the approved office 
applications in central Edinburgh to be contrary to one or more 
planning policies (see Table 8.1). 
However, with the exception of the easily identifiable policy which 
attempts to restrain the change of dwelling houses to office use, none 
of the above policy stances could be considered to be "rigid". 
Although it is unquestionable that the clearly defined "retention of 
2. The reader should bear in mind that this chapter uses the fullest 
data set on decisions. This relates to 397 cases rather than the 





(a) office restraint policy only 114 
(b) office restraint policy and Development Plan zone 15 
(c) office restraint policy and residential policy 17 
(d) Development Plan zone only 18 
(e) Development Plan zone and residential policy 30 
(f) Residential policy only 102 
(g) all three policies 7 
293* 
Table 8.1: Apparent Contradictions to Policy, 1959-1978 
* total number of approved developments = 397 
housing" policy, introduced in the first Development Plan (1957) has. 
been consistently and regularly breached by developers, more rigorous 
analysis is required for the other types of restraint policy. For 
example, in terms of Development Plan zones, over sixty permissions 
were given for office development outside the general business and 
commercial zonesih Wý%i, office development was preferred to locate. 
However, this should not automatically be seen as a weakness in 
policy, given that all planning applications must be treated on their 
merits and that many city centre activities (like the local authority 
and University) require small office premises outside established 
office areas. These desires would have to be accommodated in some 
way. 
(a) The Loss of Residential Units Through Office Development 
Despite the existence of a policy established to resist the loss of 
residential units through office development, there appear to have 
been over 150 occasions over the 20 year-period when residential 
532 
properties were permitted by the local authority to change to 
3 
offices . Since the retention of housing was used as a reason for 
refusing office permissions throughout the study period, it would 
appear that its implementation as a policy has not been consistent. 
The chance of succeeding with such an application even after the 
introduction of the office restraint policy was still one in three, 
with seventeen residential properties being lost after the 
supplementary restraints were imposed. In defence of the local 
authority, closer examination does reveal that over half of these 
particular approvals were for extensions of existing office premises 
into neighbouring residential units. However, the remaining approvals 
still indicate a level of inconsistency occurring in policy 
implementation. 
Table 8.2 shows the importance of the conversion of residential 
property as one form of change of use in central Edinburgh. As can be 
seen, well over half of the office space produced by change of use 
through the twenty year study period was through the conversion of 
houses. It also suggests that the attitude of the local authority to 
this form of land-use change has altered consistently towards greater 
restraint, resulting in its steadily decreasing importance to this 
form of development. 
3. "Residential properties" include redevelopments on residential 
blocks and the large number of residential units within them. 
Therefore the total'of 156 approvals contrary to the 'retention 
of housing' policy, grossly underestimates the actual number of 
units lost. 
333 
Time Residential to Total Change ( %) 
Period Office Use (m) of Use x 100 



















Table 8.2: Pro ortion of Total Chan S 
78738 59 
of Use Represented by Provert 
which was Previously Residential, 1959-1978 
In terms of the full range of types of development, Table 8.3 shows 






























Table 8.3: Land Use Change to Offices, Central Edinburgh 1959-1978 
(all forms of development) 
* with mixed uses discounted. 
** material changes have occurred even though the past use was offices 
Problems with the data mean that past land use (and therefore land- 




Hence the loss of residential space recorded in Table 8.3 
5 
is only a fraction of the actual residential space lost 
Despite the difficulties of the data, the importance of residential 
and old office stock to the production of new office space is readily 
visible. Other major land use changes are from shops and schools (e. g. 
Mary Erskines, Melville College) to offices. 
Table 8.4 shows that an application for office development was almost 
always more likely to be refused in a residential zone than in a 
Time Residential Commercial General Total 
Period ' Business 
1959-62 . 35 
1963-66 . 38 
1967-70 . 24 
1971-74 . 50 
1975-78 . 69 
. 14 . 05 
. 50 . 07 
. 00 . 04 
. 22 . 17 






1959-1978 . 42 . 23 . 13 . 25 
Table 8.4: Probability of an Application being Refused, by Development 
Zone and Data Group, Central Edinburgh, 1959 to 1978 
4. This is because it is impossible to calculate past land use 
componentt of redevelopments. Without access to. case study 
files, accurate records are not available and estimation 
using valuation rolls is impossible since redevelopments, by 
definition, bear no resemblance to past built structures which 
form the basis for such estimations. 
5. This can be appreciated more fully when one realises that in the 
case of the St. James' Centre alone, over 312 dwellings and 120 
small shops were demolished. Haug (1976). 
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commercial or general business zone. By the end of the study period 
the resolve to protect residential areas within the central area had 
strengthened considerably with nearly seventy per cent of applications 
being turned down. 
Not surprisingly, the two other zonings that attracted office 
developments were generally less favoured in commercial than general 
business zones. The chance of an approval in either of these more 
usual zones for office development has also decreased over the period 
under study. These general trends towards higher rates of refusal in 
all land use zonings indicate a general change in policy stance when 
the office restraint policy came into being in 1973. 
Type of Zoning Approved Refused Total Expected 
(0) Applica- Refusal(E) (0-E)2 
tions E 
Residential 61 51 112 29 16.69 
Commercial 43 20 63 16 1.00 
General Business 280 56 336 86 10.47 
Industrial 86 14 4 1.00 
Other 53820.50 
397 136 533 111 29.66 
the probability of refusal was 0.255 
v =(5-1) =4 
Tabulated Chi-Squared Value at the 95% level of confidence = 9.49 
Calculated Chi-Squared Value = 29.66 
Ho: - there is no significant difference 
OE 0cc .. 
ýQvGýoPýntný b'1 ý. c, ( <<aýHýht #4? 
t ofitj in 
different plan zones, "ý J 
Ho is rejected at the 95% level of confidence. 
Table 8.5: Chi-Squared Test: Differential Responses to Office 
Developments in Different Plan Zones, Central Edinburgh, 
1959-1976 
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Table 8.5, contains the results obtained by applying a simple chi- 
squared test to the data on approvals and refusals and indicates that 
office developments did receive significantly different treatment by 
the local planning authority in different Development Plan zones. The 
major feature of Table 8.5 is the contribution of the 'greater than 
expected' number of refusals in the residential land use zones to the 
final chi-squared total. This reflects a distinctly greater emphasis 
on restricting office development in residential zones than in other 
zones. 
(b) The Implementation of the Office Restraint Policy 
In the first monitoring statement issued by the City of Edinburgh 
District Council (1977), it was noted that, in total, more office 
space had been given permission in the three and a half years after 
the office restraint policy had been introduced, than in a similar 
period before it. This simple analysis of stocks of permissions 
neglects the fact that many deve-i-r`r1 " would have been in negotiation 
in the boom period before the policy came into operation, resulting in 
fairly unproblematic applications that were implemented after the 
policy was adopted. However, the District Councils figures do 
indicate that the office restraint policy was not consistently or 
strictly applied after its adoption. 
Table 8.6 affords a longer term view of the impact of the- office 
restraint policy. It helps to answer the question whether levels of 
refusal were significantly different for different time intervals 
within the overall study period. The analysis is again crude but 
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Date Approved Refused Total Expected (0-E) 
(0) Applications Refusal (E) E 
1959-62 53 12 65 17 1.47 
1963-66 81 20 101 26 1.38 
1967-70 86 12 98 25 6.76 
1971-74 102 38 140 36 0.11 
1975-78 75 54 129 33 13.36 
397 136 533 23.08 
the probability of refusal = 0.255 
v= (5 - 1) =4 
Calculated Chi-squared Value = 23.08 
Tabulated Chi-squared Value at the 95% level of confidence 9.49 
Ho : there is no difference between the treatment of office developments 
by the local planning authority in different time periods within 
the study period. 
Ho is rejected at the 95% level. 
Table 8.6: Chi-Squared Test: Differential Response to Office Develop- 
ment in Different Date Periods, Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
appears to show that the local authority attitude to office 
development in general was significantly different at different times, 
and the major contributory factors to this finding was the laxity with 
which developments were treated in the period 1967 to 1970 and, more 
importantly, the greater than expected rate of refusal in the last 
time period, when the office restraint policy was in operation. 
Both Tables 8.5 and 8.6 are relatively crude in that they bundle 
together all the various types of application (e. g. changes of use and 
redevelopments) before performing an analysis. However, in terms of a 
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differential response to the various types of office development in 
different periods, the calculated chi-squared values were 24.85 and 
Q, j 6 
9.80 for changes of use t redevelopments respectively . Remembering 
that the tabulated value at the 95% confidence level with four degrees 
of freedom is 9.48, this means that significantly different responses 
were given by the same local authority at different times to both 
changes of use and redevelopment. Nearly two thirds of the chi-squared 
score for changes of use arose from the more than expected refusals in 
the period after the introduction of the office restraint policy. 
In terms of the actual developments permitted, Table 8.7 indicates 
that redevelopments were substantially smaller after the introduction 
of the office restraint policy than before it, even when Argyle House 
and St. James' Centre are removed from the data set. This suggests 
that the office restraint policy not only resulted in less development 
generally, it also began to alter the size (and type) of development. 
Table 8.7 reveals a halving in the size of permitted redevelopments 
after the office restraint policy was adopted. 
Redevelopments Number Mean Standard 
(n) (x) Deviation (6') 
Before the introduction of 43 4016* 2875* 
the O. R. P. 
After the introduction of 10 2766 2195 
the O. R. P. 
Table 8.7: Size of Redevelopments Before and After the Introduction 
of the Office Restraint Policy 
*Without Argyle House and St. James' Centre. 
6. A Chi-Squared test cannot be used on refurbishments since the 
probability of a refusal was zero and therefore all the expected 
values would automatically be zero. 
339 
With respect to whether different types of development received 
different responses from the local authority, Table 8.8 shows that 
there was a very much lower rate of refusal for refurbishments than 
might have been expected. Indeed, the "less than expected" rate of 
refusals for refurbishments comprising over 80% of the calculated chi- 
squared value. 
Type of Number Number Total Expected 
Development Approved Refused Applica- (E) (0-E)2 
(0) tions E 
Change of Use 268 105 373 95 1.05 
Refurbishment 54 0 54 14 14.00 
Redevelopments 66 26 92 23 0.39 
Other 95 14 4 0.25 
Total 397 136 533 
the probability of a refusal = 0.255 
v= (4-1) =3 
Calculated Chi-Squared Value = 15.69 
15.69 
Tabulated Chi-Squared Value at the 95% level of confidence = 7.81 
Ho: that there is no difference between the treatment of types of 
development by the local authority. 
Ho is rejected at the 95.0% level. 
Table 8.8: Chi-Squared Test: Differential Response to Different Types 
of Office Development, Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
Therefore, in terms of achieving the aims of the office restraint 
policy it certainly appears as if an increased level of restraint was 
applied in the period 1975 to 1978. This lowered the overall level of 
office development and contributed markedly to changing the form of 
development to one which aided parallel policy objectives of 
rehabilitating, retaining and renovating (at least the facades of) 
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valued buildings. Without access to files, it is impossible to gauge 
how many of the developments represented extensions of less than 10% 
of the existing space and were therefore permitted through this 
exemption clause in the policy. 
The two final aims of the office restraint policy were to eliminate 
harmful speculative development by imposing a condition that the 
applicant show an 'overriding need' to be in the central area, and to 
attract development to outer area locations. Two sets of data might 
assist us in examining the former, namely, information on the amount 
of vacant space in the central area throughout the last time interval, 
and secondly, knowledge of the reasons for which certain developers 
developed particular sites. 
The presence of vacant space will at least give some indication of 
whether speculative development was continuing to provide office space 
for which there was no overriding need and which was therefore 
contrary to stated policy. Table 8.9 shows that the amount of such 
space grew substantially throughout the last years of our study period 
Date Central Area 








Table 8.9: Vacant Office Space, Immediately Available, Central 
Edinburgh 1975 to 1981 
Source: Strutt and Parker Office Surveys (various years). 
341 
(and beyond). From reading accompanying literature from the estate 
agenttit is possible to say that the majority of this vacant space was 
generated through the completion of developments rather than offices 
being vacated. 
This vacancy rate is not exceptional since it only represents between 
four and five percent of stock in the city at the time. However, by 
definition it does suggest that some speculative building was possibly 
occurring for which the developers would be unable to demonstrate an 
overriding need. 
Table 8.10 provides information on the "purpose" for which develop- 
7 
ments were undertaken in different time periods . It shows clearly 
that development for future owner-occupation dropped steadily through- 
out the study period, with a parallel growth in leasing and, for the 
boom period at least, the selling . of office property. 
(This point 
receives further attention in Chapter 9, especially Table 9.6). 
Time Period Owner Occupation Leasehold Sale Total 
1959-1962 83.9 13.7 2.4 100 
1963-1966 76.4 16.4 7.2 100 
1967-1970 55.2 33.7 11.0 100 
1971-1974 26.3 51.8 21.9 100 
1975-1978 30.4 65.5 4.3 100 
Table 8.10: Purpose of Development, Central Edinburgh 1959-1978, All 
Applicants (floorspace) 
7. This uses data on who was developing and why, which forms the 
basis for the following chapter. The source and problems with this 
data are discussed in that chapter. 
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In the final time period, nearly two thirds of the completed 
development was for leasehold. It is therefore unlikely that more 
than a small minority of applicants in the last period were able to 
demonstrate to the local planning authority that they had an 
overriding need to be in the central area. Given the timescale 
involved in constructing new office space, it is also unlikely that 
they could demonstrate that they had tenants ready and willing to 
move into completed properties. These figures suggest that at least 
this aspect of the office restraint policy was not strictly 
implemented by the local authority. 
Summarising the implementation of the policy as a whole, the City of 
Edinburgh (1977) noted: 
"The aims of the Central Area Policy of Restraint 
have been only partially achieved, more by the 
introduction of extensive parking controls and 
other transportation measures, rather than by 
restricting the growth of office development as 
such. However, the Policy has aided the main- 
tenance of a number of listed buildings and has 
reduced the loss of residential property in the 
central area" (p. 8). 
Our results support this wholeheartedly with respect to its reference 
to office properties and valued buildings. The following section 
assesses how successful the policy was in terms of decanting 
speculative office development to the peripheral locations designated 
in the office restraint policy and the Structure Plan. 
Office Developments Outside the City Centre 
An explicit recommendation attached to the office restraint policy was 
that office development should be encouraged in certain locations 
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outside the central area. The locations promoted by the local 
authority were at South Gyle, Nether-Liberton and Leith. Figure 8.1 
shows the areas where pressures for development outside the central 
area have been felt. The map is primarily concerned with developments 
on the periphery of the central areas, since there are very few 
outside this area (including those areas prescribed by the local 
authority). In an attempt to illustrate "pressure" for development, 
refusals have also been plotted alongside developments actually 
carried out and other proposals which have obtained planning 
permission. In addition, the sites where financial institutions or 
similar landed interests have established proprietary interests have 
also been mapped, so that locations with a possibility of development 
in the near future can also be shown. 
Figure 8.1 shows that by far the most pressured or developed areas are 
where important feeder roads reet the central area, giving rise to 
clusters of developments at these points. A large number can be seen 
at the north eastern edge of the central area (Leith Walk, London Road 
area). This particular cluster represents "pressure" in the early 
1970s. Most of these permissions have since been taken up by 
developers and offices built. Historically this is an area of lower 
middle- and working-class housing. As far as office development is 
concerned, it is ideally located with respect to the expansion of 
offices in the area around St. Andrews Square and the St. James' 
Centre, especially given the strictures on office development in the 
city centre itself. This area proved to be highly attractive to 






Figure 8.1: Office Consents Outside Central Edinburgh, 
1970 to 1978 
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more difficult. In August 1980, however, three of the five major 
developments in this area were still standing empty and one of the 
occupied buildings represented a decentralisation of ancillary workers 
for an insurance company from an expensive city centre property. 
A cluster of developments and permissions can also be seen in the 
Canonmills area. This area has similar locational advantages to the 
area noted above. Both developments shown in this area received 
permission after the start of the office restraint policy. One of 
the developments was speculative and was still standing empty in 
8 
August 1980 , the other was purpose built by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland as a new head office. Permissions immediately adjacent to 
this development have been secured for some time and one site is 
9 
cleared 
Less ideal in terms of proximity to established office areas, were the 
developments and permissions in the Dean and Comely Bank areas where 
only one development has subsequently been completed. This was built 
speculatively and has only recently been fully occupied (August 
10 
1984) There are also three unused permissions close to it. These 
developments are close to Charlotte Square and the West End of 
8. Trafalgar House, in Brandon Terrace, Canonmills, has just been 
occupied by the British Philatelic Association (August 1983). 
9. The development of Fettes Row is now complete (August 1983), and 
the second permission is now being used. 
10. In an effort to attract tenants, the owners of "Orchard Brae" 
have subdivided the building in the hope of breaking into 
the small office market. This has had some success but, 
naturally, means higher management costs. 
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Edinburgh but are rather remote from St. Andrews' Square, the 
principal focus of office development. 
To the south west of the West End, in the Dalry area, large numbers of 
refusals can be seen. Most of these applications were refused on the 
basis that they would generate traffic problems in an already busy 
area of the city. In addition, some proposals had excessive plot 
ratios (indicative of the speculative nature of the applicants, 
pressing for the maximum amount of space on these small sites), and 
contravened the Development Plan zonings. Local authority planners 
intend the area to undergo industrial regeneration. As such, office 
development is considered detrimental to plan aims. 
A large amount of development has taken place in the nearby Gorgie 
area. These developments have mainly been for government 
administration departments and are serviced by good road facilities. 
As such they formed relatively secure developments for developers to 
undertake. It should be noted that two permissions in this area have 
not been taken up. 
To the south east of the central area, applications for office 
developments were scattered. The largest development visible was the 
result of the decentralisation of an administrative section of an 
Edinburgh-based insurance company (Scottish Widows Fund and Life 
Assurance Society). Situated at the confluence of several of 
Edinburgh's most congested thoroughfares as well as being distant 
from the office focus, this area has not proved attractive to 
developers, despite its attractive setting. 
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The only other major area remaining to be discussed is Leith. This is 
the only peripheral area which the local planning authority outlined 
for office encouragement that has attracted more than minimal 
attention from developers. As can be seen from Figure 8.1, developers 
have only responded to a very limited extent, purchasing some parcels 
of land. Given the derelict condition of much of this property, one 
can assume that the land can be kept at a low historic cost and, 
undoubtedly, it has some potential for take up in this dockland area. 
However, given the total lack of interest by office users in 
relocating to Leith (see Chapter 6), and their ability to obtain 
refurbished developments in the city centre or new premises on the 
edge of the central area, it is unlikely that these sites will be 
developed (for offices, at least) in the near future. It is only 
through even tighter restraint in the central areas that these sites 
would even seriously be considered 
11. 
Individual developments have occurred on various major radial routes 
in the city like Meadowbank (Scottish Records Office) to the east of 
the city centre ,4 Trinity, to the north of the city centre and west, 
along the Glasgow road (Forestry Commission). These developments are 
all large government offices requiring minimal face-to-face contact 
with the general public. All of these sites are capable of housing 
more than one major development, but they are not capable of becoming 
major subsidiary office centres because of insufficient space, road 
capacity and lack of accompanying commercial services. 
11. It should be noted that, as in Dalry, the concept of offices 
in Leith has been rejected by local tenants groups as not 
aiding the employment prospects for the residents in this 
predominantly working class area. These groups have argued that 
land should be earmarked for more appropriate uses. 
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Figure 8.2 shows the annual variation in the amount of consents issued 
outside the central area between 1970 and 1976. As can be seen, they 
vary in much the same way as consents in the central area, except more 
violently. The total level of consents is very high; over 100,000 sq. 
metres in 1972 alone. This is double the floorspace figure for the 
central area for the same year. - In itself, this statistic suggests 
that many speculative proposals were being put forward and accepted in 
the build up to the property boom. Of the sixty-four developments 
12 
applied for outside the central area since 1970 , twenty-one have 
been refused, twenty-one have not been proceeded with and twenty-two 
have been carried out. Nine of the completed developments are located 
within 500m of the central area boundary. Over two thirds are within 
one kilometre of the same boundary. It also reveals that office 
proposals in locations immediately adjacent to the-central area have a 
higher rate of refusal but, if granted, are usually proceeded with. 
In contrast, peripheral proposals have-generally been held in store 
after the grant of permission. Leith is very typical of the latter. 
Table 8.11 shows that the probability of receiving a permission for an 
office proposal tends to increase slightly away from the edge of the 
central area. 
The decision to proceed with a permission seems to hold relatively 
constant until between two to three kilometres out from the central 
area when the probability drops dramatically. The cumulative 
probability of applications resulting in a development is thus 
slightly higher in the middle distance sites. Many of these are 
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government offices which can obtain deemed planning permissions and, 
being commissioned developments, are always likely to be proceeded 
with. 
Distance from Central Probability of Probability of Probability of 
Area Boundary (Km) a permission proceeding with an application 
(a) a permission resulting in 
(b) development 
(a) x (b) 
0-0.5 
0.51 - 1.0 
1.01 - 2.0 













Table 8.11: The Receival of , and 
I IGw, w. {xfin. of.., Planning Permissions 
outside Central Edinburgh, 1970-1978 
The extent to which issued consents are not taken up by developers 
both inside and outside the central area, is , _sLowo% 
in Table 8.12. 
Although it has only proved possible to gather post-1970 figures for 
the outer area it appears that, between 1970 and 1978, the incidence 
of developers not proceeding with issued planning consents is twice as 
high in the outer area as in the central area. 
Date 
Percent of Consents not taken up 






20.4 n. a. 
19.4 n. a. 
12.7 n. a. 
15.3 ) 
) 19.5 48.8 
24.3 ) 
Table 8.12: Non-Take Up of Planning Consents, Edinburgh 1959-1978 
* applications, not floorspace 
1970-1978 
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In summary, the pattern of development outside the central area of 
Edinburgh in the 1970s shows that such areas were as susceptible' to 
changing market forces as the central area was. However, certain 
areas were much more favoured by developers than others. These areas 
were usually close to the central area, with good road facilities and 
a reasonably pleasant working environment for staff. They were also 
of particular interest to office users in both the private sector and 
government wishing to find cheap locations for-their administrative 
departments. Attempts to persuade developers to develop speculatively 
on sites more distant from the central area have failed, because of 
the reluctance of tenants to relocate to such areas when a steady 
supply of space has been made available through refurbishments and 
redevelopments in the peripheral sites on the edge of the central 
area. The modicum of interest that was shown has not resulted in much 
completed development. Therefore, in terms of the aims of the 
office restraint policy seeking to attract offices to suburban 
locations, the policy has not been implemented, because of the lack of 
private sector interest. As the District itself noted (City of 
Edinburgh, 1977): 
"The dispersal of offices from the centre has not 
been as successful to date, for those office users 
willing to be located in peripheral areas, mainly 
central government departments and public boards, 
were tending to move out of the centre prior to the 
adoption of the policy. In the main, financial 
institutions and general business offices have 
maintained their demand for central area locations 
and if unsuccessful in this demand, have either 
relocated on the edge of the central area or have 
retained their existing site with some extension of 
floorspace" (p. 9). 
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The Usage of Office Restraint Policy as a Reason for Refusal 
From the above information it appears that the local authority policy 
stance towards office development in central Edinburgh did harden 
after the introduction of the office restraint policy but, as yet, we 
have not shown that the greater level of refusals was related to the 
establishment and implementation of the office restraint policy. This 
section briefly examines which policies have been used for the refusal 
13 
of planning permission as a first step to examining the use of the 
office restraint policy. There are problems with attempting this 
since it is quite possible that the real reason for a refusal is not 
the same as that published and issued to the applicant. 
However, by examining both the use of different policies and the 
combinations of reasons for refusal issued by the local authority, it 
is possible to evaluate the extent to which an individual policy was 
used and, to some extent, the "strength" which the local authority 
believed it to have for controlling development. 
It has been possible to identify four main groups of policies which 
were used by City of Edinburgh in refusing applications for office 
developments. The groups were "Land Use Policies", "Physical Planning 
Policies", "Residential Amenity and Protection Policies" and, finally, 
"Conservation Policies". This classification was reached after an 
examination of the range of reasons given by the local authority for 
refusing planning permission. Land Use Policies have been separated 
13. It is a statutory requirement that any refusal of planning 
permission be accompanied with the reasons for refusal. It is 
possible for the applicant'to use these reasons as a basis for an 
appeal against the decision. 
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off from Physical Planning Policies so that a distinction between the 
former more location and use specific policies, and the latter, more 
general planning considerations (such as traffic generation, car 
parking and plot ratio policies), could be made. 
Strictly speaking, Conservation Policies in Edinburgh make no direct 
reference to office development. However, if a development is 
considered to be to the detriment of a valued building, it has 
occasionally been refused on conservation grounds and this is of some 
14 
interest to us 
It is common for the local authority to issue more than one reason for 
refusal when a proposal is turned down. Although, there is a vaguely 
positive relationship between the number of reasons given for refusing 
an application and the size of a proposal, this is of little 
consequence. However, what is important is that some reasons for 
refusal are often used on their own whereas, in other cases, a 
combination of mutually bolstering reasons for refusal are given. If 
a reason for refusal is regularly used on its own then the Planning 
Committee is expressing faith in its appropriateness, strength and 
legitimacy, since it obviously believes that such a policy can halt an 
application on its own (possibly having a history of central 
15 
government support at appeal) However, if a reason for refusal is 
14. There are other reasons for refusal but some defy 
classification. The most' extreme example was a refusal 
because "an office is an inappropriate use for a former 
church". 
15. Strength of policy is important since successful appeals against 
refusals of planning permission lead to unplanned developments 
whic can, in turn, drastically affect local authority strategy in 
an area. 
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used repeatedly in support of other reasons for refusal, then the 
policy leading to that reason for refusal is manifestly not considered 
by the Planning Committee to be strong enough on its own to refuse an 
application. A lot depends on the nature of the proposal but, in this 
study, we are dealing with a very limited range of developments which 
does allow some conclusions to be drawn. Table 8.13 shows the extent 
to which different reasons for refusal have been used and the way in 
which they have been used, individually or otherwise. 
Reason for Refusal No. of Total No. % of % of 
times used of times times Total 
solely used used 
solely 
RESIDENTIAL PROTECTION POLICIES 
Intrusion into Residential 22 100* 0.9 
Area 
Adverse Effect on Residential 27 35 77.1 16.8 
Amenity 
Loss of Residential Unit in 23 36 63.8 17.3 
Central Edinburgh (35.0) 
LAND USE POLICIES 
Versus the Provisions of 9 25 36.0 12.0 
the Development Plan 
Against the Office Restraint 13 45 31.6 21.6 
Policy (33.6) 
PHYSICAL PLANNING POLICIES 
Prejudicial to Future 4 18 22.2 8.6 
Development 
Plot Ratio too high 2 





5 40.0* 2.4 
7 00.0* 3.4 
4 12 33.3* 5.8 
6 23 26.1 11.1 
90 208 43.3 100.0 
Table 8.13: The Occurrence of Reasons for Refusal for Office Develop- 
ments, Central Edinburgh 1959-1978 
* too few cases to draw conclusions. 
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The most common reason for refusal over the full study period of 1959 
to 1978 was that the office proposal was contrary to the wishes of the 
office restraint policy. This signifies how commonly the policy was 
used in the final time interval, being used in almost every case of a 
refusal being issued. Other very common reasons for refusal were that 
certain office developments would have a deleterious effect on the 
amenity of residential areas or that the loss of a residential unit in 
the central area was undesirable. 
If the use of single reasons for refusal are considered then by far 
the most important reasons for refusal over the twenty year study 
period were those relating to residential amenity and residential unit 
loss. They are so visible because they were long established policies 
and were used regularly to refuse planning permission for a commonly 
occurring form of development proposal. For many of these smaller 
developments, a permission would have resulted in a single flat within 
a tenement block being changed to office use. This was often deemed 
likely to generate unacceptable levels of noise and movement on the 
common staircase. As a result, the loss of residential amenity easily 
stands up on its own as a reason for refusal and would be supported by 
concepts of "good planning practice" at appeal. Ironically, larger 
developments taking over the whole tenement "stair" might well have 
had a better chance of approval than the more minor developments. 
However, such developments create extra movement within the street 
and, if the street is predominantly residential, can consequently 
create a loss of amenity for a wider group of people as well as 
causing the loss of several residential units 
in the central area. 
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When all the various reasons are considered it is readily apparent 
that the two major groups of reasons for refusal are those pertaining 
to Residential Policy and'Land Use Policy. Physical Planning Policy 
is rarely important and Conservation Policy is rarely used for office 
restraint. 
Table 8.14 illustrates the ways in which reasons for refusal were 
combined by the local planning authority when more than one reason was 
given. Quite often more than one reason from the same policy "area" 
is used to refuse an application. This is especially the case in the 
Land Use Policy category when, on at least twelve occasions, 
developments were viewed as both contrary to the aims of the office 
restraint policy and contrary to the provisions of the Development 
Plan. This combination ensures that the chances of success for an 
appeal against a policy on the ground that it is outside statutorily 
approved planning documents (which the office restraint policy was 
until 1978), are lessened. 
Residential Land Use Physical Conservation 
Policies Policies Planning Policies 
Policies 
Residential Policies 2 16 11 
Land Use Policies 12 10 6 
Physical Planning 
Policies 54 
Conservation Policies 0 
Table 8.14: The Various Combinations of Different Groups of Reasons 
for Refusing Planning Applications for Office Development; 
Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
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The most common combination was the use of Residential Protection 
Policy reasons with Land Use Policy reasons. This contrasts with the 
rarity of two Residential Protection Policies being used together. 
One explanation for this could be that more strategic Land Use 
Policies are often used to bolster Residential Protection Policies and 
vice versa. The District obviously felt the need to use reasons from 
more than one policy area to stop some applications, making an appeal 
much less likely to succeed. The overwhelming feature of the 
combination of reasons is the fundamental importance of the Land Use 
Policy group to the local planning authority's control of office 
development. Table 8.14 shows that it was used extensively with all 
the other types of reasons. 
Given that a policy was set up specifically to control office 
development, then it is hardly surprising to find such a policy being 
used. However, it is interesting to note how often the office 
restraint policy was used in conjunction with other reasons for 
refusal. This may suggest that the District did not consider it a 
particularly strong policy in its own right. As a result, when 
applications were refused using the new policy, there was a perceived 
need to bolster the decision with other reasons for refusal, which 
could act as supportive or reserve arguments in the case of a planning 
appeal. One way of establishing whether this was the case is to find 
out how people perceived the status of the policy and the manner in 
which it had been used. 
As we know from the information presented in this chapter and - 
reproduced from the local authority's own monitoring report (City of 
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Edinburgh, 1977), the office restraint policy was not implemented as 
rigorously as it might have been. If this is so, we must ask what the 
reasons for this were. The following section briefly reviews the 
perceptions of various public and private sector bodies on the office 
restraint policy and outlines two possible reasons for its apparently 
limited implementation. 
Perceptions of the Implementation of the Office Restraint Policy 
A series of interviews was carried out with local commercial estate 
agents operating in central Edinburgh (see Appendix 1). Their general 
16 
opinion was that the local authority had tried to apply the office 
restraint policy quite rigorously since its adoption. However, in 
support of evidence presented earlier in this chapter, they were 
dismissive about its status as a strong policy. They felt that it 
was quite often worthwhile for them to suggest that their clients 
appeal against refusals of planning permission based upon it. The 
present author was reminded that the office restraint policy had never 
really been put under severe pressure because, from the 1976/1977 
period, the office market had been flat (a situation which was 
exacerbated by the oversupply of offices). The suggestion here is 
that the policy would not be able to hold if severe pressures were 
applied. In addition, the agents noted that the office restraint 
policy had been used in conjunction with a particularly strict car- 
parking policy, which had greatly supported its status as a policy. 
16. Estate agents are amongst the best interviewees since they have 
experience of a range of applications, appeals and cases. 
Individual developers, naturally, are only likely to be 




The lowly status accorded to the office restraint policy by the 
commercial estate agents interviewed is of interest since it supports 
the idea that the policy was in need of bolstering when used to refuse 
planning applications. One agent noted that "after all, it only 
emerged as a paragraph in a Planning Committee's minutes". Another 
property agent who positively refused to be interviewed, noted in his 
letter of reply to the present author that: 
"The centre of Edinburgh is zoned for general 
business purposes, and I am unaware of any 
particular problem regarding office developments 
which might be of assistance to you". 
Both comments reflect the feeling that the policy has no statutory 
power behind it; indeed, in the case of the latter comment (which 
makes reference to the Development Plan: First Review of 1965), that 
the policy does not exist. Hence, despite local authority attempts to 
implement the policy, agents feel that their proposals stand at least 
a "sporting chance" at a subsequent planning appeal. Chapter 10 
demonstrates that this view is not well founded in fact. 
It is difficult to ascertain the views of the Regional Council over 
the implementation of the office restraint policy since they have no 
published monitoring material on the subject. However, at a recent 
planning appeal concerning development in the South Side, 
(P/PPA/LA/40), it was noted in the Reporter's letter to the Secretary 
of State (see Chapter 2) that an officer of the Regional Council: 
if (H)ad advised the District Council that he was 
opposed to the development under consideration 
because it was contrary to the policy of office 
restraint within the central area. The policy 
certainly had a traffic control aspect, as well as 
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being intended to preserve residential use. It had 
perhaps not been applied as strictly as he could 
have wished but it had been applied fairly 
consistently". 
In addition, the actions of the Regional Council, through the 
Structure Plan, to get the City of Edinburgh District Council to 
consult them on all office applications over 2,000 sq. ft. indicates 
their concern over the flexibility with which the District was 
implementing the policy. In terms of the role of the Regional 
Authority in the implementation of the office restraint policy, the 
Region has noted that: 
"The Regional Council's intention at the time of the 
Structure Plan was to secure for itself a strategic 
role on office development, and requested the City 
of Edinburgh District Council to consult with the 
Regional Council on office developments of strategic 
significance. There has however been little 
consultation, resulting in the Regional Council 
playing almost no role in the implementation of the 
office restraint policy", (personal communication). 
The published statements of central government Reporters have been 
unequivocal about how they viewed the implementation of the office 
restraint policy. In two separate planning appeals, central government 
Reporters have remarked upon the flexibility with which the policy has 
been implemented. At one appeal, (P/PPA/LA/50, para 11.8 of Reporters 
Letter to the Secretary of State) the Reporter noted: 
"The implementation over the past three and a half 
years of (the office Restraint Policy) does not, as 
has been indicated (to me), give the impression of 
any real degree of rigidity or strictness on the 
part of the council". 
In another appeal (P/PPA/LA/162, Reporter's Findings of Fact, No. 11), 
the reporter noted: 
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"The City of Edinburgh District Council have 
adopted an ad hoc development control policy of 
office restraint". 
With respect to their question of flexibility in the implementation of 
the policy, one commercial estate agent claimed that the local 
authority operate the office restraint policy "to suit themselves", 
suggesting that locally-based applicants, wishing to expand or showing 
a need for a central location stood a much greater chance of being 
granted permissions than applicants who might be considered as 
17 
"outsiders" . In the context of this thesis, such hypotheses require 
investigation since they suggest that, not only is the local authority 
responding to a range of different interests-in-land (residents, 
developers etc.. ) in formulating and implementing a restraint policy, 
but is possibly also involved in differentiating or discriminating 
between a variety of different types of developer (i. e. within one 
interest-in-land). This is important in terms of answering questions 
raised in Chapters 2 and 3 relating to who benefits from local 
government attempts to guide the process of spatial reorganisation. 
Conclusions 
The accumulated evidence-from Chapters 7 and 8 leaves us in no doubt 
that the adoption of the office restraint policy marked a distinct 
17. This is a serious charge. We are not suggesting corruption or 
anything of the sort, but we are suggesting that through the 
political process, or technical process of planning, that local 
firms might be preferred to outside firms. Elliott, McCrone and 
Skelton (1978) have claimed that there has been a long history of 
local chauvinism in Edinburgh politics when they note, "If we look 
at Edinburgh during the Progressive era, one is struck by the 
efforts of local entrepreneurs to keep out the big enterprises ... 
There is no doubt this was quite deliberate and accorded with the 
'localist' stand in their ideology and with distaste for 'big 
business' and 'big government'. " (p. 125). 
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change in the attitude of the local authority towards office 
development. We have seen that the new policy was used regularly as 
one of a set of reasons to refuse proposals for office development. 
As such, the success of the interests which agitated for policies to 
be formulated to restrain office growth was translated into the day to 
day decision-making process of the local planning authority and 
substantial numbers of office proposals were turned down. 
The adoption of the office restraint policy also appears to have had 
two distinct side effects. Chapter 7 showed clearly that the 
pressures for office development were channelled into refurbishing 
existing buildings and away from redeveloping city centre sites. This 
chapter has confirmed this, showing that refurbishment was very-much 
preferred as a form of development, with no refurbishment schemes 
being refused over the twenty year period. 
The second major effect of the policy, of particular importance in 
considering the spatial reorganisation of land uses in Edinburgh, was 
the diversion of development pressures out of the city centre. 
However, in contrast to the aims of the policy, this relocation of 
offices did not result in new office centres in the suburbs of 
Edinburgh but, rather, created pockets of new development on the 
junctions of major feeder roads and the boundary of the central area. 
One can only pressume that this has further exacerbated the traffic 
problems on the main radial roads of Edinburgh and increased the 
amount of commuting across the central area, both of which were 
stimuli for the office restraint policy in the first place. 
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Despite the apparent success of the strategy to restrain office growth 
in the centre, there is some doubt as to the role played by the office 
restraint policy as opposed to other measures (like strict car parking 
restrictions) within the implementation of the strategy. Some people 
have suggested that it was the associateämeasures, especially the car 
park restrictions, that resulted in higher rates of refusals. Our 
inspection of reasons for refusal does not sustain this view, although 
it may well have been a major consideration in negotiations over 
proposals. 
Chapters 7 and 8 have also indicated that, despite the general imple- 
mentation of the office restraint policy, proposals for office 
development have often been approved which are apparently in contra- 
diction to the policy in force. This was seen with respect to the 
longest standing policy of office restraint which sought to halt the 
loss of residential units to office use and was also the case with a 
substantial number of proposals submitted after the adoption of the 
office restraint policy. The following two chapters examine reasons 
for these apparent inconsistencies in policy implementation. Chapter 
9 tries to establish whether there are any patterns discernible from 
these inconsistencies to suggest that different types of applicant 
(e. g. foreign banks) are being favoured by the local authority or 
whether other reasons relating to the characteristics of the develop- 
ment explain the variation. Chapter 10 examines the "policy-in- 
action" to establish whether there were any inherent weaknesses 
in the 




The Implementation of the Office Restraint Policy: Differentiation 
between Developers 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the results of a conflict of interests in an open 
political arena over the formulation of the office restraint policy. 
We saw that the policy was designed to reduce the levels of 
speculative office development in central Edinburgh and to change the 
form of developments which did occur. Chapters 7 and 8 have 
illustrated that, in general, the policy has been implemented to some 
extent. Inevitably, this must mean that the overall interests of 
developers have been adversely affected to some degree. This is an 
important finding when considering "how and for whom the state works" 
through the land use planning system. However, we have not, as yet, 
satisfactorily identified the various components which constitute the 
developers interests, how their interests vary across different types 
of developer, and how those different interests have been affected by 
the office restraint policy. From the evidence presented so far we 
cannot say, for example, that the office restraint policy has been a 
victory for local people against avaricious speculative developers. 
To do so requires us to establish which developers have been involved 
and how they have fared with respect to the implementation of the 
policy. This chapter will demonstrate that the range of developers 
active in central Edinburgh is extremely varied, ranging from local 
citizens to multi-national investment trusts, which have different 
interests ranging from development for owner-occupation or development 
for profit or investment. Hence, within the wider questions of which 
groups have benefit ed from the formulation and implementation of the 
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office restraint policy, one must also determine whether different 
types of developers have been affected in similar or different ways by 
the policy. 
A second important reason for looking carefully at whether certain 
developers have suffered more than others from the implementation of 
the policy is that, following Underwood (1981b), the implementation of 
a policy is carried out in a very different type of political arena 
to that in which the original policy or plan was formulated (see 
Chapter 3). When individual decisions are being made on individual 
proposals, there is rarely the same level of public awareness of the 
issues (unless the proposal is for a major development) as when 
policies and plans are formulated. Far fewer people are involved in 
policy implementation, there is much more 'behind the scenes' 
1 
negotiation and developers are much more actively involved. Hence, 
when evaluating policy implementation one has to evaluate a different 
political process to that which exists for policy formulation. 
It is quite conceivable that different developers with different 
levels of resources might be able to achieve markedly different 
results from a local authority in terms of obtaining planning 
permissions (i. e. implementation) in this relatively "closed" system. 
It is conceivable that, even though a policy may have been implemented 
in aggregate terms, certain types of developers have been less 
affected than others. For example, small local businesses applying to 
develop offices for their own use might have consistently been allowed 
1. See Chapter 10. 
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to develop whilst speculative developers from outside the area were 
consistently turned down, or vice versa. Our macrotheories, reviewed 
in Chapters 2 and 3 do not provide clear guidance to the likely 
outcomes of this closed, regulative, political process. As such, we 
need to reassess those theories to extract hypotheses as to which 
developers might be most likely to benefit from less controversial and 
routine government procedures like development control. This will 
prepare us for an examination of which developers have been active in 
central Edinburgh, what "resources" they possess, what their interests 
in development have been, and how their composition has changed 
through time. Finally, tests are carried out to establish whether the 
variations in approval rates for different developers are 
statistically significant or not. This will indicate whether 
different developers have fared in a similar way with respect to the 
implementation of the office restraint policy or whether some have 
been able to circumvent its strictures significantly more than others. 
Power Relations: Developers and Local Government 
In examining the relationships between developers and the local 
planning authority over the processing of planning applications, we 
have suggested that development control is an administrative process 
conducted mainly outside the public eye. Developers are notoriously 
secretive about their activities and most of the negotiations before 
the submission of an application are not reported. Hence, our idea of 
power relations through a political system upon which different social 
and economic forces are pressing simultaneously, might have to be 
adapted to more adequately reflect the situation that exists 
in the 
development control system. 
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The theories on the role of the state outlined in Chapter 2 all varied 
with respect to their interpretation of where the source of power for 
any interest group lies. Pluralists saw political power as a 
counterweight to economic power. Structuralists saw power as 
ultimately lying in the economic base of a social superstructure 
because of the necessary relations of capitalism. It is therefore 
relevant to ask where power lies in the development control system. 
In more general terms, Simmie (1981) has noted that: 
"the development of cities in industrial society is 
best understood in terms of the objectives of 
different groups and organisations and their 
relative power as exemplified by their abilities to 
translate these objectives into actual land uses 
and buildings. The central concept in 
understanding urban development is therefore 
power". Simmie (1981, p. 29). 
For Simmie, the constituent elements of power which allow groups to 
guide the development of cities were: 
(i) capital ownership 
2 
(ii) land ownership 
(iii) political connections 
(iv) political skill 
(v) possession of information. 
Together, these features identify the possible interests that 
individuals or organisations might have, their motives for political 
action, their resources to undertake such action and the skills 
necessary to engage in political activity. By knowing which 
2. In support of Simmie's thesis relating to landownership, Elliott 
and McCrone (1982) note that, "Weber recognised that urban land, 
housing and other forms of real estate could be more than 
just items for consumption. For those who controlled them, they 
were, and are, real sources of power". (p. 98). 
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developers operating in Edinburgh possessed these various "resources", 
we might be able to hypothesise, using the theories outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, which developers might be expected to fare well 
with respect to attempts by the local authority to restrict their 
activities. 
Because the process of implementing the office restraint policy is 
largely conducted outside the public eye by persons and organisations 
not in the habit of enrolling public political support for their 
actions and who act individually in an incremental process of spatial 
reorganisation, the pluralist concept of political power as a 
counterweight to economic power is not really relevant when 
considering implementation processes like development control. 
Therefore, we might expect that, if any applicants were likely to be 
advantaged, it would be those with the greatest economic resources for 
3 
which there is no political counterbalance (i. e. "capital ownership" 
in Simmie's list). 
The elitist school, which hypothesises that interconnections and 
overlapping memberships between important economic elements of society 
and the polity are crucial to understanding decision making, might 
suggest, given the evidence of local business penetration of local 
3. To avoid misunderstanding, I repeat that I am aware that develop- 
ment control decisions are ultimately made by elected repre- 
sentatives, but I am arguing that, except in the case of large- 
scale proposals, the local authority is not under such acute 
public scrutiny. Given the discretion that exists in the develop- 
ment control system, the local authority (elected representatives 
and officials) may be vulnerable to a far more limited, but 
direct, range of influences (e. g. local chauvinism, economic 
pressures etc). 
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politics in Edinburgh (Elliott et al., 1978), that local businesses 
would be particularly favoured in regulative administrative systems 
like development control because of their close connections with 
decision-makers. 
Lojkine's (1977) conceptualisation of the "big firms strategy" makes 
the clearest statement of the structuralist Marxist argument with 
respect to how the local state might differentiate between different 
types of business. If Lojkine is correct then we would expect the 
local state to favour large "monopoly-capitalist" enterprises at the 
expense of most local capitalists. Through property redevelopment, 
the local state is said to facilitate the penetration of the local 
commercial property market by large developers. They are allowed to 
develop large complexes on the sites of earlier small businesses. 
Lojkine makes his case with respect to the effect of retail 
development in Lyon in France. His argument can be generalised to 
property developers as a whole and is clearly derivative from the 
postulation that the state in capitalist society consistently furthers 
the interests of monopoly capital at the expense of other groups 
including the petit bourgeosie as well as the proletariat. 
If the instrumentalist school is summarised as 'the state acting for 
the group that captures it' then given Elliot et al's (1978) 
information, the local authority in Edinburgh would presumably tend to 
work in ways which favour the local businesses that have consistently 
dominated it. 
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If one takes Simmie's (1981) view of corporatism as an imperfect form 
of pluralism where there are various means for different groups to 
obtain privileged access to and exert influence on local government, 
then a mixed picture should emerge. Simmie's conclusions state that 
the more capital and land an organisation (or person) owns the more 
powerful it is likely to be in ensuring outcomes (like obtaining a 
planning permission) from the local authority. Similarly, the more 
formally constituted an organisation is, and the greater its degree of 
incorporation into local authority decision-making, the more likely it 
is to secure a planning permission. With respect to people and 
businesses applying to City of Edinburgh for planning permission some 
developers, for example, "English Property Companies", have a 
reasonable amount of land and capital but are less likely to be 
formerly or readily connected into the local political process. In 
contrast, individual "Local Businesses" might each have limited land 
and capital resources, but are often well connected to local business 
representatives who experience a degree of incorporation into 
decision-making in the local area through the activities of bodies 
like the local Chamber of Commerce. Hence, it is possible that, for 
different reasons, different groups would be favoured. This might 
lead to an overall picture-of no single group faring better than 
others. Given Simmie's (1981) conclusions on Oxford, presumably a 
group like, say "Scottish-based Insurance Companies", which has 
members with a large amount of capital and land, as well as local 
political connections, would be most likely to appear favoured since 
they possess a greater level of resources than the others. 
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Developers and their Capital, Political and Land Resources: Central 
Edinburgh 1959-1978 
Before evaluating which developers possess which of the resources 
listed by Simmie, it is necessary to derive a classification of 
developers. To be of use this classification must: 
(a) bear some demonstrable relationship to the theories 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
(b) indicate something about the level of resources 
the developers possess, and 
(c) indicate something about their relationship to the 
development and political processes. 
The eventual classification was derived with the above factors in mind 
from a close inspection of the range of planning applicants involved 
in office development in central Edinburgh. This was because there 
was no previous related work to build upon or revise (with the 
possible exception of Simmie, 1981). The classification therefore 
tries to reflect whether or not the applicant has local political 
connections, to give some idea of the main sort of economic activity 
they are involved in, and to relate meaningfully to the structure of 
4 
the development industry as described in Chapters 4 and 5 
Table 9.1 lists the applicant types identified in central Edinburgh. 
Although evidence is given in the following sections, it is important 
to note that this classification also generally indicates the groups 
for whom development is primarily for their own use (e. g. local and 
national companies, banks and building societies), those who develop 
This exercise has led to further-thought by the present author on 
how such classifications might be derived if adequate data were 
available. These ideas are presented in McNamara (1983), 
contained at the rear of this thesis. 
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5. 
property primarily for rental income (investment trusts) and those 
who develop speculatively for sale and lease (e. g. property 
companies). These groups can be further subdivided into those with 
6 
local connections and those that are based outside the area . Hence 
property companies and other private companies were split into two 
groups, as were insurance companies, and government bodies. Definitive 
divisions, however, are difficult. As will be seen, insurance 
companies develop both for their own use and for leasing. Investment 




Scottish Property Companies 
Other Insurance Companies 
Pension Funds 






Banks and Building Societies 
Others 
Table 9.1: Types of Applicant for Planning Permission to Develop 
Offices, Central Edinburgh 1959 to 1978 
* companies primarily involved in activities other than property, 
insurance, construction or investment. 
We now try to evaluate the resources held by these developers which 
5. There are problems in establishing the motives behind the 
developmental activities of investment trusts as some do develop 
for own occupation. However, Table 9.6 indicates that this is a 
very low proportion of the total. 
6. This is important in terms of our considerations of 'local chau- 
vinism'. The locational origin of the developers was taken from 
the address given by the applicant and listed in the planning 
register. Although crude, this method is believed to be 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, especially given the 
time and scope of the thesis. 
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might allow us to assess their potential power. In doing this we use 
the list of resources which Simmie (1981) deemed important as a 
structuring device for our discussion, bringing the five elements 
together into three groups namely, "capital resources", "political 
resources" and "land resources". 
(a) Capital Resources 
In terms of assessing the resources of the various developers, it is 
obviously impossible in the time allotted for any thesis to establish 
the capital resources of over four hundred different applicants for 
office development in central Edinburgh. Also, with some of the 
"smaller-sized" developers, which include individuals, the research 
not only would have been difficult to perform but could have been 
7 
highly intrusive. Therefore, using published sources of information 
it is presumed that the Scottish and English Insurance Companies, the 
Pension Funds, the Property Investment Trust, the Banks and Building 
Societies and most of the Investment Trusts can be considered to 
possess substantial amounts of capital. 
The property companies and construction companies active in central 
Edinburgh generally, have less total capital than the large financial 
institutions but use more of it on property. These companies can vary 
widely from Land Securities, the largest property company in Britain, 
to small local developers. The "Scottish Property Company" category 
is dominated by one firm which is listed on the Stock Exchange and 
7. These include general literature, a selection of company reports, 




possesses substantial assets . The "English Property Companies" vary 
enormously from London-based property giants to more modest developers 
like Ossary Road Estates from Leeds, Teesland Property Company from 
9 
Stockton-on-Tees and Broadland Properties Ltd of Scarborough 
10 
Local companies and national companies obviously vary widely with 
respect to the capital resources they own. However, it can be 
11 
presumed that locally-based companies generally have less resources 
than companies acting on a nationwide basis. This is especially the 
case if the large Edinburgh based insurance companies have their own 
category. Local citizens are also presumed to have minimal capital 
resources when compared to the major investors. Central government 
and local government bodies have been included in the classification 
because they are major developers. However, as Chapters 2 and 3 have 
noted, their relation to the local authority and the land development 
process is very different to that of private sector developers, given 
that they can obtain development rights through the process of deemed 
planning permissions. 
(b) Political Resources 
political connections between interested groups and the local 
8. Scottish Metropolitan Property Company Ltd, whose company 
reports have been collected by the author. Others included 
Forth and Clyde Property Co. Ltd. and Glencona Properties of 
Edinburgh. 
9. An attempt was made to assess nested ownerships of property 
companies but this was foiled by the sheer scale of the 
task, the difficulties of such analysis and the poverty of the 
available data. 
10. Meaning non-property companies. In the case of local companies, 
the large Edinburgh insurance companies were separated into a 
different category. 
11. Many of whom are small solicitors firms, architects firms etc. 
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authority have been discussed briefly in Chapter 6. From interviews 
with officejs of the City of Edinburgh District Council and from 
published sources (e. g. Elliott et al, 1978), it would appear that the 
most of the connections between the local authority and developers are 
indirect. There are regular discussions between planning offices and 
local estate agents who act as mediators and experts in the property 
field. Discussions with development companies are both direct and 
indirect. Some companies are represented through the Chamber of 
Commerce (mainly local companies, but there are some branches of 
national companies, insurance companies, construction companies and 
professional services attached to the development process). There is 
also some overlap of membership between the local development 
fraternity and local authority representatives, although this has 
dwindled in recent times (see Table 5.5). The local authority has 
-12 
attempted to set up some dialogue with the major property investors 
that have substantial interests in the city centre. However, to the 
author's knowledge, no meetings have yet taken place. It therefore 
seems that the most direct political connections are generally held by 
local companies and estate agents. Individual "local citizen" 
developers may have some contact but, in general, not as much as the 
local companies. 
One can only assume that outside developers like pension funds, 
investment trusts, property investment trusts, English property 
companies, English insurance companies, English banks and building 
societies and national companies, tend only to interact with the local 
12. This information comes from an interview with a major financial 
institution investor, based in the, city. 
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authority over individual developments. However, the Scottish 
insurance companies and the Scottish banks presumably have good 
political contacts with the local authority over a wide range of 
issues and through the Chamber of Commerce. The Scottish property 
companies are involved with the Chamber of Commerce, but their direct 
interaction with the local authority tends to relate solely to 
individual applications (see Chapter 6, and Edinburgh Chamber of 
Commerce and Manufacturers, Annual Reports over various years). 
With respect to the second and third forms of political resource 
outlined in Simmie's list, the level of political skill which various 
developers possess is a matter for empirical research (though not an 
easy one) and has not been the focus of this thesis. The possession 
of information seemed only really important in the context of this 
thesis with respect to Estate Agents and their knowledge of the 
property market. The local authority is in regular contact with these 
agents and uses a lot of their data for forward planning activities. 
(c) Land Resources 
Because of available data it is possible to be much more systematic 
about the possession of land resources. With the available data 
it 
would have been physically possible to establish how much land all of 
the listed types of developer have owned in central Edinburgh. 
However, because of the limits of time and space, it is impossible to 
chart the history of ownership of every land parcel in central 
Edinburgh, and therefore we have concentrated on identifying the 
extent of land ownership for the financial 
institutions and property 
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companies. This is defensible because, as we shall see, these groups 
are the ones principally responsible for concentrating urban 
landownership into a limited number of hands and they invest 
significantly in properties they do not occupy. In order to 
13 
illustrate change over time, the landownership of five groups was 
taken from records pertaining to 1958/59,1963/64,1968/69,1973/74 
and 1978/79. Information on ownership was taken from the Local 
14 
Authority Valuation Rolls for every ward in the central area and the 
results are briefly presented below. 
Figure 9.1, illustrates the growth in the landownership of the five 
listed landowners (see Footnote 13) in central Edinburgh between 1959 
and 1978. The growth is spectacular, rising to over 140,000 sq. m 
15 
owned in total by 1978 and 120,000sq. m let . After remaining steady 
throughout most of the study period, the rate of purchases slowed down 
following the property collapse in 1973. The early purchases of land 
are interesting in that they reveal that land investment (mainly by 
insurance companies) was already under way in Edinburgh before the 
start of the 1960s. The fraction that the five listed land owners 
occupy as a proportion of the total owned and let has fallen 
13. In order to reduce what was an extremely onerous data collection 
and mapping exercise, the Scottish/non-Scottish distinction was 
dropped from insurance companies and property companies, 
leaving the five groups as pension-funds, insurance companies, 
property companies, investment trusts and sites owned and occupied 
by financial institutions other than banks. This last category 
includes property owned and occupied by insurance companies. 
14. Rateable valuation is assessed in Scotland by the local 
authority, but unlike England, the records on valuation are 
publicly reveal the name of the proprietor, the name of the 
tenant, the address of the property, the land use and rateable 
value. 
15. This figure relates to land not office space or retail space and 
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considerably through time from 50 percent to over 15 percent 
Figure 9.2 breaks the previous figure down into its constituent 
17 
parts . As can be seen, the largest single growth in ownership was by 
the insurance companies who, by 1978 owned approximately 68,000 sq. m 
of land in central Edinburgh. Although property companies and 
insurance companies owned similar amounts of land in 1958, by 1978 the 
insurance companies owned over a third more land than the property 
companies. An interesting feature of the growth in land ownership by 
insurance companies is that the rate of growth appears to slacken in 
the period up to the property boom of the early 1970s. This is 
followed by a boost in land purchases. Land ownership by pension 
funds also rises rapidly in the last time interval. 
These figures reflect the general patterns for the growth in land 
ownership by financial institutions outlined in Chapter 5 with land 
sales by property companies in the latter part of the study period 
being readily identifiable. The steady growth in property letting by 
property companies and investment trusts is reversed after the 
property collapse. Investment trust letting dropped rapidly to its 
1958 level, although much of this relates to the sale of Argyle House 
to an Edinburgh-based insurance company. 
16. As a very rough estimate, if one takes a figure of 140,000 sq. m, 
with a 3-storey average ground floors as shops at £60 per sq. ft. 
per annum and other floors as offices at £5 per sq. ft., then the 
annual income from this amount of property is nearly £98 
million. At a yield of 5%, this equals a capital value of nearly 
£2 billion. 
17. This obviously entails all the problems encountered earlier 
with respect to nested ownerships. Because the investigation 
into owner-ships of the companies themselves was abandoned, it 
might be presumed that, through their likely ownership of 
property company shares and assets, the real interests of the 
big financial institutions have been underestimated. 
9 
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The relative positions of the four listed lessors in central Edinburgh 
is shown in Figure 9.3. The insurance companies and property 
companies were the most important until 1973 with the pension funds 
and investment trusts as only minor lessors. This was changing at the 
end of the study period and it looked possible that pension funds 
might replace property companies as the second most important lessors 
in the city centre. 
The extent of financial institution and property company landownership 
in central Edinburgh is more easily understood if their purchases are 
mapped 
18 
As will be seen, most of the purchases were found to be in 
the First New Town and, to assist our appreciation of the extent of 
the concentration in ownership in these parts of the central area, the 
percentages of some important street frontages owned by each of the 
five groups has also been calculated and graphed. 
Figure 9.4 shows that in 1958/59 most of the property owned by the 
five landowners was held by insurance companies, for their own use in 
the First New Town area, with a concentration of land parcels in the 
19 
St. Andrews Square area There are also some investment trust 
properties close to Charlotte Square. In the South Side there are a 
number of residential properties owned by locally based property 
20 
companies 
18. Obviously, in a city where most properties are 2 or 3 storeys 
high and it is common for each storey to be in different 
ownership, mapping is difficult. The convention used is that 
properties which were predominantly held by one of the five 
groups (by rateable value) were mapped. 
19. Figure 6.1 and the street map for use with Chapters 6 and 7 
(included in the pocket inside the back cover of the thesis) may 
prove useful for the subsequent description. 
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Figure 9.4: Landownership by selected landowners e trat Cn Edinburgh, 1958. 
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Figure 9.5: Landownership by selected landowners, Central Edinburgh. 1963. 
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Figure 9.6. Landownership by selected landowners, Central Edinburgh 1968. 
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1973/1974 in the ownership of those landowners leasing property. 
Particularly noticeable areas are the West End (especially the eastern 
part of Shandwick Place), Princes Street (especially between Frederick 
Street and Hanover Street) and the roads off St. Andrews Square. 
There was also continued purchasing on the South Bridge, Tollcross and 
in the Torpichen area. 
Figure 9.8 illustrates the effects of Edinburgh's continued 
attractiveness to property investors after the property crash in 1974. 
Although there has been some sale of assets at the eastern end of 
Princes Street, George Street and the St. Andrews Square area seem to 
be dominated by financial institution investments by the end of the 
study period. The West End saw further purchases of property but, as 
can be seen, even in 1978 most of this was still held by property 
companies. The build up of assets in the Torpichen area is seen to 
have continued whilst some properties were released by financial 
institutions and property companies at Tollcross and the South Bridge. 
A second, more quantitative, assessment of the importance of the 
listed landowners is given by an examination of the percentage of 
certain street frontages owned by them. The chosen streets represent 
a cross section of the opportunities for land investment in Edinburgh. 
They are Princes Street, Charlotte Square, Melville Street and 
Crescent, St. Andrews Square and George Street. 
Figure 9.9 reveals that some streets have been dominated by financial 
institution landowners for a considerable time. Both St. Andrews ' 
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Square and George Street have been major insurance company bases since 
before the Second Vorld War. In contrast, other streets have been 
'bought in' by the five listed landowners, at different times. 
Whereas St. Andrews Square remained approximately 60% owned by 
insurance companies and property companies throughout the study 
period, Charlotte Square, the historical base for many of Edinburgh's 
more prestigious investment funds and legal practices, has remained 
with only 20% of its frontage owned by listed landowners. 
There is also an interesting contrast between the speedy purchase of 
property in Princes Street in the early 1960s with the later purchases 
of property in George Street. Undoubtedly, the former was largely 
related to the retail development, which occurred throughout the 
1960s in Princes Street, whereas George Street was one of the areas 
which remained attractive to property investors wishing to develop 
property to house incoming banks in the mid-1970s. Melville Street 
and Crescent, in the West End, has seen steady growth over the study 
period and is now over 30% owned by the listed landowners. 
Figure 9.10 (a-e) reveals how different lessors involved themselves 
with different streets in central Edinburgh. Figure 9.10a shows how 
the insurance companies were involved in leasing property in Princes 
Street at an early date. Much of this was because of office 
relocation by insurance companies from Princes Street into St. 
Andrews Square with the vacated sites then being leased. Property 
company ownership in Princes Street, like that of pension funds, has 
grown steadily throughout the study period. In contrast, apart from a 
393 
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rapid entry and exit into ownership in Princes Street around the time 
of the early-1970s property boom, the investment trusts have rarely 
been involved in long term property investment. 
This pattern of quick purchase and sale seems common for investment 
trusts and is exhibited in Figure 9.10b. Indeed the pattern in George 
Street almost mirrors that in Princes Street with insurance companies 
being the first to get involved, with pension fund and property 
company ownership rising steadily. There is a late burst of buying by 
insurance companies, the reasons for which have already been 
discussed. 
Figure 9.10c illustrates the spasmodic involvement of property 
companies and insurance companies in leasing property in St. Andrews 
Square. Although, the graph lines are exact opposites of each other, 
this should not be interpreted simply as a limited number of 
properties being sold backwards and forwards between the two types of 
landowners, although such sales did occur. There was also some sales 
of properties within the square to eventual owner-occupiers. 
Charlotte Square (Figure 9.10d), shows extensive early investment 
trust ownership which evaporated after the property collapse in 1974. 
The insurance companies, however, increased their ownership to 10% of 
the total by the end of the study period. There have also been a 
couple of property company purchases in the 1970s. Melville Street 
and Crescent (Figure 9.10c) have shown steady growth throughout the 
period 1958 to 1978 and together reveal that property company interest 
has been sustained in the area despite the property collapse. 
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Figure 9.11, summarises the situation for the five streets in 1978 and 
shows the marked differences between them in terms of their 
landownership patterns. 
Finally, Figure 9.12 illustrates the overall difference in levels of 
letting in the five streets over the study period. Even in those 
thoroughfares where leasing was common in 1958, like St. Andrews 
Square and Charlotte Square, the level of let property has at least 
doubled. In other streets the rate has gone from virtually nil to 
over 30% within twenty years. 
Hence, it is quite clear that the changes in land ownership in central 
Edinburgh are very great indeed, have occurred over a very short a 
period of time and represent important changes in the parameters of 
the economic and political arena within which property development in 
the central area is carried out and controlled by local government. 
There is no question that, in central Edinburgh at least, one of the 
key resources for development, namely land, is increasingly falling 
into the hands of a limited range of, potentially, powerful landowners 
(see Chapter 5). These new landowners are much more interested in 
leasing land than the older, less extensive landowners who were 
23 
largely concerned with benefits through owner occupation . On the 
whole they are also in possession of far higher levels of capital than 
past owners. In terms of our questions concerning likely power, one 
would anticipate that this growth 
in landownership would have been 
23. This statement does not, of course, refer to the large 
feudal landowners in the City for whom until recently, this 
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paralleled by a growth in political power for the various listed 
groups. 
Acting as a summary, Table 9.2 presents the information we have 
gathered together in this section on the relative resources available 
to the different types of developers operating in central Edinburgh in 
the study period. It is based on the information presented in Chapter 
6, information from interviews carried out in Edinburgh (see Appendix 
1) and from the above survey of land and other resources. 
Development Undertaken by Different Types of Developer 
The amounts of development calculated to have been undertaken by 
24 
different types of developers are shown in Table 9.3 below 
can be seen, the four largest developers in central Edinburgh 
between 1959 and 1978 were the non-Scottish property companies, 
Scottish property companies, Scottish insurance companies and the 
investment trusts, who together developed 56% of the total office 
space created. Even with the exclusion of Argyle House and the St. 
James' Centre, these four developers remain the most important. 
Together, the property companies were the most prominent development 
force in Edinburgh, developing over 27% of the given total, adding 
nearly 100,000 sq. m (over 1 million square feet) to the office stock. 
A third of this was incorporated in the St. James' Centre. The other 
two large developers, the Scottish insurance companies and the 
24. As in Chapter 7, the figures are distorted by the inclusion of the 
St. James' Centre and Argyle House. 
401 
TYPE OF DEVELOPER CAPITAL RESOURCES POLITICAL RESOURCES LAND RESOURCES 
Citizens Presumed to be limited Some with connections Generally, individual parcels only - 
% selling own property for development 
Local Companies Generally, limited. Small As a group, good political Usually buy property to develop for 
businesses, usually connections through their own use. No extra land purchase 
service professions Chamber of Commerce for investment 
National Companies Greater than for local Variable. Some have Usually buy property to develop for their 
companies, usually. Often contract through the own use. No extra land purchase for 
looking for prestige Chamber of Commerce. investment. 
sites. 
Scottish Property Variable. Some are small A limited number have Major builders of property to the early 
Companies residential property good contacts, but 1970s, but since that time much less 
companies. Other are generally quite distant. property. Since they act independently 
major investors their land assets do not afford them a 
-h d" " power an . 
English Property Variable. Some small com- Presumably poor. 
Companies panies involved in refur- 
bishments. Others very 
large, operating in prime 
office locations. 
Scottish Insurance Several companies with Generally, good, with 
Companies large capital resources formal and informal As a group, the insurance companies now 
channels. own large areas of the City. Some of this 
is for their own use, but they also have 
Other Insurance A range of companies with Variable depending on major investment interests in the city. 
Companies large capital resources. interaction with local No coherent action with respect to these 
business community assets. 
Pension Funds Usually extensive Presumably limited. Rapidly growing land resources held by a 
range of pension funds. 
Property Investment Usually quite major. Presumably limited. Ephemeral. Quite large in the early 1970s. 
Trusts Now dwindled. 
Construction Variable. In terms of Variable. Most have good Usually buy land to develop and sell. No 
Companies office developers, usually political contacts throug land purchase for investment. 
quite major Chamber of Commerce. 
Investment Trusts Usually extensive Poor. Although some of the Some major investors have retained proper- 
small, Edinburgh based ties in Edinburgh, but their landownership 
trusts are connected is relatively ephemeral. 
indirectly through the 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Estate Agents Limited Good. Their expertise is Limited. 
valued and the contact is 
frequent. 
Local Government Extensive, through locally Extremely good through Extensive, but not in the prime locations. 
and nationally raised infra-organisational In the Southside, lots of land with 
taxes. contact. potentional for development. 
Central Government Enormous, through Good, through inter- Usually buys land for own development, 
nationally raised taxes. organisational contact. although statutory undertakers own a 
great deal 
Banks and Building A range of companies Quite good, through a Usually buys land for own development. 
with huge capital variety of types of They are extensive land owners in prime 
resources, types of contact. areas because that is where their business 
is. 
Table 9.2: Summary of Resources: Developers in Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
It should be noted that this table does contain some assumptions. 
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investment trust produced 10.6% and 17.9% of the total stock 
respectively. 
Type of Total Development Total Average Size 
Applicants Appli- of Develop- 
sq. m (no)** Rank* cations ment (m2) 
Citizens 9989 42 12 60 238 
Local Companies 14007 42 8 69 334 
Nat. Companies 23343 16 5 24 1459 
-Scottish Prop Co 58981 (28416)* 17 4 23 1776 
English Prop Co 37647 28 1 32 1345 
Scottish Ins Co 37397 21 2 21 1781 
Non-Scottish Ins Co 7182 8 13 12 891 
-Pension Fund 11796 7 11 9 1685 
Property Inv Trust 3775 2 15 4 1888 
Construction Co 12006 8 10 11 1501 
Investment Trust 62970 (36679)* 23 3 25 1664 
Estate Agent 4384 12 14 18 365 
Local Govnt. 13476 598 2695 
Central Govnt. 21398 11 6 14 1945 
Banks & Building Soc 26994 29 7 36 931 
Other 13758 21 31 665 
Total 359,103 292 397 1230 
Table 9.3: The Amount of Development Undertaken by Different Types of 
Developer, Central Edinburgh, 1958-1978 
* minus Argyle House and St. James' Centre. 
** number for which data was available 
Other large developers include national companies and central 
government bodies which have both been responsible for some very large 
developments in the City. This reflects the nature of Edinburgh as an 
office centre of national importance with many national and 
international firms desiring office space. Although the property 
companies, insurance companies and investment trusts produced the most 
development, the local citizens and companies were the most prolific 
applicants. Together they made over 30% of all applications, the 
403 
majority of which were for small change of use from residential to 
offices. 
Given the information in Chapters 4 and 5, the low level of office 
activity by pension funds and non-Scottish insurance companies in 
central Edinburgh is perhaps surprising. Table 9.3 shows that pension 
funds were only the eleventh most proliferic office developer in the 
city centre. This low level of activity is also partially reflected 
in their land purchasing activities which, Figure 9.2 suggests, were 
also fairly minimal in Edinburgh city centre until after 1974. The 
non-Scottish insurance companies were similarly only involved in a 
few, relatively small developments. Given the disparity between the 
levels of development by the Scottish and non-Scottish insurance 
companies, there is an impression that the non-Scottish insurance 
companies have either stayed out or have been kept out of the 
Edinburgh market by better informed Scottish companies working on 
their "home turf". 
only remaining major applicants were the banks and the building 
societies who together have developed over thirty properties. As will 
be seen later, the vast majority of these developments were for owner 
occupation, but as such they have contributed 20,000 sq. m to 
Edinburgh's office stock. 
Table 9.4 demonstrates a close relationship between the type of 
developer and the. type of development undertaken throughout the study 
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noticeable of these is the one between the small scale applicant and 
the small scale development. This is illustrated by the importance of 
change of use as a form of development to local citizens and local 
companies. In contrast to these small developments, the development 
pattern of national companies coming into the area is one of 
occasional, very large, new developments and a number of small ones 
(eleven). 
Some interesting contrasts can be made between the two property 
company groups. The Scottish property companies have over 75% of 
their developed space in new developments. If the St. James' Centre 
is included in these calculations, this figure rises to 88%. They 
seem to have had very little interest in small changes of use, 
preferring to work on larger, more prestigious, refurbishments with an 
average size of approximately 800 sq. m. In contrast, half of the 
English property company developments were large changes of use 
(average size approximately 600 sq. m). This represents 25% of the 
total space in central Edinburgh developed by this group of 
developers, revealing a definite commitment to this type of 
development. These smaller developments also reflect the types of 
property company involved. Many of the English companies involved in 
change of use development were small provincial companies rather than 
25 
national, London-based companies . Together, the English and 
Scottish property companies have dominated the refurbishment market, 
developing over a third of all the refurbishments identified. 
25. The three companies listed earlier are typical here 
(Broadlands Property Company, Ossary Road Developers Ltd and 
Teesland Property Company). 
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The contrasts between Scottish and non-Scottish insurance companies 
mentioned earlier seem even greater when one compares the scale and 
type of development they have been involved with. The Scottish 
insurance companies have carried out five times as much development as 
the non-Scottish insurance companies over our study period, and have 
been particularly involved in new development. They have also been 
-involved extensively with changes of use. Non-Scottish insurance 
companies have concentrated more heavily on small scale development, 
only =producing one new development in the twenty year period along 
with some large refurbishments. 
In 'terms of the amount of space developed through each development 
type, the pattern of pension fund development is akin to that of the 
non-Scottish insurance companies. The major difference is that nearly 
half of their total space was developed through refurbishments. This 
reflects their late arrival as developers in central Edinburgh. 
investment trusts were extremely active in all types of 
development, being a major force in smaller scale developments and 
being the largest single group of developers of new structures. 
Unfortunately such a group encompasses so many different types of 
organisations (from the internationally active Argyle Securities to 
the small York and District Investment Company Limited) that 
generalisation is made difficult. Indeed they typify the problems 
which face any researcher trying to classify developers since they 
develop for sale, investment and for their own use, at all scales. 
Together they have carried out over twenty new developments in the 
407 
study period, mostly for sale or lease. In contrast, the more 
specialist property investment trust were only involved in developing 
two large sites, perhaps preferring to invest in completed 
developments. 
Banks and building societies carried out over thirty developments, two 
thirds of which were changes of use (average size, 500 sq. m) 
contributing over 50% of the total space built by them. Again, this 
is not necessarily an easy group to define since, as will be 
demonstrated below, the banks were more responsible for refurbishments 
and, new developments, whereas building societies usually involved 
themselves with changes of use from shops to offices. 
Table 9.5 shows the five largest contributors of space through each 
type of development process. 
Rank Change of Use 
Local Companies 

























Table 9.5: Leading Developers of Different Types of Development* 
Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
* total space provided. 
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It is not surprising to find that the small-scale applicants are the 
majör developers for changes of use. Table 9.5 shows that local 
citizens and local companies together were responsible for nearly half 
of all such developments in the city centre, representing over a third 
of the total office space produced in this way. The only other major 
developers of changes of use were Scottish insurance companies and 
English property companies. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated, these changes of use were of great 
importance to land use change in central Edinburgh and it is 
interesting to note that so many individuals have been attempting to 
obtain permission to turn houses (more often than not their own) into 
offices. Owing to the nature of business activity in Edinburgh, small 
offices have always been in demand and many local citizens have 
profited from this. Alternatively, local companies, unable to afford 
anything larger, have often purchased a residential property and then 
converted it to office use. Nearly all of these premises lie to the 
north'of the Princes Street/Shandwick Place axis. 
In contrast to change of use, there seems to be a far higher 
proportion of speculative developers working on refurbishment and 
redevelopment schemes. All five of the leading types of developers 
active in refurbishment are providers of, rather than users of, office 
space. This form of development requires a 
high level of skill and 
management, and this probably explains the 
dominance by specialised 
developers like property companies and construction' companies. It 
also shows the pension funds' late entry 
into the development market 
409 
in 
; Edinburgh, when refurbishment provided some of the few available 
opportunities. 
In the case of redevelopment one can see both owner occupiers and 
speculators as major developers. As will be seen in the following 
section, both national companies and Scottish insurance companies, 
conducted many redevelopments for their own use, whereas the property 
companies and the investment trusts were prolific speculative 
26 
developers, producing 41,941 sq. m and 26,601 sq. m respectively. 
Hence, we see that development in Edinburgh has been undertaken by a 
wide range of different types of developers. The presence of property 
companies and financial institutions is marked, but so is that of the 
smaller developer. Not surprisingly, we have seen a distinct 
relationship between small scale applicants and more minor forms of 
development. We have also seen how quite major developers have 
involved themselves in some small and medium scale schemes (e. g. 
pension funds and refurbishments). We noted in Chapter 4 that 
development can be undertaken to secure returns by either increased 
benefits through owner occupation, or pecuniary returns through rent 
or sale. If we are to understand how policy has affected the 
interests of different types of developers, we must know something 
about variations in their individual interests. Assessing the 
"purpose" behind applying for planning permission is one such 
indication. An analysis of these various motives for office 
development might also suggest what the reactions of different 
26. English and Scottish property companies together. 
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developers to the office restraint policy might be. For example, one 
of -the aims of the office restraint policy was to inhibit speculative 
development but which developosfrom our extensive range, was acting in 
such a way? The following section attempts to answer such questions. 
The Purpose Behind Applications for Planning Permission 
As, yet, only vague mention has been made about the purpose of 
applications by developers. For instance, it has been noted that 
Scottish insurance companies were usually interested in owner- 
occupation after their development of sites. This section attempts to 
identify clearly what different developers were seeking to achieve 
through development. Gathering the statistics presented below was a 
difficult task which involved trying to cross reference applications 
from the Planning Register with Valuation Rolls to establish whether 
the ownership of development sites had been maintained or not after 
development had been undertaken. In order to reduce this to a 
manageable task, all sites which were the subject of planning 
applications before December 1967 had their ownerships and occupation 
checked in the 1968 valuation roll. Developments after December 1967 
27 
were checked against the 1978 Valuation Roll Obviously, this 
27. Cross referencing was difficult for one particular reason. Clearly 
any development which was occupied or let by an applicant could be 
identified by cross-reference, since the applicant would be 
recorded as landowner in the Valuation Rolls. However, when 
identifying sales one would have to assume that the applicant 
owned the parcel of land referred to in the planning application 
at the time of application. This is a bold assumption to make if, 
as was the case, access to local authority files was denied. If 
it was owned at time of application, then manifestly a sale had 
taken place. If not, then the applicant could have been 
contracted to submit the application or the application was being 
made on property not owned by the applicant. In an attempt to 
resolve this problem, further cross-referencing was carried out 
(contd) 
411 
method can only give a rough indication of what has happened. This is 
because such a method lumps together those developers who sold 
property immediately after completing the development with those who 
held onto it for a few years. Similarly, it also misses out how many 
times a property was sold in the period between the time of the 
development and when the ownership was rechecked. However, the only 
way of performing this task thoroughly would be to make a complete 
site history of ownership and occupation for each of the 400 
developments undertaken. Such a task was impracticable given the 
resources of a single person over a limited span of time. Any gaps in 
available information have resulted in the omission of that particular 
case from the final data set. As Table 9.6 shows, these omissions are 
largely related to particular types of developer who were difficult 
to trace, like local citizens. Indeed, the data on local citizens was 
so poor, representing less than 10% of what was developed, that its 
inclusion in Table 8.7 would re misleading. 
From Table 9.6, a distinct group of "owner occupier-developers" can be 
27. (contd) for all developments where the developer was not picked up 
at the two dates mentioned in the text. For each case, reference 
was made to the Valuation Roll relevant to the year of the 
application to establish whether or not the applicant did have any 
interest or not. This only occurred on ten occasions (twice each 
with Scottish property companies and three times each with English 
property companies and investment trusts (34,290 sq. m in total). 
These problems are not related to other problematic cases when the 
researcher could not be certain of relationships. For example, if 
the name of an individual was on the planning application but the 
occupation of site was by a local based company, was the 
individual a member of the company, was that company his or had an 
individual sold on? These questions are impossible for the 
researcher to answer. As a consequence, the data for this section 
was poor for applicants like local citizens, but it was quite good 
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identified. These include both nationally and locally based 
companies, the Scottish insurance companies and the banks and building 
societies in the private sector, as well as the whole of the public 
sector. This means that most of the developments proposed by, and 
subsequently completed by, these applicants were later occupied by 
them. 
A second group, equally identifiable by their lack of post-development 
owner occupation, can be called "pure developers". They include the 
Scottish and English property companies, the pension funds, property 
investment trusts and investment trusts as well as non-Scottish 
insurance companies (who have only retained 11% of their developments 
in central Edinburgh). 
One can also discern slightly different development activities between 
different "pure developers". There are those who retain finished 
developments for letting and those who sell the completed buildings 
on. The investment trusts, pension funds and English property 
companies all sold approximately one quarter of their completed 
developments. The non-Scottish insurance companies sold almost half 
of their completed developments. This contrasts with the property 
investment trusts which retained all their completed developments, and 
the Scottish property companies which retained 90%. 
In total, the "pure developers" retained, on average, about 80% of 
their completed developments which might indicate that central 
Edinburgh was considered by them to be a relatively safe area for 
414 
long-term property investment. However, before examining how the types 
of developer and the purpose of development have changed through time, 
we should briefly complete our understanding of the "interests" of 
various developers who were active in central Edinburgh, by examining 
which locations within central Edinburgh proved attractive to which 
developers. This will help to establish which developers were 
interested in merely developing in established commercial areas, and 
I 
which were operating more in the residential fringe. 
29 
The Spatial Distribution of the Development Activities of Different 
Types of Developer 
The distribution of developments completed by Edinburgh based citizens 
is shown in Figure 9.13. Given the relationship between such 
applicants and the type of developments they are usually involved 
with, Figure 9.13 very clearly reflects Figure 7.7 illustrating the* 
distribution of changes of use. For such small developments, the 
threshold of this particular map is quite high. Therefore only the 
more important areas of citizen-promoted developments can be seen. 
The. main areas were to the north west of the central area, largely on 
the . edge of the established 
business area. The most important focus 
was Palmerston Place, where at least 5,000 sq. m of such development 
took place. In contrast, there was virtually no development to the 
south of the Princes Street/Shandwick Place axis. 
Similarly, Figure 9.14 only shows the main areas of local company 
development. We can see a different set of locations were developed by 
these local companies. The main areas were at the edge of established 
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themselves. Most of the development shown in Figure 9.14 took place in 
residential properties. As with local citizens, very little 
development was carried out by locally based companies in the South 
Side. 
Figure 9.15 relates to the developments of nationally based companies. 
It- contains too few developments for a pattern to be identifiable. 
There were two very large offices developed by these companies for 
owner occupation in the South Side (one is 11,520 sq. m) and two large 
offices 'in the First New Town. The large offices in the South Side 
'were for business administration (a shipping line and a brewery) and 
did not require regular contact with other offices or the public. 
distribution of the developmental activities of the property 
companies are given in Figures 9.16 and 9.17. As we know, Scottish 
property companies have been particularly concerned with new 
-developments, although they did become involved with refurbishments in 
the, later part of the study period. Figure 9.16 demonstrates that 




the St. James' Centre development . However, the pattern of 
activity was to concentrate on new development in and around the main 
business areas. They have not performed similar developments in the 
South Side. There was only one large refurbishment (in Frederick 
Street), carried out by them. 
8. Although the Scottish company which negotiated the St. James' 
Centre development was later taken over by a London-based company. 
418 
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Figure 9.17 reveals the mixture of different development types 
undertaken by English property companies. As has already been shown, 
they were extremely active in the change of use and refurbishment of 
properties in both the West End and First New Town. They were also 
very active in early redevelopments in parts of the First New Town. 
Their largest development was performed in the most prestigious and 
expensive development area, St. Andrews' Square. They have 
concentrated on the more "prime" areas of the First New Town. This 
indicates the substantial resources of some of these English property 
companies to be able to secure development opportunities in these 
areas given the competition for property and space in such locations. 
Again, like all the other types of developer discussed so far, these 
English property companies paid minimal attention to the South Side 
where', they only undertook one office development. 
I 
As we know, the Scottish insurance companies had two main purposes in 
developing in the central area. The first was for investment purposes 
and: the second, more common reason, was for owner occupation. They 
were 'Edinburgh's second most prolific developers and most of the 
, developments shown 
in Figure 9.18 show their early activity in the 
redevelopment of St. Andrews' Square and their later involvement 
in 
redeveloping the eastern ends of George Street and Thistle Street. 
Nearly all of this was for owner occupation. Outside of this very 
sharply defined area, the Scottish 
insurance companies have been 
involved in very little development except fora few refurbishments. 
They have not been involved in developing the South Side and indeed 
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type of business they are involved with, this is not surprising (see 
McCowan, 1970). 
Although their level of development activity and purpose for 
development has been shown to be very different to that, of the 
Scottish insurance companies, the non-Scottish insurance companies 
showed a similar desire to constrain their development activities 
within the confines of the First New Town (see Figure 9.19). They 
were primarily concerned with George Street and St. Andrews' Square 
but, as has been stated earlier, very little of this development was 
for owner occupation. This pattern illustrates their ability to 
develop', in the very best of the prime areas if they so desire but, 
interestingly in terms of their overall level of investment in 
developing central Edinburgh, it appears that they did not wish to. 
The very low level of pension fund activity is revealed by Figure 
9.20.. Indeed, they have only been involved in seven individual 
developments. Like the non-Scottish insurance companies, these 
potentially resourceful developers have tended to focus their 
development activities on the prime areas of the centre. 
Construction companies have only been involved with development in 
Edinburgh to a limited extent. Their two largest developments are 
J 
shown in Figure 9.21. They undertook one large new development 
in the 
South Side, for occupation by a central government department at the 
very start of the study period. Another speculative refurbishment was 
also undertaken in George Street by a construction company which 
424 
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became a very active developer in the mid 1970s 
As noted already, investment trusts were major developers in central 
Edinburgh. Their largest development was Argyle House in the South 
Side. However, in addition to this, they have been involved with at 
least seven other major developments. Figure 9.22 illustrates that 
the less central location of Argyle House was not unusual for office 
developments undertaken by these investment trusts. There were other 
developments close to Argyle House, as well as to the north-east and 
the south-west of the First New Town. However, investment trusts have 
also been involved in a variety of different sized developments within 
the First New-Town, including two upper storey developments in Princes 
Street. Interestingly, the investment trusts have not been involved 
in either Charlotte Square or St. Andrews' Square where developments 
have been demonstrably less speculative. It is also interesting to 
note that, in general terms, the 
investment trusts in central 
Edinburgh have been shown to be more willing to develop in outside 
areas,: even than the property companies. This perhaps 
illustrates a 
more; 
speculative nature. Corroborative evidence for this could be 
drawn from Figure 9.10, which saw the investment trusts purchasing or 
dispensing of their land very rapidly in comparison to the insurance 
companies. 
There is little point in presenting a map of local government 
30 
development since only one major development would be shown . Figure 
9.23, shows only four major developments undertaken by central 
29. Miller Construction Ltd. 
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government. One was in the South Side and two were at the very edge 
of office activities. This demonstrates how government offices have 
tended to locate in more peripheral parts of the central area, where 
the costs of land were low. There was only one major and one minor 
exception to this. Both were located towards the western end of 
George Street. 
Figure 9.24, shows the development of bank and building society 
premises in central Edinburgh. We have already noted that much of the 
bank development occurred late in the study period when non-Scottish 
banks were arriving in Edinburgh to make themselves available for 
business connected with North Sea oil and the possible establishment 
of a Scottish Assembly. Similarly, the mid-1970s also revealed 
increasing building society development interest. Most of the 
developments performed by these two groups were refurbishments and, as 
Figure 
,, 
9.24 shows, this was mostly concentrated to the middle and 
western end of George Street reflecting their desire for highly 
accessible locations for passing custom. There was one minor 
development in the South Side and a few others dispersed throughout 
the'` northern half of the central area, representing the opening of 
branch banks and building societies. 
One can summarise the factors which determine who develops where as 
being dependent upon what land and capital resources a developer 
possesses, what the developer 
is trying to achieve through the 
development, the level of risk the developer will take, the stance 
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opportunities for site purchase that are open to the developer at any 
particular time. The last of these variables would be almost 
impossible to assess even if the Register of Sasines was used. 
However, with respect to the other variables it appears that 
developments promoted by citizens were largely determined by the land 
assets they possessed, whereas the developments by Scottish insurance 
companies, local and national companies and the banks and building 
societies were determined by the purpose for which they intended to 
use the office at a later date. Despite variations in the size and 
origin of property companies, they appeared only to be interested in 
prime sites north of Princes Street and Shandwick Place. This is also 
true of non-Scottish insurance companies and pension funds, 
illustrating their willingness to pay a high price for secure 
investments. Investment trusts appeared a little more adventurous 
although it should be pointed out that some of their developments 
outside prime areas were 'commissioned' by central government 
departments. This was also the case with the only development by a 
construction company in the South Side. 
Hence, we have seen that the different resources that developers 
possess and the different motives they 
have for engaging in 
development, result in varying patterns of development activity by 
different developers. Although the office restraint policy applies 
similar restraints across the whole of the central area, policies such 
as the residential policy might be expected to affect different types 
of developers to varying extents. Before considering whether 
different developers have been treated similarly by the development 
433 
control system in Edinburgh, it is worth monitoring how the structure 
of the development industry working in Edinburgh has changed over time 
and the extent to which the 'purpose' of development has changed with 
it. . 3-... 
Changes in the Development Industry and the Purpose of Development 
Through Time 
The- indications from Chapter 5 were that both the type of developer 
and : the 'purpose' of development have been changing in the central 
areas of British cities since the mid-1950s. The suggestion in 
Chapter 5 was that a development industry in Britain has evolved over 
time. This industry concentrates on developing property for sale and 
lease, as opposed to past patterns of development for owner 
occupation. Table 9.7 illustrates quite clearly that early development 
pressure (approvals and refusals) in central Edinburgh originated 
primarily from those developers seeking to occupy completed 
-properties. The main developers 
in the early 1960s were central 
government, national companies and Scottish insurance companies. The 
major, "pure developers" were construction companies and Scottish 
property companies. (In the light of later years 
it is interesting to 
note that English property companies are conspicuous by their absence 
in this first time period). 
-The-statistics for 1963 to 1966 are dominated by the 
investment trust 
development at Argyle House. Other than this commissioned 
development, the major developers were again owner occupiers, namely, 
local: government and Scottish insurance companies. The English 
property companies are seen as quite 
important developers by the mid- 
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1960s (as one might expect given the history described in Chapter 5). 
If one looks at the smaller-scale developers, both this time interval 
and the next reveal a lot of activity by local citizens trying to 
obtain planning permissions. 
The period 1967-1970 is dominated by the development of the St. James' 
Centre. If this is discounted then English property companies were 
the most 'important developers along with investment trusts. Hence, it 
would appear that the "development industry" we described in Chapter 5 
was extremely active in central Edinburgh by the end of the 1960s. 
The boom period of the early 1970s sees this pattern continued further 
with the situation becoming increasingly dominated by Scottish and 
English property companies and investment trusts. Interestingly, the 
amount of space applied for by both local and national companies rose 
sharply in this period and is probably related to some companies 
responding to opportunities relating to'North Sea oil. 
The period from 1975 to 1978 clearly shows the arrival of a range of 
banks (English and overseas) following the opportunities for finance 
and services thrown up by North Sea oil. In this period, the banks 
2 
developed over 14,500m of office space, mainly by refurbishment in 
the prime area of George Street, Hanover Street and Frederick Street. 
Interestingly, the English property companies maintained some interest 
in the central area whereas the Scottish property companies apparently 
withdrew. One must also note that the pension 
funds appear for the 




In general terms, one can see that, over time, government involvement 
in office development has dwindled. This is also largely true of 
national companies and Scottish insurance companies. In contrast, 
investment trusts, English and Scottish property companies and the 
non-Scottish insurance companies increased their substantial interests 
until the collapse in the property market in 1974 after which their 
interest dwindled. Local companies and banks have been particularly 
active as developers for owner-occupation throughout the 1970s, 
whereas the pension funds have only become particularly active in the 
last part of the study period. 
In terms of the amount of property retained by developers for their 
own use after development, Table 9.8 demonstrates that the percentage 
has dropped considerably over our 20-year study period. In 
compensation for this, the trend 
in leasehold has been upwards, rising 
from 12 per cent to 65 per cent. It is important to note that 
"development-for-sale" grew up to the boom period of the early 1970s 






1959-62 1963-66 1967-70 1971-74 1975-78 
Owner 75.8 62.9 39.4 23.7 30.1 
Occupation 
Leasehold 12.3 13.9 24.1 46.8 65.0 
Sale 11.9 23.1 36.5 29.5 4.9 
Table 9.8: Percentage of Property by Amount, Leased or Sold after 
Development, by all types of Developer, central Edinburgh 
1959 1978, using all available data 
437 
sale to finance others developments. After the property crash, 
'selling-on' slumped from approximately 30 per cent to less than 5 
per cent. This trend in development for sale or lease rather than for 
owner' occupation is closely related to the changes in the types of 
developer and the growth of a development industry. 
If we make use of our earlier distinction between "owner occupier" and 
"pure" developers to redraft Table 9.7, we can further demonstrate 
that the pure developers have become the major form of developer in 
central Edinburgh. Table 9.9 reveals that positions of importance 
have switched from one where owner-occupiers performed three quarters 
of all developments at the start of the study period to one where pure 
31 
developers were producing a similar proportion by 1978 
Percentage 
Type of Developer 
Owner-Occupier 
'Pure Developers' 
1959-1962 1963-1966 1967-1970 1971-1974 1975-1978 
74 44 (66)* 32 (48)* 34 28 
26 56 (33)* 68 (52)* 66 72 
Table 9.9: Percentage of Development Applied for by Owner Occupiers 
and 'Pure Developers', Central Edinburgh 1959 1978 
* if Argyle House and the St. James' Centre are discounted. 
31. Tables" 9.8 and 9.9 differ because the former concentrates on 
. 
generalising about the purpose for development. Table 9.9 
concentrates on generalising about who was performing the 
development. As such, there are some differences between the two 
tables, ' since not all developments done by pure developers were 
leased or sold. 
438 
above table demonstrates clearly that both the structure of 
landownership and the form of the development industry in central 
Edinburgh have been experiencing change. These changes were closely 
interrelated with much of the land purchase being a prerequisite to 
development. Hence, the office restraint policy, with its particular 
target' of reducing speculative development came into effect at a time 
when `the - trend was for a growing proportion of developments to be 
32 
carried out by "pure" developers 
There has therefore been a dramatic change in terms of developers 
active in central Edinburgh. Hence, we can now ask whether 
speculative developers fared better or worse than other types of 
developers in the last part of the study period (or indeed, in any 
part of the study period), or whether the local companies generally 
fared better under the local government decision-making process. The 
following section investigates whether there is any statistical 
evidence ` to suggest that different types of developers received 
differential treatment at the hands of the local planning authority in 
central Edinburgh with respect to their office development activities. 
The Treatment of Different Office Developers by City of Edinburgh 
District Council 
In an attempt to establish whether different developers have been 
33 
treated differently by the City of Edinburgh District Council, this 
2 Not all developments by "pure developers" are speculative. 
However, given that most office developments take between one and 
four years to complete, it is rarely possible for an office 
developer to be sure who the tenant will be at the time of 
applying for planning permission. Exceptions normally relate to 
government institutions-and, occasionally, national companies. 
33. The term "different treatment" is to be understood with reference 
to statistical testing rather than seen as any implication of 
unfairness 
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section briefly lists the amounts of office space applied for by the 
different developers that were refused planning permission. This is 
by an assessment of all the decisions made on applications submitted 
by different types of developers. The size of the data does not allow 
a full, chi-squared analysis of decision making to be carried out. 
However, there appears to be no alternative test available which will 
establish conclusively whether the variations observed in the rates of 
refusal - experienced by the different types of developers are 
statistically different from that which one might expect through a 
34 
random process . These leave some problems for analysis. 
Norcliffe (1977) notes that, in order to use the chi-squared test, 
three principal assumptions must be met, namely, that: 
(a) the data may be measured at the nominal scale or any higher level 
of meaurement; 
(b) there must be at least two samples and two mutually exclusive 
categories into which the observations are placed; and 
(c) no category should have an expected frequency less than 1, and not 
more than one category in five should have an expected frequency 
less than 5. 
Whilst it has proved possible to meet the first and second of these 
criterion 
in the following tables, the inherent characteristics of the 
data set does not allow it to pass the third. Alternatives such as 
the Fisher-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are inappropriate 
since-the data is neither capable of expression in a2x2, contingency 
table nor is it capable of ordinal ranking. Consequently, a decision 
has been taken to use chi-squared scores, but as descriptive rather 
than analytical tools to review decisions made on office developments. 
34. By random process is meant one where the probability of acceptance 
was essentially equal for all the various types of developers and 
any departures from equality were due to small perturbations of a 
random kind. 
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In defence of this it is possible to argue that, since individual chi- 
squared scores are calculated by dividing the square of the between 
observed and expected frequencies by the expected frequency then, if 
expected frequencies are smaller than statistical rigour allows the 
chi-squared score will become artificially inflated. Consequently, 
when summed, there is a then a greater possibility of making a 'Type 
1' error, namely rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, 
true. However, if this is borne in mind then, in cases where the null 
hypothesis would be accepted on the basis of the completed chi-squared 
test, it is reasonable to suppose that such a finding is valid. 
Clearly no such assurance can be given in cases where the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Such assessment is admittedly crude but, as 
stated earlier, there is no alternative known to the author. 
Consequently, results of this assessment will be treated with the 
utmost caution! 
Using the information available, the amount of space refused for 
different developers is shown in Table 9.10. As can be seen, local 
companies seem to have had a great deal of their proposed office space 
turned down. This is unlike some of the other occupier-developers, 
who experienced very low rates of refusal. Both English and Scottish 
property companies experienced high rates of refusal (in terms of 
proposed space) as did pension funds and non-Scottish insurance 
companies. A major exception seems to have been the investment trusts 
2 
who, it appears, built more than 60,000 m of office space in the 
central area without experiencing a single refusal of planning 
permission. (The only recommendation of refusal by the planning sub- 
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Table 9.16: Floorspace Refused by Type of Applicant: 
Central 
Edinburgh, 1959-1978 















committee identified by the author was overturned by full committee). 
The reasons for this are unclear, but it could be that their 
relationship to land development is such that the smallest delays will 
affect their investment performance and, therefore, they are willing 
to enter into extensive negotiations to circumvent any difficulties 
involved in obtaining permissions. However, the evidence that 
property investment trusts did suffer refusals would seem to 
contradict this. Given the inter- and intra-governmental negotiations 
concerning land development, and the rights of government bodies to 
claim deemed permission for thier proposals, the low levels of 
refusals for local and central government in the central area are not 
surprising. 
Table 9.11 reveals that different developers experienced widely 
ranging rates of refusal in terms of the percentage of the amount of 
space they were trying to build. The variation is enormous from 68 
per cent space refused for local companies, to almost no refusals for 
government developers and the investment trusts. The figure for local 
companies is somewhat distorted by three sizeable redevelopments that 
2 
were refused (equal to 13,128m in total). However, the point remains 
that there is a manifestly high level of variation in the percentages 
of space refused for different developers around a mean of 
approximately 25 per cent. 
If one were to look uncritically at all the decisions made by the 
local planning authority on office developments between 1959 and 
35 
1978 , then 
it could seem that different types of developer had been 
















Citizens 9989 5115 15104 33.9 
Local Companies 12538 27047 39585 68.3 
National Companies 23193 4618 27811 16.6 
Scottish Property 28336 15201 43537 34.9+ 
Companies 
English Property 37107 12130 49237 24.6 
Companies 
Scottish Insurance 37331 3749 41080 9.1 
Companies 
Other Insurance 7182 7385 14567 50.7 
Companies 
Pension Funds 11426 7165 18591 38.5 
Property Investment 3775 4737 8512 55.6 
Trusts 
Construction 12006 4315 16321 26.4 
Companies 
Investment Trusts 36004 0 36004 0.0+ 
Estate Agents 4312 269 4581 5.8 
Local Government 13476 129 13605 0.9 
Central Government 21323 0 21323 0.0 
Banks & Building 21644 931 22575 4.1 
Societies 
Other 13390 2698 16084 16.8 
Table 9.11: Amounts of Floorspace Permitted and Refused by Type of 
Applicant: Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 (extensions 
omitted 
Average % of floorspace refused = 24.5 
+ major development not included in calculations 
(Argyle House, St. James' Centre) 
44.4 
treated differently (see Table 9.12). However, approximately one in 
three of the expected frequencies is below five, therefore a chi- 
square test of significance is not statistically valid in this case. 
As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Notwithstanding 
these problems, Table 9.12 does suggest that there are interesting 
differences between observed and expected numbers of refusals which 
merit further examination. If Tables 9.11 and 9.12 are taken together 
one can see that banks and building societies, investment trusts, 
Scottish insurance companies and government bodies appear to fare 
substantially better than other developers with respect to obtaining 
permissions, whilst locally based Edinburgh firms have fared 
relatively poorly. 
These are interesting results but, even if the chi-squared test was 
applicable, they would not prove anything since, as previously shown, 
different developers show different patterns in the types of 
development they apply for. Because these different types of 
development themselves experience varying rates of refusal, we could 
simply be looking at a situation where banks and building societies 
have a very low rate of refusal because most of the developments they 
were involved with were refurbishments. Table 9.13, shows this to be 
the case. A chi-squared test cannot be performed since 46% of the 
expected frequencies are below 5. However, it is clear that the 
observed and the expected are very different in a large number of 
cases (e. g. citizens and refurbishments and redevelopments, and 
Scottish Property Companies, Pension Funds with refurbishments). As a 
result we must try and account for this relationship between type of 
developer and type of development in any assessment we perform. 
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Citizens 60 28 88 22 1.64 
Local Companies 69 37 106 27 3.70 
National Companies 24 5 29 7 0.57 
Scottish Property 23 10 33 8 0 5 Companies . 
English Property 32 13 45 11 0.36 Companies 
Scottish Insurance 21 3 24 6 1 5 Companies . 
Other Insurance 12 6 18 4 1 Companies 
Pension Funds 9 1 10 3 1.33 
Property Investment 4 2 6 2 0 
Trusts 
Construction 
11 6 17 4 1 Companies 
Investment Trusts 25 0 25 6 6 
Estate Agents 18 5 23 6 0.17 
Local Government 8 1 9 2 1 
Central Government 14 0 14 4 4 
Banks & Building 
Societies 36 2 38 10 6.4 
Other 31 17 48 12 2.08 
Table 9.12" Chi-Squared test to establish whether the local planning 
Authority treated different developers differently, Central 
Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
local and central government decisions included 
probability of a refusal = 0.255 
v= (16-1) = 15 
tabulated X2 value at the 95% confidence level = 25.00 
calculated X2 value 31.25 
Ho : that different types of developer are not treated 
differently by the_local planning authority 
This data does not meet the assumptions required for a 
chi-squared test of significance and the result should 
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Information on the decisions made on redevelopments over the full 
period (Table 9.14), indicates that applicants were not, treated 
differently by the local authority. Even with the distortions 
introduced into the chi-squared score by small expected frequencies, 
the null hypothesis would still be rgjeAed. However, Table 9.15, 
does exhibit some noticeable differences between what might be 
expected and what was actually observed. Banks, building societies 
and investment trusts have fared far better, and Scottish property 
companies far worse, than one might have expected. 
There are problems in interpreting this last result. For example, it 
is possible that certain applicants were primarily trying to secure 
the change of residential property to offices whilst others, like 
banks, were working to change shops and other commercial buildings 
into offices. These two very different types of activities could well 
have different rates of refusal, especially given the councils policy 
relating to the loss of residential property. 
In order that terminological problems of what were 'changes of use' 
and 'refurbishments' should not cause unnecessary further ambiguity, 
an indicative chi-squared figure was calculated for refurbishments and 
36 
changes of use together (i. e. all developments retaining the 
existing structure). The final calculated chi-squared score was 
22.085, against a tabulated value of 22.36 (with 13 degrees of 
freedom, with local and central government omitted from calculation as 
being very different types of developers), indicating that it is by no 
36. It is not possible to carry out such an assessment on refurbish- 
ments alone, since there were no refusals. 
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Type of Developer Approved Refused Total Expected (O-E) 2 
E 
Citizens 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Companies 6 3 9 3 0 
National Companies 4 0 4 1 1 
Scottish Property 10 1 11 3 1.3 Companies 
English Property 6 6 12 4 1 Companies 
Scottish Insurance 8 2 10 3 0.3 
Companies 
Other Insurance 4 3 7 2 0.5 
Companies 
Pension Funds 2 1 3 1 0 
Property Investment 1 2 3 1 1 Trusts 
Construction 1 3 4 1 4 
Companies 
Investment Trusts 7 0 7 2 2 
Estate Agents 2 0 2 1 1 
Local Government 2 0 2 not inc luded 
Central Government 4 0 4 
in calc ulations 
Banks and Building 7 1 8 2 0.5 Societies 
Other 2 4 6 2 2 
Total 60 26 86 14.6 
Table 9.14: Chi-Squared test to establish whether the Local Planning 
Authority treated applicants for permission to redevelop 
differently, Central Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
probability of a refusal = 0.302 
v= (14-1) = 13 
tabulated X2 score at the 95% confidence level = 22.36 
calculated X2 score = 14.6 
Ho : that applicants seeking permission to redevelop sites 
in Central Edinburgh are not treated significantly 
differently 
This data does not meet the assumptions required for a 
chi-squared test of significance and the result should 
therefore be seen as a descriptive one only. 
4-49 
means certain that the pattern of refusals was significantly different 
from what could have occurred randomly. Indeed, given the likely 
exaggeration of the chi-squared score, this cannot be claimed at all. 
However, in spite of these problems, there are still some substantial 
variations in observed and expected values that are of interest. 
It appears therefore that much of the variation in refusal rates noted 
in Table 9.12 is related to the different forms of development in 
which different types of developers engage. Despite interesting 
variations in developer performance "within" types of development, we 
cannot establishthat they are significant in statistical terms, 
especially since there are factors which affect the levels of success 
for different types of developer even in these more detailed analyses. 
For example, looking more closely at the type of developer that fared 
particularly badly in Table 9.15, seven of the eight changes of use 
applications submitted by Scottish property companies which were 
refused, were trying to change residential property to offices. Some 
2 
of the proposals were quite extensive. One was 3,644m and three 
2 
others were over 550m in size. Hence, the chi-squared score given in 
Table 9.15 has been substantially influenced by the local authority 
applying its restraint policies rigorously against an opportunistic 
type of speculative developer. Despite this the lower than expected 
rates of refusal for banks and building societies and investment 
trusts cannot be ignored. However, in this case, most. of the 
developments undertaken by banks and building societies were changes 
of use and refurbishments in established business areas. The local 
authority might well have thought that the possible benefits of 
facilitating growth in the banking sector far outweighed the minimal 
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Type of Developer Approved Refused Total Expected (0-E)2 
E 
Citizens 60 28 88 26 0.15 
Local Companies 57 31 88 26 0.96 
National Companies 15 5 20 6 0.17 
Scottish Property 3 8 11 3 Companies 8.33 
English Property 18 7 25 7 0 Companies 
Scottish Insurance 8 1 9 3 1 3 Companies . 
Other Insurance 6 3 9 3 0 Companies 
Pension Funds 2 0 2 1 1 
Property Investment 2 0 2 1 1 Trusts 
Construction 6 2 8 2 0 Companies 
Investment Trusts 14 0 14 4 4 
Estate Agents 15 5 20 5 0.17 
Local Government 6 1 7 not inc luded 
Central Government 9 0 9 in calc ulations 
Banks and Building 22 1 23 7 5.14 Societies 
Other 22 13 38 11 0.36 
Total 253 104 357 22.58 
Table 9.15: Chi-Squared test to establish whether the Local Planning 
Authority treated applicants for permission to change the 
use of properties to offices differently, Central 
Edinburgh, 1959-1978 
probability of a refusal = 0.281 
v= (14-1) = 13 
tabulated X2 score at the 95% confidence level = 22.36' 
calculated X2 score = 22.58 
Ho : that applicants seeking permissions to change the use 
of a property to offices in Central Edinburgh are not 
treated significantly differently 
This data does not meet the assumptions required for a 
chi-squared test of significance and the result should 
therefore be seen as a descriptive one only. 
4I / 
costs in environmental terms, especially given that the developments 
were retaining valued built structures. 
The spectacular performance of the investment trusts is more difficult 
to explain. They have been involved in several major redevelopments 
in more peripheral areas of the city centre (see Figure 9.22). Other 
than these developments, the investment trusts have usually been 
involved in smaller changes of use and refurbishments in the New Town 
and the West End. Some of these have included residential properties. 
It remains unclear why this group of developers has fared so well. 
With respect to the last part of the study period, one might 
anticipate that a policy like the office restraint policy, which was 
geared to halting speculative development would lead to a non-random 
pattern of decision-making, with the "pure developers" experiencing 
higher than expected rates of refusal. Table 9.16 assesses this for 
all developments in the period January 1975 to December 1978. 
As can be seen, there is no case to suggest that speculative 
developers have been prejudiced against in the application of the 
office restraint policy. Even if the distortions in the chi-squared 
score were to be ignored, the null hypothesis would still be accepted. 
If refurbishments and changes of use are separated off and examined in 
the same way then a similar conclusion is reached with a calculated 
chi-squared score of only 14.655, against the same tabulated score of 
22.36 for the same period. Hence, specualtive developers did not 
appear to suffer as a result of the introduction of the office 
45 1ý 
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Type of Developer Approved Refused Total Expected (O-E) 
2 
E 
Citizens 2 8 10 44 
Local Companies . 11 15 26 11 1.45 
National Companies 4 2 6 2.5 0.1 
Scottish Property 6 3 9 4 0.25 Companies 
English Property 6 4 10 40 Companies 
Scottish Insurance 2 2 4 20 Companies 
Other Insurance 2 2 4 20 Companies 
Pension'Funds 6 1 7 3 1.33 
Property Investment 0 1 1 0.5 0.5 Trusts 
Construction 
4 3 7 30 Companies 
Investment Trusts 7 0 7 33 
Estate Agents 1 4 5 22 
Local Government 0 0 0 not included in 
Central Government 0 0 0 the calculations 
Banks and Building Societies 13 1 14 6 4.17 
Other 11 8 19 80 
Total 75 54 129 16.80 
Table 9.16: Chi-Squared test to establish whether the Local Plannin& 
Authority treated different developers differently betc: een 
January 1975 and December 1978, Central Edinburgh 
probability of a refusal = 0.419 
v= (14-1) = 13 
tabulated X2 at the 95% confidence level = 22.36 
calculated X2 = 16.80 
H. that different types of developer were not treated 
° differently by the local planning authority in the 
period January 1975 to December 1978 
This data does not meet the assumptions required for a 
chi-squared test of significance and the result should 
therefore be seen as a descriptive one only. 
restraint policy, despite expectations that they might do so given the 
inherent anti-speculative emphasis of the policy. 
Finally, with respect to this question of whether particular types of 
developers are favoured by the local authority, an analysis was 
carried out to ascertain which developers had been able to obtain non- 
conforming permissions. Using Table 8.1, which outlined the number of 
permissions that had been granted in apparent contradiction to office 
policy in central Edinburgh, the applicants involved in these cases 
where both the office restraint policy and residential protection 
37 
policy had been breached were identified. Of twenty four cases , 
seven permissions were gained by local companies, three by estate 
agents, and two each by investment trusts, central government and 
local people. The numbers are much too small to test statistically 
and are greatly influenced by the particular range of developers 
/ 
involved in developing residential property. However, the data is 
consistent with the view that "well connected" local companies and 
estate agents have some advantage in securing non-conforming 
permissions. 
The Involvement of Outside Pressure Groups in the Development Control 
Process 
Before concluding on the differential success of developers through 
the development control process, it is important to outline briefly 
37. This includes the situation when all three policies (including 
the Development Plan Zoning) were apparently disregarded. Other 
categories were not tested in this way for the reasons given in 
Chapter 8, but the protection of residential property. is a 
fairly clear policy statement to test, especially after the 
inception of the office restraint policy. 
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the role of outside interest groups in the development control 
process. This examination was somewhat curtailed by the reluctance of 
Edinburgh District Council to permit access to the individual files on 
each application. Such access would have helped to answer many of the 
questions raised by this thesis, particularly how active outside 
groups were in making their opinions known to the local authority when 
the implications of developments were being considered. However, it 
was felt necessary to at least get an impression of which groups were 
involved. 
The only available source of information was the voluminous minutes of 
the Planning Committee and Sub-Committee. Because these minutes 
naturally contain all the proceedings of a large city committee, and 
city centre developments emerge slowly over lengthy periods, a certain 
amount of time and effort was needed to follow the particular history 
of any developments. However, to make the task a manageable one, the 
history of forty-two development proposals that had been made during 
the study period in George Street and St. Andrews Square were 
reviewed. Although the Committee minutes tended to refer only to a 
limited range and form of consultation with outside bodies (namely 
formalised channels of information-exchange), some insights were 
possible. 
Formal contact with outside bodies appeared to relate exclusively to 
redevelopments. No such contacts were made on changes of use or 
refurbishment. Outside bodies were consulted on twelve of the twenty- 
38 
three proposals for redevelopment made across the full study period 
38. This includes recurring proposals on the same site. 
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Consultations were made on almost two thirds of the redevelopment 
proposals in St. Andrews Square and on less than half the proposals in 
George Street, possibly reflecting a greater concern with the 
architectural unity of the former. 
Over and above these twelve occasions, the consultees had their 
unsolicited comments recorded in Planning Committee minutes on three 
further occasions. Of this total of fifteen redevelopment proposals 
where outside views were formally represented to the relevant 
Committees, thirteen responses were opposed to the proposed designs 
and two considered the proposals to be satisfactory. As far as could 
be ascertained, nine of the fifteen schemes were eventually permitted 
after substantial negotiations and six were refused. 
Originally, there was a fairly limited range of consultees, primarily 
consulted on design issues pertaining to new developments (not on 
whether the redevelopment should take place). This group of 
consultees, which included the Princes Street Panel, Royal Fine Arts 
Commission and the Scottish Development Department, was widened by the 
requirement in the early 1970s so that civic societies should be 
consulted with respect to any intentions to demolish listed buildings. 
From that time, the Cockburn Association (otherwise known as the 
Edinburgh Civic Trust), the Scottish Civic Trust and the Scottish 
Georgian Society were all consulted with respect to potential 
demolitions of listed buildings. 
There are few conclusions to be drawn from this information except to 
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note -that outside bodies were only consulted on particular types of 
developments and that their opinions were often taken into account in 
negotiations over design criteria for new developments. If the 
outside bodies did not actually stop demolitions taking place nor have 
much influence on changes of use and refurbishments, they did 
contribute to debates on the design of replacement buildings and to 
the local authority's deliberations concerning redevelopments. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to establish which types of developer had been 
active in central Edinburgh between 1959 and 1978, assess the level of 
economic, political and land resources they possessed and ascertain 
whether or not the possession of such resources was in any way 
correlated with patterns in decision-making through the development 
control process by the planning sub-committee of City of Edinburgh 
District Council and its predecessor. 
We, ahave shown that there was a 
fairly wide range of developers 
operating in the city between 1959 and 1978 and that, in line with the 
national picture, a development industry has grown and come to 
dominate the process of office development in the city centre. 
Parallel to these changes, the motive behind development has also been 
demonstrated to have changed from a process carried out for owner- 
occupation to one conducted for short-term profit or assured income 
through rent. In addition, it has been clearly shown that certain of 
these::. developers have become increasingly powerful holders of land 
resources in central Edinburgh. This is particularly true of 
insurance companies, property companies and pension funds. 
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An. analysis of development control decisions has revealed some 
interesting patterns with respect to the level of success different 
types of developers have had with their planning applications. The 
main: feature has been that certain business interests would appear to 
have performed substantially better than others, with respect to 
securing planning permissions for change of use developments at least. 
However, this conclusion cannot be taken as a firm indication that the 
local planning authority has been involved in discriminatory activity. 
There are clear reasons why the chi-squared score was so high for 
changes of use. The Scottish property companies, many of which were 
small and based in Edinburgh, were seen to be actively trying to bring 
residential property into office use in strict contravention of the 
aims of planning policy. Hence, much of the "discrimination" against 
the Scottish property companies was directly related to their 
particular development activities. To a lesser extent this was also 
true of locally based companies, many of which had tried and failed to 
bring residential property into office use in the periphery of the 
central area. 
In`-contrast, the banks and building societies, Scottish insurance 
companies and investment trusts, fared very well with respect to 
development control decisions and their low rates of refusal. Much of 
the. redevelopment activity of the Scottish insurance companies and 
investment trusts was performed when there were few restrictions 
against such development and many of the developments by banks and 
building societies set out to reain the existing buildings. However, 
it, is possible to suggest that the potential for economic growth in 
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the financial sector offered through the arrival of foreign banks in 
Edinburgh influenced decision-making on office development in the 
central area, especially since environmental issues were not raised. 
If the local authority were under the same impression with respect to 
proposals by investment trust then they have been mistaken since a 
very high proportion of this group's finished developments have 
subsequently been let to tenants. 
With respect to the more contentious redevelopments, no discriminatory 
patterns were apparent in local authority decision-making. 
Presumably, this form of development has such severe impacts on 
townscape that no discretion could be exercised, 'especially in the 
period when such developments were to be restrained. With respect to 
the period of strict restraint, there was no particular discrimination 
against speculative developers in the last time period. 
Clearly, the results of this and the three previous chapters have 
implications for evaluating the theories outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, 
and earlier in this chapter. First and foremost is that the policy of 
office restraint was formulated and implemented reducing the range of 
profit-making opportunities for developers. Secondly, within the 
range of developers active in central Edinburgh, there have been some 
interesting variations in the levels of success they have experienced 
through the development control process. There would appear to be very 
littlerto support the notion that 'local chauvinism' would prevail in 
such an arena. In terms of large financial institutions faring well, 
this could perhaps be seen as a result that was directly-beneficial to 
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the local economy. As such a "big firms" strategy (Lojkine 1977) is 
also inappropriate since local firms would also have benefit ed. 
; These conclusions will be examined 
in much further detail in the 
concluding chapter. 
Although there have been variations in the level of success for 
different developers, there was also an underlying suggestion that the 
. primary consideration 
in the minds of the local authority decision- 
makers when adjudging proposals, was the form of development involved 
rather than the type of developer. However, it does appear to have 
been, the case that, as Underwoo&(1981b) has suggested, the whole 
system is subject to variation and discretion from decision to 
decision. The success of the investment trusts has highlighted 
clearly that there is a level of apparent ad hocery in decision- 
making. There appears to have been a fair number of relatively 
inexplicable lapses in the implementation of the office restraint 
policy. This chapter has shown that, at most, only a relatively small 
proportion of these lapses relate to the nature of the developer. 
This,, therefore, begs the question whether the policy itself contained 
inherent deficiencies in its form or expression which led to problems 
in its implementation for particular cases. Policies cannot be made 
to fit all possible situations and the way a policy is expressed can 
enhance or reduce its level of effectivness. The following chapter 
seeks,, to establish whether there were any problems in the 
: 
implementation" of the office restraint policy that were inherent as a 
result of the way in which it had been formulated and expressed. Such 
problems might help to explain further the apparent ad hocery observed 
in the decision-making of the local authority. 
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Chapter 10 
Office Restraint in Edinburgh: Policy in Action 
Introduction 
The past three chapters have made use of development control decisions 
to. illustrate the impact of developers and of state activities on the 
process of office development. The data provided, suggest that the 
local authority did respond to political pressures placed on it from 
outside interest groups and that the restraint policy, which was 
formulated as a result of those pressures, was applied reasonably 
equitably across different applicants and was mainly used to 
discriminate between forms of development. 
However, there are still questions that remain unanswered about the 
implementation of the policy. We know that the office restraint 
policy was implemented, but not in a mechanical way. This indicates 
that the* outcome of the development control process cannot be 
predicted with any certainty. Therefore, we need to be able to 
explain why a state activity like development control is somewhat 
unpredictable. The political. theories outlined at the beginning of 
Chapter 9 do not provide adequate explanations. 
However, in Chapter 6 we noted that the form in which the desire to 
restrain office development was expressed allowed the local authority 
substantial 'room for manoeuvre' in its decision-making. The results 
of Chapters-7,8 and 9 suggests that this discretion was later used. 
Could this inbuilt discretion have ultimately proved a weakness for 
460 
the implementation as a whole? Given that it is often impossible for 
a policy to cover all possibilities in terms of the highly varied 
context for land development, were astute developers able to take 
advantage of the inbuilt caveats and terminology of the policy to 
secure permissions, which on first impressions were contrary to the 
letter and spirit of the policy. At the very least, this may explain 
a further proportion of the apparent ad hocery observed in the 
decision-making process. 
The examination of the office restraint policy in action will also 
allow further, perhaps more subtle, interpretations of the patterns of 
decision-making given in the three previous chapters. Before such an 
examination it is worth making it absolutely clear why such an 
interpretation is necessary and why development control decisions are 
insufficient on their own to judge policy implementation. 
Conceptual Problems in Using Development Control Data for Policy 
Evaluation 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that a planning policy should not be viewed 
as a simple statement of intent or code of practice. Rather, planning 
policies form the basis for negotiations between interested parties 
and planning authorities. In general, the development of land is such 
a varied and complex process, that no simple set of policy rulings or 
guidelines could possibly hope to form a basis whereby decisions could 
be made routinely on development proposals. It is primarily for this 
reason that a simple analysis of local planning authority decisions is 
insufficient in itself to assess how a policy has been used. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the process of land development is 
complex. Not only are there organisational problems inherent in 
orchestrating the construction of the building, there is also the 
need for constant interaction between developers and the local 
authority over the ramifications and other aspects of a proposal. The 
larger a proposed development is, the greater the potential 
ternalities will be. Therefore, it is likely that a greater level 
public sector/private sector negotiations will be needed for larger 
velopments. This is important since it means that different sized 
plications are likely to be processed through the development 
ntrol system in different ways (viz. the larger redevelopments in 
orge Street and St. Andrews Square were discussed differently from 
anges of use since consultees were involved in the former and not 
e latter). 
is also worth reminding ourselves that the relationship between a 
anning policy and the decisions made on planning applications by 
anning authorities is not clear cut. For example, Kingsbury (1982) 
s-discovered, through investigations in six local authorities, that 
tween 24 per cent and 65 per cent of decisions made on planning 
plications were not directly related to any policy contained in a 
anning document. Underwood (1981b) has also noted that despite the 
sire, of development controllers to move away from discretionary 
wards routine decision making, the sheer variation exhibited by 
anning proposals results in development controllers being left with 




Healey et al (1982) have also noted that some policies in published 
plans evolve as a result of consistent responses of development 
controllers to particular types of proposal. These "policies" have 
therefore been in informal (or even unconscious) operation even before 
their eventual crystalisation into formal policy statements in 
statutory planning documents. This therefore raises questions about 
exactly when a policy comes into use, and the relevance of any policy 
to decisions made by a local planning authority. 
Hence-the relationship between policies and decisions is problematic. 
To -. imply that it is not, would be to fall into the misconception 
pointed out by Barrett and Fudge (1982), that implementation was 
linearly connected and subordinate to policy formulation. This 
therefore means that planning policies should be assessed through 
their role in determining-applications and forming the framework for 
negotiations. Some form of case study applications are needed to 
establish the real nature of, what is, a complex negotiating process. 
Finally, it is important to note that the existence and form of a 
policy ; are not unrelated to the 
level and type of development 
pressures experienced in an area. Both McNamara 
(1984a) and Elson 
1. Indeed, it should be reiterated that even statutory planning 
documents, and the policies contained in them, form only a part 
of-the material considerations to be taken into account by 
a planning authority when determining a planning application. The 
law states that each application must be viewed on its merits. 
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2 
(1982) have demonstrated that the very existence of a restraint 
policy can affect whether developers apply for planning permissions. 
The developer's perception of the strength of, say, a restraint policy 
can well affect his decision on whether to bother submitting a 
3 
planning application . Therefore rates of refusal could be quite low 
in a restraint area, not because the policy has not been implemented, 
but because the presence of a tough policy has deterred applications 
hat do not conform. Hence, there is a generally applicable rule 
hich suggests that all work on rates of refusal has to be qualified 
Y. case study and interview material as a means of interpreting the 
esults of any statistical examination. As stated earlier, this 
actor also makes the apparent high rates of refusal for developments 
fter the adoption of the office restraint policy even more 
emarkable. 
ence, it can be concluded that, whilst data on planning decisions can 
e considered useful in evaluating policies in very general terms, the 
final statistics can only be considered as descriptions (rather than 
xplanations) of the outcomes of what is a highly complex process of 
ublic sector/private sector interaction. The exact nature of that 
nteraction cannot be inferred from the statistical analysis, which 
an only form a basis for investigation. Further information which 
From interviews with residential and industrial developers working 
in Hertfordshire, regarding a tight restraint policy in the outer 
south east of England. 
It should be noted that, despite the findings of the previous 
chapters, Edinburgh is viewed by outside investors as a strict 
". -planning authority. 
Indeed, in the 1980s the local authority 
has become increasingly concerned over this image, especially 
since it feels that such an image might be deterring investors in 
a period of deep recession (see Appendix). 
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pertains directly to that public sector/private sector interaction is 
also required. 
Planning Appeals: An Alternative Source of Information 
In order to obtain information relating to the way in which the office 
restraint policy was operated, a, further extensive information 
gathering exercise was conducted. Unfortunately, access to 
development control files on individual planning applications was 
ultimately denied to the present author by Edinburgh District 
4 
Council . There is no question that these files would have formed 
the key source of information on the use of the office restraint 
policy since they record in detail the restraint postures adopted by 
the local authority and the utilisation of the restraint policy in 
5 
informal negotiations and other communications with developers . As a 
result of this setback, alternative sources of information had to be 
sought. Initially the present author attempted to piece together 
6 
application histories from publically available documents . This 
represented the assembly of material from newspaper reports, planning 
committee minutes and, where possible, existing publications and 
theses. However, this method of information collection was not cost 
effective in terms of the results produced. A far more fruitful 
information search was conducted through an analysis of planning 
appeal reports, which are held for public perusal at the Scottish 
National Library in Edinburgh. 
4. See Chapter 1, Footnote 2. 
5. This' was made very evident in the research work done in Hert- 
fordshire (McNamara 1984a, 1984b). 
6. Two of these case studies were presented in Chapter 6. 
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, stated in Chapter 3, anyone in Scotland who is refused planning 
permission for a development proposal has a right of appeal to a 
7 
higher order of planning authority . An inquiry is held, either in 
public or by written representations, into every appeal made to the 
Secretary of State. These inquiries are presided over by a 
8 
"Reporter" , who listens to the evidence presented and makes 
recommendations to the Secretary of State on what decision central 
government should make. This recommendation is accompanied by a 
precis of the arguments of both the appellant and the defending local 
authority which, along with the recommendation, is supposed to assist 
the'Secretary of State in making a decision. For the purpose of this 
thesis, these inquiries, and the reports which they generate, are of 
great, importance, since they succinctly list the range of arguments 
used by the development industry when trying to circumvent the office 
restraint policy in central Edinburgh. This sort of evidence allows 
us to assess the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the policy. It 
also, allows us to interpret central government responses to the 
existence and implementation of the office restraint policy. 
Local authority planning officers (more so than members of planning 
committees), are constantly aware of the dangers of appeal decisions 
going-against them. In such situations, where their original decision 
is-reversed by a higher authority, an "unplanned" development occurs. 
In the case of office development with the possibility of many 
attendant externalities, these ad hoc reverses of policy could have 
serious repercussions for central area planning. Therefore, planning 
7. See Chapter 3 for details. 
8. "Inspector" in England and Wales. 
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officers must constantly bear in mind all the potential arguments that 
are capable of being used against them when making decisions in the 
development control process and invoking policies as reasons for 
refusal. Hence, an examination of the arguments raised at planning 
appeals against the office restraint policy will produce some 
important insights about its use and application and its strengths and 
weaknesses. Individual case studies of planning appeals are largely 
irrelevant to our interests since they often turn on particular 
details or site characteristics. However, the arguments used commonly 
over a number of appeals are useful when viewed together. This is 
because the recurrence of common arguments indicates potential 
weaknesses in the office restraint policy, which may ultimately affect 
its day to day implementation. 
Obviously, appeal cases do not form a representative sample of all 
applicaticns. Firstly, they are all appeals against refusals of 
9 
planning permission . By definition, this means that these proposals 
were of specific types that fell outwith the bounds of the policy. 
They are also untypical of the way that most applications have been 
processed. Because the appeal inquiry is virtually an "arena of last 
resort", all the possible arguments which could be assembled against 
a particular planning policy as applied to a particular site, are 
brought together. These arguments are then often presented (in writing 
or at: public inquiry) by expert witnesses on behalf of appellants. 
9. It is appreciated that appeals can be made against conditions 
applied to planning approvals or the non-determination of an 
application within a given time period. However, the local 
authority contested each of the appeals described here with 
reasons as to why the developments should be refused. 
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This is most unlike the informal negotiations which surround the day- 
to-day decision-making on most planning applications. However, 
despite these problems, the information from these inquiries is still 
of great importance to us, given our focus of interest on the role of 
10 
the state in determining land use patterns The following section 
outlines the manner in which the office restraint policy was put under 
. scrutiny at planning 
appeals. 
Arguments Used by Private Sector Development Interests Against the 
Office Restraint Policy 
This section presents an examination of all the appeals made to the 
Secretary of State of Scotland against refusals of planning 
permissions to develop offices in central Edinburgh since publically 
available records were begun in 1976. A listing of these appeals is 
11 
given in Table 10.1 
By examining the information collected from planning appeal records, 
it has been possible to derive the main thrusts of argument used by 
appellants against the use of office restraint policy. They have 
been: 
a) arguments over the legality of the policy; 
b) arguments over the internal logic of the policy; 
c) arguments over the application of the policy; and 
d) arguments over the terminology of the policy, 
10. Where appropriate, arguments used against the office restraint 
policy at the Lothian Region Structure Plan, Examination-in-Public 
are included as corrobarative material. 
11. It will be seen that some of the appeals that have been examined 
took place after 1978. Evidence taken from these appeals is 
considered valid for examining the strengths and weaknesses of the 
-office restraint policy, because the policy has remained in force 
and relatively unchanged to date (October 1983) and consequently 
the arguments over the policy, at appeals, have not changed. As a 
result, they allow a fuller store of information to be utilised in 
assessing the policies. 
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129-133 Rose St A. A. Laing Ltd change of use 
5/6 Randolph Cresc Argyle Securities change of use 
9 Blenheim Place Forth Studies Ltd change of use 
24-28 Earl Grey St James Grant & Co Ltd change of use 
21 Chester Street Mr. Lovell change of use 
Hill Street Lane/ Hogarth Shipping redevelopment 
Queen Street Estates Ltd 
10 Albany Street Broadlands Property change of use 
Co. Ltd. 
8 Melville Crescent J. McLaughlin Ltd 
P/PPA/LA/109* 3 Torphichen Street n. a. 
change of use 
change of use 
P/PPA/LA/119* 34-35 Queensferry St Huddersfield & change of use 
Bradford B. Soc. 
P/PPA/LA/151* 5 Walker Street Scotia Daf Trucks Ltd change of use 
P/PPA/LA/154* 21 Manor Place Dr. M. C. Finlayson change of use 
P/PPA/LA/162* 14a-16 George St The Standard Life refurbishment 
Assurance Co (1982) 
P/PPA/LA/183* 9 Wemyss Place n. a. change of use 
Table 10.1: Planning Appeals Relating to Offices, Central Edinburgh, 
1976-1981 
* post 1978 appeal. 
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Since these different arguments had the potential to undermine the 
strength of the office restraint policy, it is proposed to take each 
of these types of argument in turn and illustrate the variety of forms 
they have taken when used by appellants and their consultants against 
its implementation. This is followed at each stage by an analysis of 
the defence made by the City of Edinburgh District Council against 
such attacks. Following this is a brief look at a major appeal in the 
South Side to show how the office restraint policies have been used in 
areas of blight. Together, this detail permits a sensitive assessment 
. of the strengths and weaknesses of the office restraint policy 
in 
12 
action to be made 
(a) Questioning the legality of the office restraint policy 
This form of attack on the office restraint policy took three 
principal forms. Firstly, and most importantly, development interests 
questioned the legal status of the office restraint policy. Secondly, 
the right of the local authority to use the office restraint policy to 
halt-an office development on a site that had already been in partial 
or '. 'pseudo" office use e. g. a dental surgery) was occasionally 
questioned and, thirdly, the use of the policy to halt certain office 
developments was often claimed to be unjust in that similar proposals 
had recently been permitted in the near vicinity. The following 
section reviews each form of argument in turn. 
In several different cases, it was argued that the office restraint 
12. Since all the appeals are referenced with P/PPA as a prefix, 
when individual cases are alluded to in the following text, only 
the LA/xx part of the reference number will be cited. 
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policy was not contained in any statutorily approved planning document 
and, as such, the appellant requested the Reporter to restrict his 
consideration of the proposal to take into account only the most 
recent documents with such approval (LA/162, LA/50). In all 
these cases, the proposal sites were found to fall within the 
Development Plan First Review zonings for general business purposes, 
where office use was a preferred land use (LA/2, LA/50, LA/99, 
13 
LA/162) . Hence, appellants were arguing that their proposal was in 
full, accord with the latest statutorily approved plan. Therefore, in 
considering the appeal, it was argued that the Reporter and Secretary 
of "State need not concern themselves with the office restraint policy 
(LA/50). Interestingly, when the office restraint policy was included 
in a statutorily approved document (the Lothian Region Structure Plan, 
1978), this argument was dropped since it could no longer be argued 
that the policy had no tangible central government or regional council 
support (LA/16). However, in response to this a new line of attack 
was designed by appellants. This was based on the fact that, since 
there was no site specific local plan for the central area, the only 
statutorily approved plan relevant to specific parcels of land was 
the -old Development Plan First Review. In this way the old argument 
about, the lack of legal status for the office restraint policy was 
reinstated. Had such arguments about the legal status of the policy 
been substantiated in the eyes of the Secretary of State then the 
office restraint policy would have collapsed overnight because most of 
the central area was covered by old general business zonings. Hence, 
local authority planners regularly bolstered the office restraint 
13. See Chapter 6. 
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policy in appeals by extra physical planning arguments against 
granting permission, as noted in Chapter 8. 
The defence of the local authority's position in this situation was 
difficult. Principal lines of defence were either to reinterpret past 
policies for the central area in a more restraint oriented way or 
reduce the status of past policies. In one case the local authority 
argued that the old Development Plan zonings were merely a rough guide 
for development controllers and did not represent automatic guarantees 
of 'planning permission (LA/50). On another occasion the local 
authority argued that each planning application had to be viewed on 
its merits, regardless of zonings (LA/99). 
The 'implication of the argument that the office restraint policy has 
no statutory basis is that the policy has no official support from 
central government. Therefore, one common defence of the status of 
the policy was for the local authority to indicate to the Reporter the 
various other forms of support for the policy that had been issued by 
central government. Of particular importance here are previous 
decisions issued by the Secretary of State which supported the office 
restraint policy. One particular decision was quoted frequently 
14 
(LA/47, LA/50 and LA/109) . In this appeal 
(at 9 Blenheim Place, 
LA/33), -the Secretary of State had noted that he was: 
" prepared to attach considerable weight to this 
stated policy (of office restraint in Central 
Edinburgh)", (para 6, LA/33). 
14. As Chapter 5 noted, decisions on planning appeals are a 
principal means by which central government can influence land use 
planning at the local planning level, if it so chooses. 
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The level of support for the policy at Regional level was questioned 
by appellants in two appeals. In response, the District claimed 
Regional Council support for the policy since: 
"A review of the restriction of office development 
policy in the central area, adopted by the District 
Council in March 1974, has been proposed by the 
Lothian Regional Report, but no revision or 
reversal of policy has yet emerged" (LA/50), 
Thus implying that the policy has full Regional Council support. 
A ; large team of Reporters 
is appointed by central government to deal 
with , planning 
inquiries as and when they arise. Therefore, 
appellants, or the relatively restricted number of planning experts 
who, are used as advocates by appellants, are able to repeatedly 
question the status of the office restraint policy at separate appeals 
in. the knowledge that two Reporters might view the same policy (and 
the arguments against it) differently. This inconsistency is examined 
further below. 
A number of refusals on small changes of use that eventually led to 
appeals being lodged, related to the change to full office use of a 
building already in part office use (LA/50), or in "pseudo" office use 
(LA/47, LA/154), or in temporary office, use (LA/16). The legal 
questions which arose have largely revolved around whether or not the 
proposed site was or was not already in office use. The evolution of 
these proposals into planning appeals is somewhat indicative of 
differing opinions of the applicant and the local authority over 
whether the full office use of the building was of consequence for the 
nearby area. Arguments tended to revolve around whether, say, 
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surgeries were offices or not, whether residential units would or 
would not be lost or not, and whether it was right that a temporary 
permission should or should not be made permanent. These cases tended 
to turn on the particularities of the individual site concerned. 
As McAuslan (1980) has noted, one of the ideologies of the land use 
planning system is that all applicants for planning permission stand 
equal before the law. Therefore, any claim by an appellant that he 
has been unjustly dealt with by a planning authority is a potent 
argument in an appeal, if it can be proved. In several appeals 
(LA/16, LA/33, LA/50 and LA/162), the agents acting for appellants 
produced substantial amounts of evidence to show that other 
developments, similar in type and location to their own proposal had 
previously been approved by the local planning authority and that, as 
a consequence, they had been unjustly singled out for refusal. In 
this way, ad hocery by a local authority can lead to further problems 
for that authority at a later stage. 
The'usual responses of the local planning authority in such situations 
included: - 
(a) the production of statistics to show how strictly 
the policy had been implemented in the nearby area 
(LA/16); ' 
(b) an analysis of the evidence presented by the 
appellant to reveal which "so-called" exceptions 
to the policy had, in fact, been within the types 
permitted by the office restraint policy; 
(c) arguments to show that the area within which the 
appellant had gathered his evidence was arbitrary 
and that a wider area showed the strict 
implementation of the policy more accurately; 
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(d) and the argument that each application was viewed 
on its merits, and that they had, therefore, acted 
justly in the past (LA/16, LA/99). 
It was sometimes in the appellant's interest to argue that his 
proposal was "special" in some way. This implies that the proposal 
could not be considered as a precedent by other developers (LA/16), 
and would not, therefore, lead to further appeals which could cite 
their, proposal as evidence in their favour, or prejudice the 
15 
implementation of the policy 
(b) Questioning the logic of the use of the office restraint policy 
There were two principal ways in which the logic behind the office 
restraint policy was attacked by appellants. Firstly, some appellants 
attacked the general logic behind the policy, claiming that there was 
a -known need for offices in the central area (LA/162 and LA/50) and 
that the policy was therefore ill founded and illogical. However, it 
is, important to note that an appeal relating to a specific development 
proposal is not a very appropriate forum for attacking the general 
application of a policy (since this is considered a matter for wider 
public'deb 
4 
within the plan-making process), and as such this type of 
attack was generally ignored by the Reporter. Secondly, and much more 
commonly, appellants argued that the logic of applying the office 
restraint policy to a particular proposal was misguided. In the case 
of office development in central Edinburgh these arguments normally 
revolved around the logic of keeping central area properties in 
residential use. Variations on this theme included: 
15.. In converse, the local authority argued that certain proposals 
would ultimately establish precedents (LA/99), and should not, 
; `. therefore, be permitted. 
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(i) that the property (or area) was not suitable for 
residential occupation (LA/2, LA/33, LA/183); 
(ii) that no tenants could pay the rent, if an 
economic rent was charged after necessary 
rehabilitation of the property (LA/99); 
(iii) that there was no demand for residential 
properties in such areas (LA/60). 
Although the local planning authority normally contested such lines of 
attack with various empirical evidence on rents and costs, the 
arguments tended to be conducted without much substantive evidence on 
either side. 
With respect to arguments over the general logic of the policy, the 
local authority response was simply to remind the Reporter of the 
necessity for, and the reasoning behind, the restraint of offices in 
the city centre. This allowed the Reporter to see a specific proposal 
in context with the general planning situation and demonstrated that 
their earlier decision to refuse development was consistent with a 
defensible policy and was therefore the right decision. 
(c) Questioning the application of the office restraint policy to 
specific proposals in central Edinburgh 
In the sense that these attacks on the office restraint policy were 
aimed at the application of the policy to particular proposals, they 
were akin to those described in the preceding section. The 
significant difference in these particular cases was that the "logic" 
of the policy was not questioned. Indeed, the spirit of the policy 
was regularly supported by appellants 
(LA/99, LA/154 and LA/162). 
However, in these cases it was the over-zealous way in which the 
policy was being applied which became the focus for appellants' 
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criticisms. The major criticism was that the office restraint policy 
was being interpreted too strictly. Appellants' arguments commonly 
claimed to show that: 
(i) the . traffic generation of 
the proposal was 
minimal (LA/33, LA/50, LA/154); 
(ii) the additional office space was minimal and would 
not undermine the policy (LA/2, LA/50); 
(iii) the existing buildings were not precious (LA/50), 
incongruous (LA/50), unstable (LA/162) or in poor 
condition (LA/50); 
(iv) redevelopment would enhance the appearance of 
the building (LA/50) and/or locality (LA/162); 
cvi there was no demand for the buildings in their 
present, non-office, use (LA/50); 
(vi) there was no other possible use for the building 
other than offices (LA/162); 
(vii) conservation groups had been consulted and had 
raised no objections (LA/50); 
(viii) the local residents preferred offices to the 
present use (LA/183); 
(ix) the area was already predominantly commercial in 
character (LA/2, LA, /16, LA/47, LA/99, LA/154 and 
LA/196); 
(x) future plans would (LA/60) allocate the property 
for office use in the next round of planning 
anyway. 
In response to these pleas for flexibility in the implementation of 
office restraint policy, the attitude of the 
local authority was 
neatly encapsulated by their reply to one developer which noted that: 
"policies are under constant review, but current 
policies are upheld until formally changed". 
As stated, given the complexity and variety of development situations 
in a city centre, it is unlikely that any simple and clear cut 
policies could ever be defined which could clearly 
divide off 
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proposals which should receive planning permission from those which 
should not. As a consequence, there will always be borderline cases 
where a small amount of flexibility on the part of the local authority 
could change a refusal into a permission. This would be true if the 
policy was applied rigidly or not. If a policy is applied flexibly, 
then a different set of "borderline" cases would inevitably have to be 
considered. Hence, in a restraint policy, the line has to be drawn 
16 
somewhere and then defended. Against arguments of over-zealous 
implementation, the local authority tended to produce statistical 
evidence to demonstrate the likely effects of granting a permission, 
which were usually claimed to be significant. 
(d) Questioning the terminology of the office restraint policy 
The construction of unambiguous policies or statistics is a major 
problem for any policy maker or legislator. Even the simplest 
policies can be open to a variety of interpretations. However, it is 
also true to say that a level of ambiguity within a policy can also 
allow a level of flexibility and discretion to an implementing agency. 
It -has already been suggested that the form of words chosen for the 
. office restraint policy 
had this need for discretion in mind. 
However, as we suggested earlier in this chapter, these ambiguities 
can also be exploited by development interests as loopholes. Three 
"phrases" relating to office restraint generated debates over 
the definition of terms. They were: 
"(a) the nature of the "overriding need" that applicants 
had to show in order to develop in the central 
area; 
16. Or, at least, has to be seen to be drawn somewhere. 
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(b) the level of the "extraordinary costs" of 
rehabilitation, which developers could use as 
justification for a change of use of a building to 
offices; 
(c) and the nature of "residential units", which the 
local authority was trying to keep in the central 
area. 
In one appeal, an appellant was trying to change a temporary planning 
permission for offices which had run from 1954 to 1979 to a full 
planning permission (LA/16). As part of their case, they argued that 
the present tenants (the Property Services Agency of the Department of 
the Environment) had an overriding need to be located at the site. In 
response to this claim the local authority replied that: 
"this need must arise from the claims of a known 
occupier. Since the Department of the Environment 
does not require planning permission, their need is 
not known and 'overriding need' has not been 
established". 
effect this argues that, since the Department of the Environment 
can develop whatever property they need for their operations through 
deemed planning permission, they are unable to demonstrate why they 
need this particular property and therefore the landlords of the 
property, who had secured the original temporary planning permission, 
could not demonstrate that they or their tenants had an 'overriding 
need' to be in the central area. Unfortunately, this case is the only 
one viewed by the present author on the definition of overriding need 
by an applicant and since it relates to a central government body, it 
is a special case. The files of more usual planning applications 
would have been more interesting on this point, since they would have 
contained details of how applicants were demonstrating 'overriding 
need' in the course of negotiations over their individual 
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applications. However, the above case does show that the key element 
of the proof lies in the "claims of a known occupier". This 
demonstrates how part of the office restraint policy was aimed at 
excluding speculative developers who, almost by definition, could not 
produce evidence of a known occupier's need to be in the central area. 
The question of "extraordinary costs" of rehabilitation arose in two 
separate appeals (LA/99 and LA/162). In LA/99, the appellant argued 
that the economic costs of refurbishing the proposal site would be of 
a level unlikely to generate a worthwhile return by its retention in 
residential use and that this was therefore an extraordinary cost. In 
LA/162, a similar argument was mounted for an existing retail 
-building. In this case the developers produced figures showing that 
17 
the''job of refurbishing the shop for use as offices (and hence 
rehabilitating the frontage), would cost £350,000 more than simply 
demolishing the old building and developing a new office block. The 
appellants claimed that the costs of refurbishment were demonstrably 
"extraordinary", but that they were willing to pay them if a planning 
-permission 
for office development was forthcoming. 
The local planning authority disagreed in both cases. In the first 
appeal it argued that restoration costs could only be considered 
; extraordinary when the present value of the house plus the costs of 
restoration exceeded the ultimate value of the property. The local 
authority argued that the building in question could be restored and 
maintained in residential use at 
"ordinary" cost and, therefore, the 
17. This refurbishment was refused permission in 1981 and is not 
'therefore recorded in tables in earlier chapters. 
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change of use to offices should not be permitted 
the second case (LA/162), the local authority questioned the 
assumptions used by the developers to assess the costs (and returns) 
of their proposed development. By questioning and suggesting more 
realistic alternatives to some of these assumptions, the local 
authority was able to show that the developer could get a very good 
return from the development whichever way it was performed and that, 
as such, this development did not represent an extraordinary cost. 
Finally, there was even a debate over what constituted the loss of a 
"residential unit" (LA/33). In this case, the developer proposed to 
change half of an existing house to offices. The present occupier of 
the house, it was claimed, found the building too large for her needs. 
Therefore, she would retain the remaining half of the house after the 
development was completed and, as such there would be no loss of a 
residential unit. However, the local authority replied that the 
development would still represent the loss of residential 
accommodation which, they claimed, was contrary to the spirit of 
planning policies operating 
in the area. 
(e) Office Restraint Policy Applied in Blighted Areas 
All the previous appeals have related to sites in the First New Town 
area of central Edinburgh. However, offices were occasionally applied 
for in other parts of the central area and, on two occasions (LA/40, 
LA/109), led to appeals. This section will very briefly describe the 
18. In the event, the Reporters disagreed with this interpretation, 
but recommended the dismisal of the appeal on other grounds. 
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arguments of LA/40, and outline the different use of the office 
restraint policy by the local planning authority in blighted areas as 
opposed to its more common use in areas of demand. 
LA/40 was a proposal to substantially alter an existing, semi-derelict 
19 
block of shops and houses in the area of Tollcross (see Figure 6.1). 
The proposal was to provide shopping space on the ground floor and two 
22 
floors of offices (1200m and 600m ) above the shops. Planning 
permission was refused by the local planning authority because such 
development was contrary to the office restraint policy. 
During the course of the appeal the appellant argued that: 
(i) there was no demand for shops above ground floor 
level in the area; 
(ii) the development of housing above the shops was 
not considered economically practical; 
(iii) that a shop nearby had recently been developed 
with the same specifications included in this 
proposal. Therefore there was a precedent; 
(iv) the development would provide employment in 
this blighted area; 
(v) the traffic generation of the offices would 
be insignificant; 
(vi) the development would bring housing back to 
the area, by making it a more attractive area; 
. 
(vii) the proposal fitted within the policy of the 
small area plan for Tollcross which stated that 
offices should not be allowed: 
"other than in exceptional cases of overriding 
need, including the change of use of the 
19. Which, as Chapter 6 has noted, was blighted by a series of road 
proposals which did not materialise. 
48 2 
buildings which would otherwise become vacant and 
possibly derelict to the detriment of the 
environmental amenity of the area and the planning 
objective of restoring public confidence but 
subject to proof ... that they cannot reasonably be 
used for a more acceptable purpose". 
(From Tollcross Local Plan, Interim Report). 
(viii) the policy was inappropriate in this case, 
especially since the proposals were only 60 
metres inside the boundary of the policy area. 
The appellant concluded that: 
"It would be a pity if planning blight were to be 
perpetuated after the abandonment of the road 
proposals, because of the Office Restraint Policy". 
In response the local authority argued that: 
(i) there was no need for any more offices in the 
central area; 
(ii) they had the support of the Secretary of State 
for the Office Restraint Policy; 
(iii) the policy they were applying was both 
logical and necessary; 
(iv) the precedent, quoted by the appellants, was in 
fact an exception; 
(v) dereliction in the area was not inevitable if 
the permission was not granted; 
(vi) residential development was possible on the 
proposal site. 
In. addition, the District Council provided a witness from the Lothian 
Region Highways Department (a rare Regional involvement with an 
appeal) to say that the traffic 
implications of the twenty to 
thirty more cars which the development would generate in the Tollcross 
20 
area were very serious indeed 
20. This reiterates the concern over traffic in the central area. 
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Hence, even in an area of blight, 60 metres from the edge of the 
central area, generating a small amount of traffic and. possibly 
rehabilitating a dilapidated building, the local planning authority 
were determined to restrain office development in the belief that more 
appropriate use could be made of the site. 
The Office Restraint Policy: Elements of Strength and Weakness 
In a recent paper concerned with the restraint of residential 
development in southern Hertfordshire, McNamara (1984b) listed four 
21 
key elements of a strong restraint policy . They were: 
(a) a firm basis in planning law for the ambit and the 
implementation of the policy; 
(b) Central government support for the policy; 
(c) Support for the policy at local level; 
(d) Clear and unambiguous aims which could be easily 
understood by developers, development controllers, 
planning committee members and the public. 
These four elements provide a basis with which w. e can examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the office restraint policy. 
As we have seen, it was not the legality of what the policy was 
seeking to do that was questioned by appellants 
but, rather, the legal 
status of the policy itself. As a result of the fact that the office 
restraint policy was not lodged 
in a statutorily approved document 
until, the approval of the Lothian Regional 
Structure Plan, the policy 
was constantly being challenged 
by developers. Both the structure of 
21. This listing is more specific to planning restraint policies, 
and as such, is used at this junction. The policy as a whole is 




the office restraint policy and the subject of the policy (restraint 
of offices) are perfectly legitimate in terms of the law of land use 
planning. However, without the official sanction from central 
government through the modification and approval procedures for 
statutory plans, the issue of the status of the policy can be brought 
into question. 
The fact that the existing statutorily approved land use zonings 
encouraged office development made the local authority's position on 
restraint even weaker (despite the local authority's argument that the 
office restraint policy was a further reinterpretation of those old 
zonings). In addition, the legal standing of the policy was further 
undermined by the flexibility with which the local authority had 
22 
applied it However, it does not appear that this flexibility has 
ultimately led the policy into the difficulties in which, in theory, 
it could have. Rather, it has simply given the local authority 
planners extra work in trying to refute claims of unfair refusals. 
One 'reason why it has not undermined the policy is that appeals have 
not tended to turn on such issues. 
Without question the major strength of the office restraint policy has 
been the level of support it has received from both central government 
and pressure groups and others in the local area. Edinburgh, as we 
22. Despite the arguments to the contrary by the local authority, 
Reporters did note (see Chapter 8) and comment on the ad hoc 
implementation of restraints. This "ad hocery" leads to further 
problems for the local authority through other appellants and 
applicants being able to claim that precedents had been set and 
that they were being treated unjustly. 
485 
have, seen, is the centre of many national bodies and organisations. 
The civil servants of the Scottish Office form, by and large, a 
significant element of Edinburgh's articulate middle class. As 
individuals they are, therefore, subject to local pressures and 
unavoidably influenced by local feelings. As an organisation they are 
capable of being lobbied on a day to day basis by local and national 
amenity groups, many of whom are based in Edinburgh. These factors 
must all ultimately aid the aims of the office restraint policy in 
central Edinburgh since civil servants are socialised into the 
ideology that "restraint is needed", an ideology which pervades 
23 
central Edinburgh 
Table 10.2 shows that almost two-thirds of appeals made to the 
Secretary of State concerning offices in the New Town were dismissed. 
Those that were upheld all appear to be cases where the local planning 
authority has, in the eyes of the Reporter at least, tried over- 
-I 
zealously to restrain office development. In four cases (LA/109, 
LA/154, LA/183 and LA/196) the Reporter found the local authority's 
proposal that the properties in question should be used as residences 
rather than offices unacceptable either in economical terms or in the 
likely conditions for their later use as dwellings. One was a 
basement in a busy thoroughfare (LA/109) another was the only flat 
. 
left in a tenement block (LA/196) and one had been a dental surgery. 
In LA/183 the Reporter argued that the use of the property for offices 
-would actually aid conservation policy. 
23. Ironically, the civil servants of the Scottish Office are able to 
view the skyline of central Edinburgh from the windows of the 
largest (and some say most intensive and ugliest) office building 
in Edinburgh, St. James House. 
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Reporters Secretary of Explanation 
Recommendations State's Decision 
P/PPA/LA/2 sustain dismiss 
P/PPA/LA/16 dismiss dismiss 
P/PPA/LA/33 dismiss dismiss 
P/PPA/LA/47 dismiss dismiss 





P/PPA/LA/119 dismiss dismiss 
_P/PPA/LA/151 
dismiss dismiss 
P/PPA/LA/154 sustain sustain 
dismiss 
dismiss 
sustain blighted edge of 
of city centre 
site 
very small 
change of use 
P/PPA/LA/162 dismiss dismiss 
P/PPA/LA/183 sustain sustain change of use 
club to offices 
P/PPA/LA/196 sustain sustain very small 
change of use 
Table 10.2 The Decisions Made on Appeals by the Secretary of State: 
First New Town, Edinburgh, 1976-1981 
With respect to LA/50, some limited development of the site was 
permitted by the Reporter, after a most comprehensive attack on the 
office restraint policy by a planning consultant had been made. In 
concluding the Reporter had noted that: 
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"The refusal of office development, in strict 
accordance with the policy of office restraint 
would condemn the site to the retention of 
buildings with little or no prospect of being used, 
practically or economically, in the future, unless 
another acceptable use can be found for the site 
which however seems rather remote" (para 11.8). 
Despite these problems caused by over-zealous usage, Table 10.2 shows 
quite extensive, practical support by central government. This 
support now has formal expression in both the approval of the Lothian 
Region Structure Plan (December 1979) and the statement issued in 
LA/33 (issued 22nd December 1976). 
Chapter 6 has already illustrated the level of local support that 
existed (and still does exist) in Edinburgh for office restraint. 
This ideology of sensitively restraining development pervades not only 
the public sector but the private sector agencies involved with 
development in Edinburgh as well. We saw in Chapter 8 that even local 
estate agents who stood to gain from development activity- were in 
support of the general aim of restraint in the city. As such, key 
elements of the development industry were taking the restraint policy 
as a justifiable "given", even before beginning negotiations with. 
local authority planners. Since the local estate agents are generally 
in favour of the office restraint policy, developers from outside 
Edinburgh quickly become aware of the need for sensitive developments 
even before they meet with local planners. 
A- final, but crucial, element of the policy's strength in 
implementation was that the office restraint policy was easily 
understood by the local citizenry. The single aim, contained in the 
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policy's title, was easy to understand and support. As Chapters 7 and 
8 have shown, it was largely supported on the basis of a popular wish 
to retain the architectural heritage of the city centre. Its 
connection with traffic generation was not articulated by people 
outside the realms of planning applications and planning inquiries, 
whereas the simple aims of protecting central Edinburgh from the 
"architectural barbarism" of modern property developers was sufficient 
to`focus local support for the policy. This, in itself, strengthened 
the, policy since there was political support for its aims and its 
implementation at all levels, especially when expressed through the 
amenity and other groups. 
The major weaknesses for the office restrain policy related to its 
lack of status, which perhaps a detailed, site-specific local plan 
might have enhanced, and the unpredictable way in which the policy was 
used. Many appellants could not understand why they should be denied 
the right to develop where examples of permissions existed nearby, 
often in the same street. In other cases, like the example in 
Tollcross, its implementation on properties that might have benefit ed 
from refurbishment or redevelopment and cost little in terms of 
externality effects, caused some discontent. The opportunities made 
available through the way the policy was expressed could also have 
caused problems for implementation. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has tried to enhance our understanding of why the local 
planning authority in Edinburgh permitted certain developments which 
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appeared to contradict the declared policies of the authority. Some 
of, these "non-conforming" permissions might relate to the type of 
developer involved and, more importantly, the type of development 
involved. This chapter sought to establish whether there was also a 
case, to suggest that problems with the policy itself might also have 
been a further reason for these anomalous decisions. 
Without access to the files kept by the local authority on individual 
development (including the non-conforming ones), it is much more 
difficult to say how the policy was used, or whether the aims of the 
policy were difficult -to assert in the course of day-to-day plan 
implementation through the development control system. The 
information from planning appeals seems to indicate that the policy 
did suffer from several inbuilt deficiencies. The terminological 
ambiguities were certainly capable of wide definition and exploitation 
by office developers and their consultants. The volte face in policy 
terms, with respect to the stance of the local authority towards 
office development in the city centre, coupled with the non-statutory 
status of the office restraint policy further weakened the position of 
the policy and laid it open to challenge at appeal. Similarly, non- 
conforming decisions have been shown to have a cumulative effect in 
terms of weakening a restraint policy, through recourse by applicants 
and appellants to calls for natural justice. 
However, the same analysis of appeals decisions also reveals that 
there was extensive support for the office restraint policy and its 
aims at both central government level and, to a limited extent, 
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amongst estate agents and even some appellants in the city. A general 
conclusion might well be that the office restraint policy was a fairly 
tough policy that was strongly supported. 
Hence, using the evidence from this and the preceding four chapters we 
can say that popular resentment against office and transport 
developments coupled with economic imperatives causing problems for 
expenditure on roads led to a change in policy regarding office 
development in central Edinburgh. We have seen that this policy has 
. been implemented relatively successfully. Many more proposals 
for 
office developments have been turned down since the adoption of the 
policy. However, a substantial number have also been permitted, some 
apparently in contradiction of existing policies. The form of office 
development in the city centre has also changed dramatically. Much of 
this must have been related to the existence of the restraint policy 
or its use in negotiations surrounding proposals. Thus development 
activities have been channelled by the policy to fit conservation, if 
not traffic, policies. 
We have also seen that the policy was not mechanically implemented, 
yet only a few of the "non-conforming" permissions can be related to 
the nature of the developer involved. Similarly, this chapter has 
shown that the restraint policy itself was relatively tough. Perhaps 
one can only conclude that the development control process, which 
deals with very varied proposals in widely differing circumstances in 
both time and location, is inherently unpredictable. In a regulatory 
system that examines the merits of 
individual proposals, there will 
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always be inconsistency. Without the case study files it will be 
impossible to identify the reasons why a proposal was given planning 
permission. However, even given this gap in our knowledge, we have 
examined a very interesting case of how a local authority has acted 
under pressure to control one aspect of the spatial reorganisation of 
land uses in the city centre. We have seen that there is substantial 
worth in investigating the role of local government in the 
determination of land use patterns. However, we have also seen that 
the results of the activities of such agencies can only be predicted 
to a limited extent. We now turn to evaluate the accumulated evidence 





In terms of evaluating the role of local government in guiding the 
spatial reorganisation of the city, the control of office development 
in central Edinburgh has provided us with a case study which is 
valuable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the forces pressing for 
the right to develop property in central Edinburgh have been shown to 
be potentially powerful in a number of ways, both economically and 
politically. In this they are not dissimilar to development forces 
operating in city centres across the United Kingdom and they have also 
undergone similar changes in composition to those operating elsewhere 
in the country. There may be unique features about the situation 
relating to land use planning in central Edinburgh, but the forces 
behind commercial property development in the city are similar to 
those in other parts of the country. 
Secondly, there has been consistent pressure from developers to obtain 
planning permission to develop offices in an area of considerable 
architectural and heritage value. This has resulted in a powerful 
political lobby being mobilised, over a relatively short period of 
time, to resist further development. The crucial arena for the 
resolution of this conflict of interests has been the local authority 
(and to some extent central government) in whom the right to develop 
land is vested. The granting or not of planning permissions and the 
use of planning policy to accommodate, control and guide the pressures 
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for development are both measures of the impact that these conflicting 
forces have had on local authority action. 
By' an analysis of the pressures placed on local government by these 
interest groups and the effects that these pressures have had, we can 
add valuable information to the presently limited store of knowledge 
about how, and for whom, local government operates and the extent to 
which it influences the complex process of spatial reorganisation in 
contemporary Britain. 
Seven questions were outlined in the introduction to this thesis. The 
first five can be answered relatively easily from our empirical work. 
These questions related to the nature of pressures applied to the 
local authority in order to secure or resist the issuing of 
development rights, the response of local government to such 
pressures, the translation of such pressures into political action, 
the effect of that political action on local government decision 
making regarding the process, history and resultant spatial 
distribution of offices in Edinburgh. Conclusions on these 
questions are recorded in the following section. 
However, questions relating to who benefits from state activity and 
the role of the state in the process of the spatial reorganisation of 
land uses are more difficult to answer and, given our interests, 
require more substantial treatment. The way in which local government 
operates and who benefits are both evaluated in terms of the four 
questions outlined in Table 2.2. Evidence to answer these difficult 
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questions is assembled from both the evaluation of how planning 
policies were formulated to mediate the conflict of interest that 
existed in central Edinburgh (Chapter 6) and the way in which those 
policies were implemented (Chapters 7,8,9 and 10). Observations 
are then made on the changing nature of the process of spatial 
reorganisation and the role which local government plays in it. 
Finally, the methodology used in the course of this thesis is 
reviewed. 
Pressures on Local Government: For and Against Development 
In : terms of requests for the right to develop office properties in 
central Edinburgh, there is no question that the pressure on local 
government from office developers has been substantial throughout the 
twenty year study period, 1959 to 1978. These pressures were 
generated by a wide range of different types of developers seeking to 
develop in the central area for a variety of reasons. The focus of 
pressure has consistently been on the First New Town, but some large 
firms and government bodies seeking cheaper sites for office 
accommodation have developed large offices in less central locations. 
The pressures for development have grown and declined in approximate 
accord with the national picture of "boom" and "slump". However, 
Edinburgh has been shown to have had its own, slightly different, 
history of development pressure owing to sustained interest in the 
area after the property crash of 1974. In total, the effect of office 
development in central Edinburgh has been a major transformation in 
parts of its built form, along many of, its central parts. In addition, 
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there has been some 'colonisation' of new areas on the edge of 
established commercial areas by some developers and office users. In 
2 
total, there was an estimated increase of 400,000m of new office 
space between 1959 and 1978. 
Although the pressures for development have been somewhat cyclical in 
nature, the range of developers pressing for development right has 
altered dramatically. A development industry has come to dominate 
office development in central Edinburgh. Above this demonstrable 
change in the nature of developers there has been an accompanying 
change in the 'purpose' for which development rights were being 
sought. The process has changed from a predominant interest in 
'development for own use' to 'development for profit', by sale or 
rent. A third important change that was revealed by our empirical work 
was that governmental pressure for office space has dwindled through 
the study period. Finally, it has also been shown conclusively that 
financial institutions and property companies have become significant 
new landowners in central Edinburgh. This means that they are more 
than likely to continue to be major forces behind future pressures to 
develop in the central area. Hence, one can conclude that there has 
been consistent pressure applied to local government in Edinburgh to 
permit- office development in the central area by a decreasing number 
of increasingly powerful developers. 
In. 'parallel with changes in the nature of developers there has been 
increasing pressure brought to bear on the local authority in 
Edinburgh to halt further office development and related public-sector 
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road construction projects in the central area. It has been shown that 
there has long been a network of societies and associations in the 
central area through which the feelings of many individuals about the 
redevelopment of the city have come to be expressed. In working class 
housing areas to the south of Princes Street and at a number of 
locations on the periphery of the central area, new groups were formed 
within the study period to fight comprehensive redevelopment plans and 
road proposals which directly threatened their homes and the 
environmental amenity which they enjoyed. These newer groups 
differed in socio-economic composition, resources and purpose, from 
the wealthier and more established central area groups and city-wide 
amenity societies which had large reservoirs of both professional and 
financial resources with which to assist their campaigns against 
-redevelopment. 
When several major redevelopment proposals were made public within a 
relatively short period of time in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the. attention of the entire city became focussed on issues of 
redevelopment, and the collective outrage of these groups transformed 
land development into a hotly contested political debate. There is no 
doubt that the amenity groups and residents groups were extremely 
successful in translating their sense of outrage into effective 
political action in the early 1970s. Major public meetings were held 
to, assemble support from local, national and international sources for 
their cause. In addition, local and national newspaper coverage kept 
the general public informed about the issues, greatly assisting the 
cause of the groups by detailed reporting of such matters as the 
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flying of air balloons over Haymarket Station (see Chapter 6). All 
this public protest was over and above the direct contact that some 
groups had previously enjoyed with planning officers and members. It 
is also true to say that some of these amenity groups, especially 
those defending the First New Town, had the support of large numbers 
of Edinburgh businessmen, civil servants and, as has been shown, even 
some commercial estate agents and developers in the city. 
The 1960s ideology of redevelopment reflecting the vitality and 
virility of a city was rapidly transformed by the political activities 
of the residents groups and conservationists into an ideology geared 
to defending Edinburgh's heritage. This newly restrictive posture 
towards the redevelopment of the central area became increasingly 
socialised into the ideology of Edinburgh businessmen, government 
officers and the general public. 
(It has also been shown that there 
was no effective tourist lobby supporting such restraints 
in the early 
1970s. Rather, the tourist lobby has developed and become 
incorporated into the local government structure in the early 1980s 
because of the increasing importance of the industry to Edinburgh's 
economy). 
In contrast, the developers did not possess a cohesive lobby to defend 
their interests at the local level. As we have noted, the process of 
office development became increasingly-dominated by outsiders through 
the period, with a few important exceptions 
like Miller Developments 
and 'Edinburgh-based 
insurance companies. With respect to office 
users, the main attitude of the general 
business community towards 
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development was one of defending the ability of local office users to 
find appropriate office space and ensuring that sufficient space for 
economic growth was permitted by the local authority. The main 
concern of local business representatives was with the parallel 
problem of traffic conditions in central Edinburgh and, in this, they 
were--in favour of any measures which improved traffic movement and 
parking. They were sceptical about suggestions of starting office 
centres outside the city centre. Developers based outside Edinburgh 
were usually only engaged in negotiations with the local authority over 
the determination and progress of individual applications. Only when 
they secured previous commitments from the local authority, as at 
Haymarket, or when their arrival in the city carried connotations for 
the- economic well being of the city (e. g. foreign banks) were they 
able to exert any apparent leverage at all on local decison-makers. 
Hence, one can conclude that, in the open political arena at least, 
the- concept of restraining office development was largely uncontested 
except for provisos being made by representatives of local business 
and estate agents to maintain the potential for economic growth in 
Edinburgh's central area. This concern was enshrined in the final 
form of the office restraint policy. 
We have seen that the local planning authority acted quite rapidly in 
response to these political pressures. An indication of their desire 
to appease the emergent anti-development lobbies was the £450,000 
paid as compensation to a developer for modifying his planning 
permission. However, even more 
important was the decision to suspend 
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the road proposals . This act resulted in a number of other measures 
being introduced rapidly to restrain the growth in traffic in the city 
centre. These included car parking restrictions, bus priority lanes 
and a policy to severely restrain further office growth. In these 
ways,, the local planning authority was seen to act in response to 
"grass roots" pressure. Indeed, restraint in the First New Town 
became, officially incorporated into the decision-making body through 
the establishment of the New Town Conservation Committee upon which 
the local authority was well represented. 
The form of the policy to restrain office development was such that no 
applicant with an overriding need to be located in the central area 
would be denied the right to develop. In theory at least, this 
facilitated development to support economic growth but excluded 
speculative development, for which the policy outlined alternative 
locations outside the central area. In practice, the process of 
office. development had become dominated by speculative developers by 
the time the restraint policy was adopted and such discrimination was 
not , operated. 
The office restraint policy also facilitated the 
channelling of pressure for development into a form which retained 
rather than replaced existing built structures. We have concluded 
that the policy was made deliberately flexible to permit a fair degree 
of- discretion in its implementation which reflected some concern on 
behalf of the planners over the economic ramifications of the policy. 
Our results also show that a fair amount of discretion was in fact 
used in the implementation of the policy. 
1. Although it is recognised that severe problems of financing. were 
part and parcel of this decision. 
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Chapters 7 and 8 showed that, in general, the policy of the office 
restraint was implemented quite rigorously after its formulation, 
leading to a significantly higher level of refusals after its 
adoption. There is no doubt that it lowered the level of office starts 
in., -central Edinburgh at a time of enormous pressure from individual 
developers (which in turn, was related to a financial situation which 
affected the economy as a whole). Similarly, there is no doubt that 
the-form of the policy, its use in negotiations with developers and 
its delineation of development opportunities in the city, resulted in 
a dramatic alteration in the effects of office development on the 
-built environment (though not on traffic generation) leading to a far 
higher rate of refurbishments taking place. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the office restraint policy affected 
the location of office development in Edinburgh as a whole. Although, 
the opportunities it opened up in locations outside the city centre 
were'-largely eschewed by speculative developers, the policy did open 
up new speculative opportunities on the edge of the central area. 
Given the distribution of modern office blocks around the edge of the 
restraint area (e. g. Orchard Brae and Trafalgar House), there is no 
doubt` that the office restraint policy has led directly to the 
generation of office development in these previously undeveloped 
areas. This was not intended by the local planning authority which has 
since been found to design further restrictive controls for these 
areas. This reflects the evolutionary 
interrelationship between 
policy formulation and 
implementation. 
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The inbuilt flexibility of the policy has been put under close 
examination at planning appeals with all aspects of its form being 
questioned. These terminological debates have been supplemented by 
direct attacks by appellants on the logic of the policy and the 
flexibility with which the policy had been applied. However, the 
combination of the office restraint policy and physical planning 
policies, plus the support of central government for the policy, has 
provided adequate defence for this somewhat ambiguous policy in times 
ofýneed. As a result, the policy has remained largely unchanged for 
the last five years of our study period, except for minor amendments 
and additions. This has allowed the local planning authority to react 
flexibly to development proposals and has given them a strong hand in 
negotiations with prospective developers. 
Empirical evidence, interviews and appeal cases seem to indicate 
clearly that the policy has been used with a certain degree of 
discretion but, as Chapter 9 has shown, it is not possible to show 
conclusively that there has been any significant bias against 
particular types of developers. However, it is worth noting that 
certain types of developers 
(e. g. banks and building societies and 
investment trusts) have had lower rates of refusal than others (e. g. 
Scottish property companies and locally based companies) for similar 
types. of development. It has been suggested that the policy was 
designed to permit discretion and that discretionary practices have 
been engaged in by the local authority. This has mainly favoured 
applicants whose presence in the city intimated potential economic 
growth. This may well have been seen as a relevant material 
consideration when decisions were being made. 
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Factors Affecting Implementation 
What does our case study of office restraint in central Edinburgh show 
us about the nature of policy-making and implementation? Firstly, it 
showed a local planning authority constantly reacting to an evolving 
situation and producing a policy which synthesised the demands of the 
various interests. Hence, the pressure for the policy was largely 
"bottom-up". Secondly, we saw how the form of a policy changed 
incrementally through the experience of implementation. Although the 
policy remained basically the same, the need for some redevelopment in 
the Haymarket area was grafted on to the office policies in Lothian 
Regional Structure Plan in 1978. The Regional Council also extended 
the restraint policy into the inner suburbs as a reaction to the ring 
of offices that had been developed on the edge of the central area. It 
has been argued that the appeals system can play a part in policy 
evolution by forcing a regular reconsideration and possible 
redefinition of the terms within a policy. This did not occur in the 
case of the office restraint policy because of solid central 
government support for the existing policy. 
In the light of the factors affecting implementation, outlined in 
Chapter 3, what were the factors that assisted or hindered 
implementation in the case of the office restraint policy? With 
reference to the level of powers and resources available to achieve 
implementation, the main strengths of the office restraint policy were 
that it had enormous public support, that it was using powers that 
were-'indubitably legal and 
defensible within a framework of land use 
planning law and that 
it had the support of higher tier planning 
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authorities (i. e. both Lothian Region and central government). 
However, as Chapter 10 has shown, the inbuilt ambiguities of the 
policy, the flexibility in its implementation, the lack of a site- 
specific plan supporting the policy and the lack of statutory approval 
for the policy, did give rise to some debate which might have weakened 
the policy had central government support been less than wholehearted. 
In terms of the level of agreement between the various agencies over 
the implementation of the policy, we have shown that there has not 
been a consistent and concerted opposition to office restraint over 
the whole study period. Amenity groups and general business interests 
both, had their interests incorporated within the form of the office 
restraint policy. Interviews have also shown that the policy had 
the tacit support of a range of influential commercial estate agents 
who acted as important "go-betweens" for developers and investors and 
the local authority. This was an important feature assisting 
implementation. Hence, the situation in central Edinburgh cannot 
simply be described as an antagonism between developers and the local 
authority. There were other important groups involved. However, it is 
also true to say that the policy was implemented in a period when the 
office market was depressed and pressures on the local authority for 
the right to develop were appreciably lower. 
Finally, in terms of the level of control that the local authority had 
over the necessary powers and resources to generate a new distribution 
of offices within the city, our case study has demonstrated 
significantly different results for the promotional and restrictive 
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halves of the office restraint policy. As we have said, the local 
authority had the requisite powers to restrict development in the 
central area. This was not the case with promoting new growth nodes 
in . the suburbs. These outer locations were not attractive to the 
developers who, it was anticipated, would be the main implementing 
agencies for this aspect of the policy. Consequently, development did 
not occur. Instead, it occurred on the edge of the central area 
where, through the areal limitations of the office restraint policy, 
the' local authority did not possess sufficient powers to halt it 
(until a policy was specifically created at a later date to give them 
the' requisite powers). This situation reflects the powers and 
resources of the planning system which has commonly been found to be 
more adept at restricting than promoting development. 
Towards'A Review of Theories of the State: Evidence from Central 
Edinburgh 
The above evaluation of the factors which affected plan implementation 
can and should be located within a more theoretical framework with 
respect to how and for whose benefit local government operates. To 
this end, the four questions defined in the summary table produced in 
Chapter 2 (Table 2.2) are used as a means to organise our findings. 
Rather than review the implications for theory at the end of our 
findings on each of the four questions, the various theories of the 
state are reviewed in the light of all the assembled evidence at the 
end of this section. 
(a) Who Benefitted from Local Government Activity? 
This is by no means a simple question. In effect, the situation in 
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Edinburgh has shown that a range of different interest groups have 
been affected beneficially or adversely by the actions of the local 
authority. General business interests, who had an interest in land 
and its development for their own use, were never seriously damaged by 
the local planning authority. When this group were the main 
developers, there was minimal restraint. When further development was 
restrained, the eventual form of the policy contained caveats to 
protect their investments. (In fact, in 1983, when the local 
authority became increasingly concerned that the restraints on 
developers and the lack of attractive office space in the city might 
actually be hindering economic growth, there was talk of relaxing the 
office restraint policy, see Appendix 8). 
In contrast, those who viewed land and its development as a means to 
making profit through sale and leasing of new office space, have had 
their business opportunities altered substantially. The office 
restraint forced them to turn to potentially more costly 
refurbishments' and away from redevelopments. They were encouraged to 
develop less attractive peripheral locations instead of central area 
-sites. 
Both changes were highly likely to affect the likelihood and 
level of profits for "pure developers". So much so with respect to 
outer growth areas that developments were simply not considered to be 
economically feasible since potential rents could not 
justify the 
expenditure of development. However, 
it is interesting to note that 
the =changes 
in the structure of the development industry have meant 
, that, 
"general business" land users are increasingly leasing sites 
developed by "pure developers" rather than developing their own sites. 
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Thus' the office restraint policy is increasingly having to show 
flexibility towards speculative developers to facilitate. or protect 
economic growth. However, this situation is not (as Ambrose and 
Colenutt, 1975 might indicate), for the benefit of developers but, 
rather, to ensure that general business has space to operate in. 
A third business group, 'those who make profit from visitors who enjoy 
the'' architectural heritage of Edinburgh, have also benefit ed 
indirectly from a policy which retains the value of their "assets", 
even, though they possess minimal ownership rights over the 
architecturally valued streets and squares of Edinburgh. 
Interestingly, with respect to theoretical issues, all the above 
interest groups might be described as 'capitalist'. Yet they all have 
widely different perspectives on the office restraint policy. Indeed, 
some are positively in favour of restraint, thus appearing to share a 
common interest with certain non-capitalist groups. This suggests 
that'any division of interest groups in local politics by reference to 
the relationship of their members to the means of production has to be 
donee with greater care than many past studies of the effects of land 
development have taken. In addition, it should also be noted that the 
same "capitalists" can have several different 
interests in land at the 
same time and, thereby, have mixed feelings about the policies of 
local government. For example, in Edinburgh, a Scottish insurance 
company like Standard Life Assurance Company 
is a landowner, 
developer and land user. In this case, the policy of office restraint 
might "enhance the value of their 
let properties, whilst being a 
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hinderance to the accumulation of future profits through development 
activities and, yet, facilitate the maintenance of the prestige of the 
premises they occupy in an architecturally valued thoroughfare. 
Hence, the notion of particular groups having particular, often 
predictable, interests is rather more complex than many studies have 
argued in the past. In this case, there are few simple relationships 
to be drawn between what a capitalist organisation does and what its 
reaction to government policy will be. Different sets of interests 
will. vary in importance over time. With industrial land users, for 
instance, a predominant interest can perhaps be identified. With 
financial institutions who are gathering money in and re-investing it, 
the idea of a predominant interest is less easy to define. 
Similar problems of definition affect the division of non-capitalist 
groups. The conservationists were of two main types, those who 
defended their dwellings from destruction by office development and 
those who defended areas other than those they lived in because of the 
enjoyment they took from them. The material interests and the 
political struggles these groups fought were quite different, 
although manifestly both interests could easily be held by one and 
the same person. In contrast, it could be argued that the office 
restraint policy had seriously affected the job prospects of 
2 
construction workers in central Edinburgh . Hence for some "workers" 
the policy was welcomed, for others less so, although it is recognised 
2.., On this point, Penfold (1978) noted that "Obviously the ban on 
permissions in the central area is not as rigid as it is sometimes 
painted... It is suggested that one factor working in favour of a 
possible easing of the office restrictions has been a desire by 
the city council to ease serious unemployment in the local 
building industry" (p. 23). Also see Appendix 8. 
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that neither the Trades Council, Labour Party nor construction 
workers' unions made any comment on office restraint in central 
Edinburgh to this effect. 
It must also be noted that, before office restraint was enforced, many 
households were removed to large housing estates on the edge of the 
city resulting, for some, in costlier journeys-to-work and lower 
levels of social facilities than they enjoyed before. The effects of 
office development on these displaced people would be one important 
complement to the work in this thesis. Unfortunately, time and space 
-did not allow the present author to undertake such work. 
In summary, the primary beneficiaries of this policy have been those 
who, own sites in the city centre and those who enjoy the amenity of 
central Edinburgh. The main cost of the government activity has been 
borne by those companies primarily concerned with developing land for 
profit. However, it has been shown that the likelihood of being 
refused planning permission is primarily dependent on what type of 
proposal was being made by a developer, rather than who the developer 
was. There was some evidence that certain types of large firm were 
treated more favourably than others but, again, much of this was 
partially explained by the development activities of the firms 
in 
question. Other evidence of large firms receiving preferantial 
treatment was exhibited in the letting of property in the St. James' 
Centre. However, the discriminator here was not local government but 
a--private sector developer seeking 
"safe tenants", such as chain 
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store retailers, to guarantee a steady return on a major investment 
(see Haug 1976). 
(b) Around what Social Divisions were Interest Groups Organised? 
The land use planning system has been designed to accommodate and 
mediate conflicting pressures for land and, as such, is frequently 
forced into decisions between whether parcels of land should be used 
for the production, consumption or exchange of goods. However, the 
example of office development in central Edinburgh and the policies to 
restrain it show clearly that interest groups do not always divide, or 
cannot always be defined, on the basis of their position in relation 
to-the production process, as some Marxists believe (also see Crouch, 
1981). We have seen a coincidence of interest between hotelliers (as 
a form of capitalist for when office restraint maintained Edinburgh 
tourist status and their income) and conservationists (the vast 
majority of whom are, in the strictest sense, proletarians). There is 
a similar coincidence of interest over the office restraint policy 
between construction companies and their work forces, which Cawson 
(1983) has called a 'functional interest'. Therefore, although the 
land use issues can be viewed as directly related to production and 
consumption processes, and 
individuals in a society might be ascribed 
to the capitalist or working class by reference to their relationship 
to the means of production, in terms of their involvement in local 
political conflicts over the use and development of land, 
interest 
groups and the alliances they make are not necessarily confined to one 
side or other of the production-consumption dichotomy. This has major 
implications for the theories of the state reviewed in Chapter 2. 
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(c) How Did the Local Authority Interact with Interest Groups Outside 
the State? 
Our case study has provided us with an interesting example of change 
through time with respect to the way in which the local planning 
authority was seen tö interact with outside interest groups. In the 
first half of the study period, the local authority was in regular 
informal contact with general business interests through the Chamber 
of Commerce. In addition, professional expertise was also hired in 
this early period and used by the local authority to examine and 
report on the designs of new developments for the city centre. 
Meetings with the amenity societies, although common, were not usually 
of this kind. Lobbying by the various amenity groups was constant 
throughout the 1960s but this was more by letters of protest to the 
local authority and newspapers and through their internal 
publications, than through formalised channels of communication. In 
the event, the lack of attention paid to the amenity societies' case 
was such that more public protests were organised and the issue of 
redevelopment in central Edinburgh became far more politicised. Not 
only did this course of action rapidly lead to substantial progress 
towards meeting the aims of the conservationsts and others, it also 
had significant effects on the nature of interaction between amenity 
groups and the local authority. Conservation as a policy and 
conservationists as an interest group became 
incorporated into the 
planning philosophy of the city 
by virtue of the links between the New 
Town Conservation Committee and the local authority. In the South 
Side, the South Side Advisory Panel and the South Side Planning 
Workshop were established by the local authority to explain policy in 
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the area and be sensitive to political action and reaction in the 
area. These groups were developed after increasing protest at the 
area's redevelopment, led by the South Side Association. This 'led 
Armstrong (1976) to note with reference to the City Centre that: 
"Planning has now changed to such an extent, that 
local involvement is positively encouraged ... 
However will local opinion be listened to and will 
demolition give way to improvement? " (p. 25) 
Both City of Edinburgh District and Lothian-Regional Council sought 
the comments of a wide variety of groups to proposals, preferring 
negotiation and discussion to open public debate of development 
3 
issues . There 
is also some evidence to suggest that there have been 
attempts by Edinburgh District to establish a property investors group 
with whom the problems of property development and the economic 
prospects for the area could be discussed. However, this initiative 
wa's not undertaken until towards the end of the study period when 
concerns over the effects of development restraint on economic growth 
were rising. 
Obviously, there were many individual interests that were not 
incorporated, but this applies equally to property developers as it 
does to local citizens. No evidence has been collected by the present 
author to suggest that the City of Edinburgh has sought to 
incorporate certain interest groups and exclude others. Rather, it 
has sought, to package sectional protest and interest into "units" with 
which it can negotiate. Interest groups have been left with the 
option of either getting 
involved and trying to influence policy 
3. Although, the impact of legislation on public participation is 
also seen as a major factor here. 
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through negotiation or choosing to stay outside organised channels 
and fighting policy in more public arenas. However, in general terms 
the City of Edinburgh has shown itself willing to meet outside groups 
whatever their raison d'etre. 
What Role did the Institutions and Actors within the Local Authority 
Play in Decision-Making? 
Without access to the case study files on particular developments and 
files relating to the evolution of the office restraint policy, it 
remains difficult to satisfactorily answer this question. However, 
the evidence from the formulation and implementation of the office 
restraint policy suggests that the discretion available to local 
planning officials on any issue largely depends on the level of 
"politicisation" of that issue. It is quite clear that the local 
authority's philosophy of growth and development did not alter 
in a3vance of the public display of protest against it. Rather, we 
have seen that these outside pressures turned the issue of city centre 
redevelopment into an overtly political 
(and public) struggle to which 
elected representatives responded quickly by altering the policy 
stance of the local planning authority. In addition, the policy that 
was produced was a compromise aimed at satisfying a wide range of 
outside forces, vocal or otherwise. This would suggest that, when 
issues are politicised, the power of officers is reduced. 
In -terms of the much less public arena of development control, it 
would appear that a substantial 
degree of discretion has been used in 
making individual decisions. Several appeal cases have argued that 
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apparently similar proposals have been treated very differently by the 
local authority. This flexibility indicates that officers and members 
have a considerable discretion in these matters. This, in turn, 
implies that they are not merely reacting to outside pressures but 
formulating their own opinions and acting upon them. This would 
support Underwood's (1981b) thesis that the formulation of planning 
policies and the negotiation on individual decisions are essentially 
different types of political process, the former being more public 
(and hence more pluralist in character) than the latter. The less 
public arena leaves the planning officer more discretion. (Also see 
Reade, 1982a, on negotiations over planning applications and 
corporatism in planning). However, it was also seen that the 
controversial nature of office development in central Edinburgh was 
such that the different forms of political process seen in the 
formulation and implementation stages, did not materially affect the 
outcome of the new restraint policy. The policy was largely 
implemented as formulated. 
A Review of the Theories of the State 
It is neither possible nor is it the intention that this thesis should 
"prove" or "disprove" any of the various theories of the state, 
described in Chapter 2. Indeed, reasons have been suggested why 
empirical material such as that collected 
in this thesis could be 
described as insufficient for such a purpose. However, taking 
Saunders' (1981) position on the need for counterfactuals (i. e. 
statements that can be tested, see Chapter 
2), this thesis is able to 
examine each of the different theories 
from within their own internal 
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logic. Table 2.2 outlined how each theory might hypothesise answers 
to, the four questions discussed in the previous section. By examining 
the evidence from central Edinburgh, those "hypotheses" can be 
commented upon. Not only should this permit a critique of each theory 
but it should also allow a list of features to be drawn up which any 
theory relating to how, and for whom, local government works should be 
capable of explaining in relation to case studies like our own in 
central Edinburgh. 
In terms of the representationalist-pluralist perspective on local 
government politics, it certainly appears true that public political 
protest is an extremely powerful force at a local level, especially 
when. it is accompanied by the possibility of being translated into 
votes at election time. Increasingly, vociferous demands for 
restraint in Edinburgh have resulted in an appropriate policy being 
established. It is also true that, as pluralists would suggest, the 
alliance of interest groups that combined to fight office development 4 
would be unlikely to re-form 
in the same way over other issues 
Similarly, it also appears to be the case that the local planning 
authority repeatedly sought political compromises to 
balance the 
different pressures being placed upon it from outside groups. 
However, it is not true to suggest that these compromises were simply 
interpretations of conflicting pressures in an open and public 
political arena. Certain 
interests seemed to be implicitly 
incorporated into policy. 
A. For example, one could suggest that the working class areas of the 
periphery would show very different voting patterns to those 
middle class residents of the First New Town when voting on 
the general policies of the local authority. 
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The interests of the general business community were protected in the 
formulation of the office restraint policy without those interests 
uttering more than a few words in public on the subject or fighting 
any-political or propaganda campaign. Hence there would appear to be 
more to interest representation than simply "who shouts loudest". 
The policy towards central area redevelopment in Edinburgh was 
demonstrably disjointed and incremental, as Lindblom (1959) suggests. 
However, this incrementalism was contained within certain limits. 
Business, interests would have been seriously affected by any 
moratorium on offices, but since economic growth was seen to be in the 
"public interest" (or even synonymous with it, Doak 1983), there 
seemed'to be a link between the polity and general business interests 
over the underlying assumptions of planning policy in the city. We 
cannot necessarily infer anything "structural" from this, as some 
Marxists might hope, but we can throw serious doubt on the pluralist 
concept of the "neutrality" of the state in the evolution of 
capitalist society and in controlling the spatial reorganisation of 
that society. 
When, one considers the elitist school of thought, there is no doubt 
that there has consistently been an interpenetration of local business 
interests and-the local council for a considerable time in Edinburgh 
(Elliott. et al., 1978), with many City of Edinburgh councillors being 
drawn directly from the business community, as well as officers, 
members- and businessmen being drawn from the same socio-economic 
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background and occasionally mixing together at social functions 
However, 'whilst this might explain how general business interests 
became enshrined in the office restraint policy, there is no evidence 
whatsoever to show that local businesses have been favoured in any way 
over other developers with respect to obtaining planning permissions 
in central Edinburgh. Indeed, large outside businesses appeared to 
fare 'better with respect to the rates of refusal they experienced. 
General business interests were protected but, if the elitist theory 
was correct, then surely some form of traffic scheme would have gone 
ahead to appease the most basic and most vocally expressed fears of 
6 
the business community (see Chapter 7). 
As stated above, with respect to Marxist based theories of the state, 
one cannot identify from a limited piece of empirical research, 
whether the link between the local authority and general business was 
"structural" or not. Despite this, the fact that there was a direct 
link between business interests and the form of the office restraint 
policy might satisfy some structuralist and instrumentalist authors. 
However, even a cursory inspection of the data shows that local 
authority actions were not merely orchestrated. to appease the needs of 
local capitalists. Similarly, we have seen that land use planning in 
central- Edinburgh was not conducted for the sole benefit of property 
developers as Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) have suggested. Even if one 
takes Johnston's (1982) concept of instrumentalism as local government 
'captured' by particular groups, the case of Edinburgh shows the local 
5. The evidence for this statement comes from-interview material. 
6. It might also be argued that it was this local business bias that 
kept the road proposals alive for as long as they were. 
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authority synthesising opposing pressures rather than being directed 
by any particular pressure group. Although this thesis cannot comment 
on whether, in the final instance, the state will ultimately act on 
the . behalf of capitalists, 
it does reject the mid-1970s view of a 
deterministic link with local authorities as simply serving the 
. interests of capitalists and 
land use planners simply serving the 
interests of property developers. 
Saunders' (1981) has outlined the difficulties of using empirical work 
to question Marxist-structuralist thought on how and for whom the 
state works. However, the case of central Edinburgh has raised a 
number of important points. Firstly, there is no doubt that the 
interests of the local business community were protected by the form 
of the office restraint policy. We are unable to identify from our 
material whether this link is inevitable through the structure of 
contemporary capitalism or whether the links relate to-planners simply 
assuming that the "public" interest is defined by assured economic 
growth. However, it is suggested that the office restraint policy has 
been'ýimplemented at some cost with respect to overall capital 
7 
accumulation. Obviously, one cannot perform a cost-benefit analysis 
on =such an issue but, in terms of the redevelopment of central 
Edinburgh at least, one can suggest that the strategy of new roads and 
further office growth in the central area would have led to a higher 
rate of capital accumulation than a strategy which prolonged the 
problems of traffic circulation 
in the city, led to higher costs for 
7. The ramifications of such a study are immense and would require 
a multitude of hypotheses about the various costs and benefits 
of the various strategies that could have been undertaken. 
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land (through restricting the supply of office space), raised the cost 
of leasing property and generated a locationally sub-optimal ring of 
"peri-central" office developments. Are the structuralists correct to 
say that, despite this set-back, this stance will ultimately lead to a 
higher rate of capital accumulation, as government acts invariably do, 
in the long term? It is difficult to see how they could, except to 
cite lower public expenditure (and lower rates) by the local authority 
through lower road construction costs and increased revenue from 
tourism. Such factors are, in any case, only indirectly related. 
Secondly, and of great importance for structuralist thought, the case 
of central Edinburgh has illustrated clearly that not only are there 
"functional interests" (Cawson 1983) which are held jointly by 
proletarians and capitalists 
(e. g. construction companies and building 
workers unions and members) but there are also "non-functional" 
commonalities or coincidences of 
interest (e. g. owners of existing 
office blocks and conservationists). These findings therefore lead us 
to reject the concept that the relationship to the means of production 
is the only satisfactory way of describing the basis for the 
generation and involvement of 
interest groups in local political 
struggles. It also rejects the notion that localised political 
struggles can always be conceived of as 
forms of "class struggles". 
This has serious implications for Marxist analysis of local politics. 
It is not possible to "disprove" the dualist theory of the state since 
our study here has only really concentrated on one of the two 
levels 
of: government operating 
in Britain, but we can make some comment on 
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its hypotheses concerning local government. We have also only 
concentrated on one issue, and Saunders speaks about local politics 
generally being about consumption issues and generally being conducted 
in public, pluralist-type arenas. However, by looking at land 
development we see immediately that production and consumption 
cannot be split either in terms of the process of land development 
itself or in terms of the politics of land development. For example, 
a building is produced by a company and "consumed" by users. It also 
affects the amenities and assets of others. Even if the individuals 
could be split into producers (capitalists) and consumers (workers), 
we, have demonstrated that their interests in terms of local politics 
cannot. In addition, we have seen that the political struggle 
surrounding the office restraint policy quickly led to the most active 
interest groups becoming incorporated, rather than continuing to 
fight in an open, pluralist-type arena. Since there is no reason to 
suggest that office development in central Edinburgh is fundamentally 
different to any other process of land development then, with respect 
to-the land use planning area at least, Saunder's dualist thesis, as 
presently formulated, must 
be viewed as inappropriate for examining 
land use planning as a governmental activity. 
Despite the ambiguities which persist when outlining corporatism, if 
we concentrate on Simmie's 
(1981) definition (see Chapter 2) we can 
see, that the concept of imperfect pluralism has some merit for 
describing what transpired in relation to office restraint in central 
Edinburgh. At different times we saw the local authority using 
different ways to mediate between different groups. However, this did 
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not lead to tri-partite discussions between local government, 
8 
developers and amenity groups 
It . 
is also true to suggest that some groups had to earn their 
incorporation by becoming more powerful through organising public 
protest, whereas others, like the Chamber of Commerce, were 
incorporated without any such campaigning. However, on the particular 
issue of restraining office development, there were some very 
"powerful" landowners and developers who remained largely outside the 
local political system despite the overtures that were made by the 
local authority to establish a dialogue with them. 
In general, our evidence would support Simmie's (1981) idea that the 
more incorporated an interest group is, the more influence or power it 
has.;. General business interests have been incorporated for a 
substantial time and proved influential. Conservation interests were 
given much better access-to policy making after the establishment of 
the Edinburgh New Town Conservation Committee. Indeed, these facets 
an organisation would seem more important in terms of responses 
from local government than references to the amount of capital and 
land it has. However, unlike Simmie's (1981) rather special case of 
traditional landowners in central Oxford, the new and powerful 
landowners of central Edinburgh do not, as yet, appear to have exerted 
8. Although, of course, all three were involved to varying degrees 
in public debates of issues like the Lothian Region 
Structure Plan, Examination-in-Public. 
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pressure through formal or informal channels . Hence, the possession 
of the potential for power does not necessarily lead to the exertion 
of that power. In Oxford, the powerful college landowners possess 
extensive landholdings in the immediate area of their day-to-day 
activities. This is not the same in the case of large insurance 
companies who spread their investments around the country. However, 
as with our comments on other theories, in this instance the concept 
of . 
"production" and "consumption" groups used by many corporatist 
theorists is rejected by the evidence gathered in central Edinburgh. 
We have also shown that the local authority has been keen to 
incorporate all types of interest group irrespective of their 
characteristics and have found the negotiative mechanism attractive 
for-dealing with all manner of groups. It also brings conflict away 
from public view. Hence, in conclusion, corporatist negotiation in 
Edinburgh is on the increase in this case, but it embraces groups of 
all kinds, not just "key" groups. 
Finally, with respect to managerialism, there is some evidence to 
suggest that government officers and the organisations to which they 
belong are able to act independently of pressures put upon them. In 
line. with Simmie's (1981) view, the granting of a planning permission 
is akin to a form of resource allocation. However, it is not part of 
any expenditure programme, but is more a reaction to pressures placed 
on local government from outside. The demands for development rights 
9. ý It is quite conceivable that this limited range of landowners 
in Edinburgh have no clear idea of how much land other 
-institutions and property companies. own. 
Hence, they are unaware 
of their collective power. This is a further difference to Oxford 
,.. where the colleges are all too aware of their power. 
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lie outside the control of the authority and there is no absolute 
limit on the allocation of such "resources". Therefore, if anything, 
the development controller is a "reactive" rather than "premeditative" 
gatekeeper. We have seen that the development controller in 
conjunction with other members of the planning department have 
substantial discretion to negotiate and be flexible, which also 
suggests that planners can sometimes operate somewhat autonomously 
rather than simply respond to the balance of pressures upon them at 
any particular time. Therefore, some planning activities like plan 
preparation are quite pluralist whilst others, like development 
control, are much more managerialist (although this does lead to a 
sort of corporatism through negotiation, as Reade, 1982, and 
Underwood, 1981b, suggest). However, when the planning issues get 
politicised, the flexibility and discretion of the officers is reduced 
by politicians reacting to public pressures. 
Hence, in the light of the evidence produced by this thesis we have 
found all the 'theories of the state' listed in Chapter 2 to be flawed 
in some respect as explanatory tools to satisfactorily describe the 
actions of the local authority we have observed with respect to its 
control of office development 
in central Edinburgh. However, if we 
review our findings we can suggest what the essential elements of any 
such theory might be. 
(They also act as conclusions to this section). 
Any theory of how, and for whom, local government works should be 




(i) that groups of individuals with different 
relationships to the ownership of means of 
production can have coincidences of interest over 
a range of issues; 
(ii) that interest groups often form around material 
issues rather than around their relationship to 
the ownership of the means of production; 
(iii) that general business interests and economic 
growth tend to be implicitly protected by local 
government action as an expression of the 'public 
interest' (see Doak, 1983); 
(iv) that local government officers and the organisa- 
tions they serve do act on their own initiative 
within the bounds set by (iii) and in so doing, 
(a) act in ways which tend to maximise their 
opportunities for discretion, 
(b) act incrementally in reaction to pressures, and 
(c) seek to legitimise their actions 
(v) that local government bodies seek to incorporate 
pressure groups, whether concerned with production 
or not, whilst seeking to avoid the politicis- 
ation of issues in an open and public arena; 
(vi) that public protest at the local government level 
can significantly influence government action and 
have lasting results, even if it lowers the level 
of capital accumulation in a particular area. 
This list suggests that further research is needed on the influence 
and autonomy of local government officers, and on the ideologies of 
local government officers and members. In addition, there is a 
definite need to refine our understanding of the interests, aims and 
motives of pressure groups and their members, and the 
interrelationships between interest groups and the polity at local 
government level. 
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The Nature of Spatial Reorganisation and the Role Played by Local and 
Central Government 
Although it is immediately recognised that one case study cannot hope 
to examine all the elements or aspect of a process like spatial 
reorganisation, we have clearly shown that spatial reorganisation is 
neither simply an economic nor a political process, but is rooted 
firmly in the whole social dynamic of society. The demands for land 
and land uses are changing, the agents that satisfy those demands are 
changing and the social institutions which control the requisite land 
use changes are evolving. In addition, it should be remembered that 
these various agencies and institutions and their interests are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive from each other. The study of spatial 
reorganisation has suffered from the false division of planner and 
developer, public sector and private sector. The two are not always 
diametrically opposed and developers, like the "private sector" in 
general are extremely varied in character. Remedies to these 
oversimplifications can only come from further empirical work and 
reflection. 
Even in our limited case study, we have seen major change in the 
range of developers active in reorganising city centres. The range of 
developers has changed dramatically in a twenty year period from a 
multiplicity of land users developing sites and buildings primarily 
for their own use, to a sophisticated development industry, 
increasingly financed by some of the most powerful financial 
10 
institutions in Britain, developing for future incomes or profit 
10. The speed of the change should not be underemphasised. The 
development industry has grown up and come to dominate commercial 
property development in a very short space of time. 
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This has a number of ramifications, not least of which is that the 
historically localised link between developer and local authority is 
quickly being lost and a new set of links between planning 
consultants, agencies to assist development, large financial 
institutions and local planners are being forged. The emergent 
development industry tends to have its main political strength at the 
national rather than the local government level, where it secures the 
general conditions for profitable activities through land and property 
development. 
In terms of spatial reorganisation, this change to profit-seeking 
developers means that opportunities for development will actively be 
sought with perceptions of the likely needs, rather than expressions 
of the actual needs of possible land users. Hence, the process of 
spatial reorganisation is likely to be based on market analyses of 
anticipated needs rather than occurring through the incremental 
-relocation decisions of 
individual land users. Similarly, it 
demonstrates clearly that some aspects of spatial reorganisation, like 
commercial property development, are now specialised forms of a 
commodity production process themselves rather than merely adjuncts to 
facilitate other commodity production processes. This means that land 
use patterns in twentieth century Britain must increasingly be 
interpreted through reference to the relationship of the property 
sector to the economy as a whole and what opportunities were available 
for*developers at different times, rather than by simple reference to 
the! locational needs of land users (which are rarely fully satisfied 
by a developer). Although developers seek to satisfy the needs of 
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land users as best they can and thereby increase their returns from 
development, their ability to do so could well be constrained by the 
political decisions of planners or the problems of securing the 
necessary land rights through the land market that are an essential 
pre-requisite of the development process. In theory, land use 
patterns will reflect the usual locational requirements and the 
ability of land users to pay. In reality, the actual land use 
patterns will come to depend on the variable ability of developers to 
satisfy these requirements at the right price. 
In 
,, 
terms of the politics of land development and spatial 
reorganisation in general, the change of use of land in central 
Edinburgh to offices has been shown to represent a redistribution of 
resources (economic or otherwise, like amenity) between members of a 
. society. 
The profits of developers were often coincident with the 
loss'of amenity or dwelling places for others. In relation to this it 
was seen that not only do people have an interest in their own land, 
but they also have interests in other, people's land; interests which 
they, are able and willing to defend. These issues are of extreme 
importance at local level. In terms of examining the impact of the 
political system on the spatial distribution of land uses, this thesis 
has concentrated particularly on political activities specifically 
designed to produce predetermined patterns of land use. However, we 
have also seen that the plans and policies (and their implementation) 
needed to achieve those spatial goals are socially determined 
phenomena. The outcomes are not determined 
in any a priori fashion; 
there is no certainty of implementation. In short, there is no 
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determinism concerning the ability of town planning to influence land 
use -change. The example of the ring of office developments on the 
edge of the central area in Edinburgh illustrates this clearly. 
Although it would be impossible to explain that pattern without 
reference to the office restraint policy, the pattern is not what the 
policy prescribed. This aspect of the policy failed because it ran 
contrary to the economics of commercial property development and, 
since it was the interest of private sector developers which 
determined implementation in this particular case, the offices were 
built adjacent to the centre rather than at growth nodes outside the 
centre. 
We have also seen that land use planning at the local level is almost 
totally circumscribed by central government decision-making. It is 
here that the legislative framework for control is designed, the 
fiscal aspects of development are determined, advice notes and 
circulars are issued, financial support for government development 
projects is allocated and support to locally determined planning 
policies is given (or witheld). The content of these governmental 
initiatives may be fashioned under pressure from a similar array of 
interested parties. However, the ability of those interested parties 
to `compete at the central as opposed to the local level is very 
11 
different Chapter 5 has shown the property lobby to be powerful 
11. It has been suggested that the developers lobby has a distinct 
advantage at this national level where they are very influential 
through their huge financial resources.,, ---As such the national 
and international financial institutions concentrate their 
efforts on securing a framework of land-use planning which 
permits profits to be made. In contrast, many urban based 
amenities groups are predicated on a limited areal base and, as 
such, are unlikely to form political bodies, which will be 
effective at central government level. 
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with. respect to a whole range of influential decision making bodies at 
central government level. The increasing flow of financial 
institution funds into property is making it even more significant. 
In contrast, there are only a few urban-based, nationwide, amenity 
groups operating at central government level, in contrast to rural 
groups like the Council for the Protection of Rural England or the 
National Trust. (Edinburgh may be an exception here, being the base 
for national amenity groups like the Scottish Civic Trust). 
Supplementary research to that of Colenutt (1975) and Massey and 
Catalano (1978) is needed on the ability of the property and 
. 
development lobby to structure the framework for land use planning and 
thus affect planning at the local level. 
From the above it is obvious that land use patterns cannot be 
explained by simple reference to the needs of the land users. They 
must,. also include historical examinations of general economic 
conditions, general attitudes and ideologies about the extent and 
style of planning controls, the existence of other significant 
political and fiscal 
instruments affecting developers and the 
development process and, finally, the changing attitudes towards the 
desired patterns of land use in the local political arena. Spatial 
reorganisation is a social process. Knowledge, of social processes 
makes interpretation of changing land use patterns easier, whilst an 
examination of spatial patterns can 
in turn shed some light on how 
society is organised and how it changes. Geographers have much to 
offer in this area. 
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A Reappraisal of the Findings and Methodology of the Study 
Before concluding it is important to review our findings in two ways. 
Firstly, to what extent can the results of our study be considered as 
general and, secondly, in what ways could the methodology of such a 
study be improved in the light of experience. 
(a) 'A Reappraisal of Findings 
In trying to assess how general our case study findings might be, 
there are two important questions to answer. The first is how typical 
was'--the case study policy as a representation of state action to 
control spatial reorganisation and, secondly, how typical was the 
context of central Edinburgh? In terms of the policy studied, the 
office 'restraint policy represents a situation where it was possible 
for- a compromise to be struck between interests, where the costs of 
that - compromise 
(either in traffic increases or the further 
displacement of residents from the centre of the city to peripheral 
estates) were relatively invisible to the major interests actively 
campaigning around the issue. Some of these deleterious ramifications 
were capable of being resolved through other policy fields. If this 
possibility of compromise was the case, then the office restraint 
policy has much in common with many land use planning policies. For 
example, the costs of restraining housing development on. the urban 
fringe for those wishing to move out of inner city areas are 
relatively intangible, perhaps manifesting themselves in higher land 
prices. - Hence, profiteering housebuilders-rather-than restrictive 
planning, policies may get blamed for frustrating their desires. The 
costs to the planning authority are minimal. Other examples would 
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serve equally as well. As such, in comparison to other state 
policies, the nature of land use planning is more regulative than 
directly active, its effects less immediately obvious. Studies on who 
benefits from changes in state housing, education or health policy 
might well reach different conclusions from those derived here. 
In-terms of planning policy, the office restraint policy is possibly a 
little unusual in that it related to a bigger issue than most, showed 
a wider range of interests than most and was politically more 
contested than most. As such, the study might be said to have 
concentrated on the more "spectacular" end of the spectrum of planning 
issues. With respect to such criticism, it should be pointed out that 
these features may have made the study more feasible in the first 
instance, since less would have been said or recorded about a lesser 
issue. However, the criticism is almost certainly a valid one. This, 
therefore, suggests that further study on less controversial issues is 
required to get a clearer impression of who benefits from the general 
process of land use planning. 
Turning to the typicality or otherwise of Edinburgh as a case study, 
we mentioned in Chapter 6 that the urban morphology, topography, 
history and outstanding architectural quality of its central area made 
it a rather unusual case study area.. However, we have shown that 
similar issues of office restraint have evolved in many other cities, 
pitching very similar sets of 
interest groups against one another. 
Edinburgh probably does represent an example of higher than usual 
levels of pressure for, and discontent over, development. It was an 
531 
area with less than the usual room for compromise (i. e. no war damaged 
sites for new roads), but results of this study will remain of some 
interest to reseachers monitoring other city centres. Naturally, its 
contents will be of more interest to those working in other historic 
or highly valued centres like Bath or Chester. In both cases, the 
information on the composition of the development industry, its 
evolution through time and the extent of their land resources will be 
of general interest. 
(b) A Reappraisal of Methodology 
Since there have been calls both by the present author and others 
(Elliott and McCrone, 1982 and Blowers, 1980) for future research into 
the questions raised in this thesis, it is important to appraise the 
methodology used in this piece of work as a means to facilitating more 
searching studies in the future. The current author feels convinced 
that a detailed history of policy is necessary for any study of this 
sort. Without one, the information on decisions and policy 
formulation cannot be interpreted easily. In this context, the use of 
interview material is important. If this study was to be repeated, 
more interviews would be undertaken. However, having said this, a 
sound data base on decision-making remains 
important, in order to put 
the (potentially) subjective interviews into context. In respect of 
interviews the development control decisions were an integral part of 
identifying who the main interests were. A purely interview-based 
study might not have achieved the requisite detail. 
It' was clear at the time of doing the study that the key source of 
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information on the development control process was the case files kept 
by the local planning authority. The subsequent denial of access was 
an undoubted blow to the implementation of the study. Many of the 
questions which took months to answer would have been found relatively 
quickly -had such access been available. Indeed, having worked in 
other local authorities and used such files (Healey et al., 1984, 
McNamara 1984a), the present author would consider the existence of 
the necessary access to such files as being a major consideration in 
selecting a location for case study work. The material must of course 
be treated confidentially, but there are ways and means of using the 
material whilst ensuring that such confidentiality remains. 
Similarly, given the advent of computer storage for development 
control records, it is advisable to try and find a case study area 
that can provide such material easily and quickly. In some cases, 
this material can be recoded by college computer departments, thus 
reducing the laborious process of data assembly and coding. 
However, the above discussion leaves out the matter of whether the 
questions were approached 
in a reasonable manner. It is firstly 
important to note that, even if they were adequately approached, only 
half of the question as to who beenfits from state activity has been 
tackled here. It is necessary, as Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) 
suggest, to consider the effects of 
development and policy on those 
households forcibly dispossessed of their homes or the amenities of 
their local area through the action of developers and the local 
authority. Having said this, the current author 
feels reasonably 
533 
satisfied with his limited attempt to answer questions, some of which 
lie at the heart of political theory. This was achieved by a 
consistent lowering of the earliest aims of the thesis to ones which 
were manageable. Perhaps, for some, 
it would have been better to take 
just one theory of the state and pursue it in depth using a case 
study.. However, this thesis set out toýask wider questions about the 
role of government in guiding the spatial evolution of contemporary 
urban, society. Given such a question, no one theory can assume an 
epistemological superiority, but the criticism of spreading effort too 
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviewees* 
City of, Edinburgh District Council, Planning Department (2) 
City of Edinburgh District Council, Planning Department, Development 
Control 
Lothian Regional Council 
Ediburgh-based Commercial Estate Aents (3) 
Edinburgh-based Insurance Company, involved in property investment 
Cockburn Association 
personal Communication in Writing 
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers 
Scottish Tourist Board 
Edinburgh-based Commercial Estate Agent- 
Scottish Development Department 
*The -, names of individuals are not given since- confidentiality was 
promised before 
interviews took place. 
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Appendix 2 
Scots and English Land Law 
of primary importance here is the recognition that the differences 
between, the two systems of land law in Scotland and England are only 
of minor importance in terms of the findings of this thesis. There 
are subtle differences in the nature of rights in land and in the form 
the registration of rights in land and it is on these differences 
that we will briefly concentrate. It should be noted that there are 
two ; extremely valuable and extensive. texts available to readers 
interested in following the historical evolution of the differences. 
They are Farron (1958) and Kolbert and Mackay. (1977). As Farron 
(1958) notes: 
"It is suggested, from the present inquiry, .. e that there is a large measure of similarity between 
the two land law systems (of England and Scotland)" 
(p. 251). 
They both possess a universally derivative tenure of all land from the 
sovereign (with the limited exception of, some land in Orkney and 
Shetland). In addition, both systems are without a full register of 
title (although Scotland has the remarkable Register of Sasines). In 
addition to these two basic similarities, Farron (1958) also notes 
that: 
"There is scarcely an institution tenure of the 
Scots or English feudal system which has not at 
one time existed in the other system"_(p. 252). 
The major differences in the system relate to the retention of a 
basically feudal land system in-Scotland, - centuries after its demise 
in England. Indeed, Farron argues that the Scottish land system lags 
behind the English in nearly all areas with the exception of the 
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methods of land registration. 
In conjunction with the need to be able to parcel up the rights in 
land in order to sell them as in identifiable and transferrable 
entity, the evolution of freeholds and leaseholds developed with the 
advent of capitalism in England (see Hill 1940, and MacPherson 1975) 
as an essential adjunct to an economic system based on private 
property rights. However, Scotland could also be described as a 
"capitalist" country yet its feudal land system has persisted to this 
day. Farron (1958) has suggested that the feudal system in Scotland 
was never so overshadowed by the supreme power of the sovereign as in 
England because the Kings of Scotland were much more dependent on 
'local magnates' for the raising of any armed forces. Hence, a legal 
system evolved which gave much more power and attention to the rights 
of the feudal lords in a way that was unknown in England. The system 
was still evolving until the time when James VI of Scotland succeeded 
to the English throne and a stronger, more centralised administration 
was developed which was more capable of directing the evolution in the 
form of land rights. 
The contemporary English system is relatively straightforward. 
Although all land in England is 'held' of the sovereign in "socage 
tenure", it is quite usual to speak of people holding absolute rights 
in land. As Dalton (1983) notes: 
"All land in England is freehold because someone 
somewhere always holds the fee simple (i. e. no time 
limits are imposed on the enjoyment of the land) of 
a particular piece of land" (p. 5). 
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The freeholder can make grants for the enjoyment of the land to others 
for limited periods. This can either be for the life of a tenant or, 
more commonly, for a term of years. This is known as a leasehold. 
The freeholder may impose conditions on the leaseholder. When the 
lease expires the land all its improvements revert back to the 
freeholder. In the interim the granting of a lease is usually 
accompanied by the extraction, from the leaseholder, of a rent. 
The Scottish system depends on the feudal relationship between a 
feudal lord and a vassal. Originally, a feudal lord could permit a 
vassel to occupy and use his land for the payment of an annual sum of 
money, in perpetuity, and a declaration of loyalty. This right of 
occupation was not viewed as a real right in land until it was 
registered by a notary public. Indeed, any claim to rights in land 
was and still is considered worthless without such a "sasine" being 
made. Originally, the registration of sasine was actually performed 
on the relevant parcel of land, with the feudal superior physically 
placing rock and soil in the hands of the vassal (or feuar), the event 
being recorded by a public official and a witness. This ancient 
practice has now been changed to a clerical task (see Kolbert and 
Mackay, 1977, Chapter 27). 
There were problems in the Scottish system. For example, if the 
vassal wished to relinquish his rights or the rights he possessed were 
to be passed on through inheritance, then the new vassal would need to 
make a new homage of loyalty to the feudal lord (or superior). This 
would require a further investiture. Obviously, this system of 
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constant reapplication to the feudal lord was too impractical and 
expensive for a society with a growing population and, as a result, a 
system of "subinfeudation" developed whereby a vassal was able to 
issue lesser rights in land to a sub-vassal. This left the sub-vassal 
in a difficult position if the feudal superior had not approved the 
arrangement and had alternative plans for the land. This evolved into 
a system whereby on inheritor or purchaser of rights could replace the 
vassal in his relationship to the feudal superior, with a particular 
charter. Hence, a two-tier. (or possibly more) relationship of feudal 
superiors and vassals has remained in Scotland until very recently. 
This system entails the payment, by vassals, of "feuduties" to feudal 
superiors on an annual basis. In certain cases, the feudal superior 
could impose conditions on the use of the land either at the beginning 
of the feuing or, occasionally, at times during the feuing. The 
position of the vassal was far from safe. 
In the 1970s the Government made far reaching reforms to the Scottish 
system, to bring it more in line with the English system of freeholds 
and leaseholds. Reform was seen as necessary to rid Scotland of terms 
like "superior" and "vassal", to remove possible conditions on vassals 
which were constructed at the whim of the feudal superior and which 
might interfere with the amenity or enjoyment the vassal had from his 
land, to remove charges from superiors to alter feudal charters, to 
remove the need for particular feuars to collect unallocated feudities 
from neighbours and pay the cumulo feuduty to the superior, to remove 
the autocratic position of the superior and to reduce the costs of 
securing mortgage deeds (see Kolbert and Mackay, Chapter 30). 
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The Halliday Committee (Cmnd 3118) was appointed in 1964 to analyse 
conveyancing practice and legislation in Scotland. When they reported 
in 1969 they advocated the abolition of feudal tenure and its 
replacement by absolute ownership and leases (i. e. akin to the English 
system). Two bills moved towards this. They were the Conveyancing 
and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act, 1970 (on purchasing procedures for 
property) and the Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act, 1974. The later 
bill allowed vassals to pay a 'once-for-all' sum to redeem their 
feuduties and thereby remove the need for annual payments in 
perpetuity. No new feuduties were to be issued after September 1974 
and, the redemption of feuduties was compulsory in the course of any 
sale of property. Therefore, as Kolbert and Mackay (1977) note: 
"The feudal system is not abolished by these 
provisions. However, feuduties can no longer be 
imposed and existing feuduties will gradually 
disappear" (p. 335). 
Feuduties in Scotland are usually under £10 and have been fixed in 
perpetuity (or until such time as the property is sold or the 
feuduties are redeemed). Hence, their value has dwindled over time 
through inflation. As such they do not affect the value of commercial 
property. (However, they could conceivably lead to some imposition of 
conditions of occupation by the feudal superior). Since 1974 it 
appears that there has been little voluntary effort made by vassals to 
actually redeem feuduties. The feudal system will therefore slowly 
die out as properties are transferred. 
Of interest to this thesis is that the importance of public written 
records to Scottish land conveyancing means that there is information 
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on landownership in Scotland that is wholly unavailable in England. 
This had led to a general openness about landownership. As a result, 
both the Register of Sasines and local authority Rateable Valuation 
Rolls carry information of who owns which land parcels. In terms of 
the concerns of this thesis, such data is invaluable. 
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Appendix 
Scots and English Land Use Planning 
Given the interests of this thesis, it is neither appropriate nor 
necessary to catalogue the multiplicity of minor differences that 
exist between the two systems. These differences exist in almost 
every aspect of planning law, be it the preparation of local plans, 
the issue of central government guidance, the planning 
responsibilities of the different tiers of the authority, the 
interrelationships between authorities and, in certain ways, the 
appeals system. Presumably, for those interested, some time spent 
working through the comparable sections of Grant (1978) and Young 
(1978) would generate results. 
With respect to our work it should be noted that Scotland has 
instituted most of the principal changes that have occurred in England 
and Wales. The right to develop land was nationalised in 1947 and the 
changeover to the new form of structure and local developmet plans 
occurred a year after it was introduced in England and Wales, as was 
the case with local government reorganisation generally. As with most 
large metropolitan areas south of the border, planning in Edinburgh is 
two-tier, with a structure plan laying down the guidelines for local 
plan content. Unlike the English case, the district authorities do 
not need to obtain a 'certificate of conformity' with the structure 
plan before presenting it to the Secretary of State for his approval. 
However, a regional council can, according to Young (1978), assume 
responsibility for the production of a local plan. The district can 
appeal against this. However, in the case of central Edinburgh, the 
lack of plan preparation for the central area reduces the significance 
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of these differences. In most other respect (e. g. public 
participation, public local inquiries, need for a survey) the two 
system are very similar. As with English cities, development control 
decisions are normally made at the district level, they must 'have, 
regard' to the provisions of the development plan and they too might 
have consultation with the region over previously agreed forms of 
development. 
As Chapter 2 notes, there is a third tier of planning in both England 
and Scotland. In England, the Secretary of State for the Environment 
is informed of land use planning issues (and influences those same 
issues) through the regional offices of his or her department. Hence, 
the Secretary of State is particularly concerned with environmental 
issues but is divorced from the situation through the filter of a 
regional office. In Scotland, the environment is only one of a wide 
range of functions that the Secretary of State for Scotland must 
monitor and act upon. However, there is no regional filter. The 
Secretary of State and his department are much more directly involved 
in local planning matters. 
The issuing of guidance to local authorites by central government 
differs. In Scotland, local authorities are advised through Planning 
Advice Notes whereas, in England, one has circulars which influence 
the interpretation or carrying out of planning practice. This had led 
to some differences in practice. For example, local authorities in 
Scotland were advised (Planning Note 28,1981) to produce district- 
wide plans rather than a mosaic of small plans, whereas no such advice 
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has been issued in England. However, suffice it to say, for the 
requirements of this thesis, the differences are minimal. 
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Appendix 4 
The Development Control System in Edinburgh 
The system of development control operated within City of Edinburgh 
District Council and its predecessor the City and Royal Burgh of 
Edinburgh is akin to that used elsewhere in other British local 
authorities. However, there are a few idiosyncracies which are worthy 
of note. 
In Edinburgh, there is a Development and Planning Committee which has 
a Planning Sub-Committee. Although it is a sub-committee, the 
Planning Sub-Committee is composed of the same elected representatives 
as the full committee. However, it is particularly concerned with 
making decisions on small issues such as individual applications for 
planning permission, whereas the full committee concerns itself with 
wider strategic and policy issues. The political composition of those 
committees is determined, as with other committees of the local 
authority, by the political complexion of the full Council. The ratio 
of elected members on the various committees reflects the general 
political composition of the authority. 
As Figure A4.1 demonstrates, when an application for planning 
permission is submitted to the local authority, it is considered by 
the relevant parts of local authority itself, and statutory 
notifications and consultations are carried out outside the local 
authority (e. g. conservation groups, Highways Department of Lothian 
Region). This information is collected together and synthesised into 
a report for the Housing Sub-Committee, which is presented by the 
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District Planning Officers. Notification of the application is then 
placed on the 'Continued Planning Applications' list. This is the 
first official notification to councillors concerning the application. 
The Councillors can then inspect the reports, read planning officers' 
recommendations and prepare to discuss the application at the Planning 
Sub-Committee. 
The Planning Sub-Committee has the right to grant planning permission 
to applicants (with or without conditions). It does not have the 
power to issue a refusal. The Planning Sub-Committee can only 
recommend to the full Development and Planning Committee that a 
refusal should be issued. In effect, this recommendation to 
themselves allows the applicant a chance to "appeal" against the 
recommendation and perhaps produce further evidence to support his or 
her case. In some cases, the applicant is personally invited to speak 
to the full committee, in other cases written representations might be 
made. After further deliberations, the full committee makes a 
decision. If a refusal is issued then the applicant still has a right 
of appeal through the statutory mechanisms made available to him. It 
is this internal appeal system which makes the Edinburgh system 
different from that in most other local authorities. 
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Appendix 5 
Costs to be Assessed in the Course of a Commercial Development 
There are four types of cost incurred in the usual commercial property 
development. The following sections detail those various costs. 
(a) Professional Costs 
The professional costs or "on costs" (Pilcher, 1975) can be split into 
two distinct groups, namely legal costs and professional costs. Legal 
costs are normally incurred through the convenancing of property 
rights (if any) through the process of development and the management 
of the construction and maintenance of the property if ownership is 
retained by the developer. Professional costs include payments for 
surveyors, valuers, engineers and architects. Another form of 
professional cost is the letting fee paid to an estate agent for 
introducing a tenant to a developer. Pilcher (1975) notes this cost 
in an example of a commercial development, as being 10% of one year's 
rental. 
(b) Financial Costs 
Newell (1977) correctly notes that the type of- financial costs 
incurred in the development is dependent on the type of finance used. 
Although the financing of development is mentioned in more detail 
elsewhere, the main varieties of finance for development can be listed 
as; 
1. internally raised 
2. loans (short-term, medium-term, long-term) 
3. equity finance. 
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Internally raised capital bears an "opportunity cost" determined by 
the opportunities for investment and return that have been lost by the 
investor through his tying up capital in a development. 
The other forms of finance cost are more tangible. Loans tend to come 
in two main forms (short-term and long-term) to match the preparation 
and implementation stages of a development. Equity capital, raised by 
the issuing of shares, again incurs a cost. That cost is paid out of 
the profits of the company. For a company to attract such interest, a 
1 
certain criteria of success must have been programmed through time 
(c) State Costs 
Lichfield (1956) identifies a third type of cost for the developer. 
These "state costs" are included in the annual costs of any investor 
and include tax on the profits from development, or companies 
associated with development. Manifestly, if the profit from the 
development process is heavily taxed then the net return of such 
activity is reduced. It is therefore the net return to the investor 
that must be compared alongside the net return of other investments. 
High taxation of development profits was one of the problems leading 
to low levels of investment in property in the early 1950s (100% 
development tax) and had led to a perennial debate throughout the 
2 
post-war history of planning . Some would argue that deals struck 
with local planning authorities to facilitate the granting of a 
1. The ability of central government to affect all of these aspects 
of development is given in Chapter 4. 
2. For detailed discussions of "compensation" and "betterment", see 
Cullingworth (1979) and Ratcliffe (1976). 
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planning permission (sometimes known as "planning gain"), is another 
form of locationally specific tax. 
A second form of state cost is the local property tax paid by 
proprietors to British local authorities - the "rates". Commercial 
and industrial buildings now contribute very substantially to the 
revenue of local authorities. However, these local taxes tend to be 
passed on to the occupier rather than be borne by the developer. The 
existence of company and property taxes greatly affect how much 
development is carried out, and the developers strategy in terms of 
the sale or leasing of finished properties. 
(d) Physical Costs 
A fourth, obvious, area of cost is that paid out for the construction 
of the buildings. Barras (1979), gives a very detailed account of 
these costs and tendering arrangements made for the development of 
buildings. In addition to the construction costs, there are also 
costs of connecting the development's essential services (e. g. 
electricity and water) and maintaining the building. 
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Appendix 6 




Type of Applicant 
Development Plan Zones 
Type of Development 
Size of Development 
Land Use Change 
Purpose of Development 
Number of Office Applications on the Site 
Construction of Approved Development 
Date of Decision 




Type of Applicant 
Development Plan Zone 
Type of Development 
Size of Development 
Land Use Change 
Number of Office Applications on the Site 
Date of Decision 
Time Period of Decision 
Reasons for Refusal 
Number of Reasons for Refusal 
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Appendix 7 
Comparison of Office Development in Central Edinburgh 
with Other City Centres 
As a measure of the extent to which the results of this thesis can be 
generalised to other cities, it is important to establish whether the 
pressures for development in Edinburgh, and the range of developers 
operating in central Edinburgh are akin to those operating in other 
city centres in Britain. This appendix briefly sets out to ascertain 
whether this is the case. Unfortunately, the data to achieve this 
goal was difficult to assemble and therefore the choice of city 
centres with which to compare central Edinburgh has largely been 
determined by the availability of data. The three centres chosen for 
comparison are Manchester, Bristol and City of London. The data for 
Manchester are taken from a paper by Catalano and Barras (1978). The 
data on office development in the City of London has been taken from a 
report produced by James, Lang and Wooton (1980). The data for 
Bristol were obtained from official statistics presented to the author 
by the City of Bristol Planning Department (1979) and processed by the 
1 
author 
Table A7.1 illustrates the differences in the magnitude of office 
floorspace between the different cities. Edinburgh can be seen to be 
the smallest of the four centres having only half the office space of 
Manchester and 80% that of Bristol. All the provincial centres are 
2 
dwarfed by the sheer size of the City of London figure 
1. The data have been standardised wherever possible. 
2. It must be remembered that City of London represents only a part of 
the total for London. 
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Manchester Bristol City of Edinburgh 
London 
Central Area 1,636,200 1,074,415 5,759,940 821,256 
Vacant Space 312,700 69,677 325,158 34,188 
Outside Central 458,893 164,809 n. a. 491,836 
Area 
% Outside Central 21.9 15.3 n. a. 37.5 
Area 
65 
Vacant Space 19.11 6.5 5.6 4.16 
(Centre) 
Total Area 2,095,093 1,239,224 6,085,098 1,313,092 
2 
Table A7.1; Office Development in Selected Centres (m ) 
1. Catalano and Barras (1978) 
2. City of Bristol Planning Department (1979) 
3. Jones, Lang, Wooton (1980) 
4.1978 figures 
5. Strutt and Parker (1979) 
6. Est. from Catalano and Barras (1978) 
The percentage of office space lying vacant acts as a good indicator 
of the balance between the supply and demand for offices. Except for 
Bristol, the figures quoted relate to 1977 and as such relate to the 
end of the 1970s property slump. Manchester can be seen to have 
nearly a fifth of its central office space lying empty. This is by 
far the highest proportion of vacant space of all the centres, being 
three to four times that of the others. Edinburgh has the lowest 
vacancy rate of-all. 
Edinburgh has far more of its office space outside the (locally) 
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defined central areas. Indeed, over a third of its office space is 
located outside the centre. However, as Chapter 7 illustrates, many 
of these non-central offices are actually located around the edge of 
the central area, thus reducing the contrast. In Manchester, planners 
are actively trying to keep offices in the centre, which might go 
towards explaining the differences between comparable figures for both 
cities. 
Figures A7.1 illustrates the pressures for office development felt in 
3 
the four centres throughout the 1960s and 1970s . As can be seen, all 
four cities experienced periods of high and low growth. It can also 
be seen that the peaks and troughs for each location do not 
necessarily coincide. There is no regular pattern to suggest that 
cities "lead" each other. Bristol had a trough in 1969 whilst 
Edinburgh had. a minor peak. The City of London's largest peak occurs 
at a time when Bristol and Edinburgh's office completions were 
declining. Except for Manchester, there seems a marked tendency for 
the peaks to get higher through time. In Edinburgh troughs have a 
2 
level of approximately 5,000 m per annum. The corresponding figure 
22 
in Bristol is 10,000 m per annum and 20,000 m per annum in 
Manchester. 
Figure A7.1 suggests that each city centre hs its own distinct 
"wavelength" where each city has its own requirements for office space 
which developers attempt to satisfy. Edinburgh exhibits a wavelength 
of 5-5.5 years, Bristol of 7-7.5 years and Manchester of 4-4.5 years. 
3. Based on completions. - Therefore Edinburgh has been used with an 











Table A7.2 takes the four time periods used by Catalano and Barras 
(1978)to describe boom and slump in the office market in Manchester 
and compares their findings with those from the other three centres. 
The rates of application include both approved and refused 
applications in order that some attempt can be made at assessing the 
"pressures" for development. 
City of London Bristol Manchester Edinburgh 
1959-1965 n. a. 5.14 10.4 3.7 
1966-1969 35.5 5.5 5.5 3.25 
1970-1974 57.8 7.8 12.0 6.4 
1975-1978 29.5 3.25 2.0 * 6.5 
Table A7.2: Average Number of Applications (Per Annum) for 
Office Developments (Over 1000 m ), Selected 
Centres 1959-1978 
*= 1975-1976 base 
The pattern of. boom and slump in Manchester, referred to by Catalano 
and Barras (1978) is readily visible. The'rate of application in the 
"slump" of the mid-1960s period is half that experienced in the later 
boom periods. The last slack period seems to indicate a complete 
collapse in the office development process in central Manchester (see 
Damesick, and City of Manchester Planning Department, various). 
However, the Manchester experience was not general. Although, London 
followed a similar pattern, the swings were (proportionally) not as 
extreme. In contrast, Bristol and Edinburgh seemed to show steady 
growth throughout the 1960s. Bristol peaked in the early 1970s 
whereas Edinburgh doubled its 1960s level of applications and remained 
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constantly high throughout the greater part of the 1970s. Edinburgh 
is therefore different with respect to the pressures it experienced 
from office developers (see Chapter 7 for explanations of this). 
In terms of the sizes of proposed developments Edinburgh is again seen 
to be very different from other centres as Table A7.3 shows. 
('ooom .i) City of London Bristol Manchester Edinburgh 




17% 19% 27% 
10% 15% 24% 
10% 0% 17% 





The most distinctive feature of the office development process as 
experienced in Edinburgh is the small scale nature of proposed 
developments. In proportional terms, Manchester has over thirteen 
2 
times the amount of large developments (over 10,000m ) experienced in 
Edinburgh.. However, Manchester shows itself to be a location where 
there is an extreme bias towards very large developments. Bristol and 
London experience lower proportional levels of pressures for very 
large developments, revealing a more even spread, across the size 
categories. 
A further breakdown of Table A7.3 into separate time periods reveals a 
general tendency for more smaller offices to be proposed in a period 
of slump than in a period of boom (see Table A7.4). 
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1959-65 1966-69 1970-74 1975-78 
Man, Bris, Edin Man. Bris. Edin, Man, Bris, Edin, Man. Bris, Edin, 
1-5 18 74 85 44 55 85 28 69 88 - 54 85 
5-10 46 20 8 11 32 8 31 9 12 - 31 15 10-20 18 6 4 28 14 0 28 22 - - 15 0 
> 20 18 0 4 18 0 8 14 00 -0 0 
100 100 101 101 99 101 101 100 100 - 100 100 
Table A7.4: Size of Proposed Developments (Per Cent) Selected 
Centres, By Time Periods, 1959-1978 
(not always equal to 100 owing to "rounding up") 
Man - Manchester; Bris = Bristol; Edin = Edinburgh 
The comparative work which follows uses the detailed material 
collected by fieldwork from sources in Edinburgh and the excellent 
survey carried out in Manchester by Catalano and Barras (1978). Since 
similar data was not immediately available for Bristol or the City of 
London, only Edinburgh and Manchester can be compared. 
Table A7.5 shows that property companies were the predominant 
4 
developer for all sizes of development in Manchester , especially over 
2 
20,000 m. The second most important type of developers were 
"financial institutions", who accounted for almost a quarter of all 
applications. Industrial and commercial applicants were the third 
most important group. 
Financial institutions, property companies and industrial and 
commercial developers were the three most important developers in 
4. See Chapter 8 for a detailed examination of types of developer in 
central Edinburgh. 
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central Edinburgh. However, it was the financial institutions that 
were most important developers, with the exception of the medium sized 
2 
developments between 5,000 to 10,000 m 













Companies 52% 24% 44% 38% 48% 0% 63% 50% 50% 26% 
Financial 
Institutions 26% 50% 28% 23% 26% 0% 0% 50% 22% 45% 
Public 
Sector 3% 4% 0% 8% 9% 100% 6% 0% 4% 6% 
Industrial/ 
Commercial 3% 16% 20% 3% 4% 0% 25% 0% 11% 11% 
Other 16% 6% 8% 0% 13% 0% 6% 0% 11% 5% 
Number 31 80 25 13 23 2 16 2 95 97 
Table A7.5: Developers Active at various scales of development; 
Manchester and Edinburgh, 1963-1976 (Percent of 
applications relating to developments over 1000m ) 
In terms of the nature of proposed developments, Edinburgh is again 
shown to be different to other large cities like Manchester and 
Bristol. Table A7.6 shows that in Edinburgh nearly 40% of all 
development proposals intended to retain the existing built structure 
(i. e. change of use or refurbishment), whereas in Bristol and 
Manchester, over 90% of all such applications were for the replacement 
of existing buildings. 
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Type of Development Manchester Bristol Edinburgh 
Redevelopment 92% 94% 60% 
Extension 4% 0% 1% 
Refurbishment 4% 5% 15% 
Change of Use 0% 1% 24% 
Percentage 100 100 100 
Table A7.6: Percentage of Applications (over 1000 mZ) by Type of 
Development, Selected Centres 1959-1978 
Further differences are shown by looking at the land use changes 
engendered by the development proposals. Table A7.7 shows that over 
half of the office developments in Manchester were carried out on 
established office sites with the stock of offices being expanded 
in situ. The figures in Edinburgh is approximately a quarter. 
Land Use Change Manchester Edinburgh 
Vacant Ground 7% 2% 
Office 60% 26% 
Shops 4% 14% 
Storage 4% 6% 
Recreation/Leisure 3% 18% 
Transportation 6% 0% 
Industrial 1% 3% 
Residential 0% 15% 
Miscellaneous 14% 17% 
100 100 
Table A7.7: Land Use Change to Offices Edinburgh and Manchester 
1963-1976 (over 1000 m 
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Table A7.7 also shows that a far higher proportion of land in 
residential and recreational use has changed to offices in Edinburgh 
than in Manchester. The major differences relate to the fact that 
many large Georgian houses have been turned over to offices in 
Edinburgh. In some instances this transition has occurred via an 




In summary, one can note that office development in central Edinburgh 
has experienced periods with a high level of pressure for development 
separated by periods with a far lower level of pressure. The 
situation in Edinburgh shows a prolonged stability of pressure for 
development after the property collapse of 1973/74 which is not 
repeated elsewhere. 
Edinburgh experienced less pressure for development than either 
Manchester or Bristol and there was a far higher proportion of that 
pressure aimed at developing smaller scale redevelopments and large 
refurbishments. This reflects a far higher concern to retain existing 
built structures in Edinburgh than in the other cities reviewed. 
Despite these differences, it would appear that the important 
developers in Edinburgh are very similar in composition to those 
operating in Manchester, but what they are building is very different. 
Hence, one can conclude that Edinburgh was experiencing the same types 
S. See Chapter 7 for further details. 
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of pressure for development, from similar types of developers, as 
other cities in Britain. However, the manifestations of those 
pressures (scale, type of development etc) were related to the 
particular features and requirements of central Edinburgh. Although 
Edinburgh is unique in this sense, it possesses enough features in 
common with other cities to make the experience of central Edinburgh 
pertinent to other cities in Britain, especially those with historic 
or valued town centres. 
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Appendix 8 
Post-Script. Situation at September 1984 
The period under study finished over six years ago. Therefore, it is 
perhaps of interest to readers to briefly outline changes that have 
occurred since 1978. This appendix presents information taken from 
recent publications relating to the property market in Edinburgh and 
. fF/týaýr interviews with local authority planning kin the District and Regional 
Councils. 
As elsewhere in Britain, economic conditions in Edinburgh have been 
changing since the end of the study period. Unemployment in the city 
has been on the increase. Local authority planners at both District 
and Regional level have become increasingly aware that Edinburgh has a 
reputation among property developers and investors for being a 
difficult area to obtain office planning permissions in. As a result, 
there is a growing feeling at both tiers of local government that the 
office restraint policy might be instrumental in turning employment 
away from the city through developers not even trying to obtain 
permissions. Hence, there -are some suggestions that it is perhaps 
time to demonstrate Edinburgh's willingness to accommodate further 
development by making amendments to the office restraint policy. 
Interestingly, these moves come-at a time when the market for offices 
in the city is picking up for the first time since the mid-1970s. A 
recent report by a local estate agent (Ryden and Partners, 1984) noted 
that two large and eight smaller office lets had substantially reduced 
the amount of office space immediately available in Edinburgh. 
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Reasons underlying the buoyancy of the market were continuing spin- 
offs from North Sea oil, increased industrial investments, improving 
export prospects and changing arrangements connected with Stock 
Exchange practices. Therefore, there is the distinct possibility that 
the office restraint policy may be relaxed before it has ever really 
been put to the test. The political will has moved with increasing 
problems of economic recession and unemployment, towards a far greater 
concern with job prospects and a feeling that Edinburgh's status as a 
financial centre must be maintained. This move may be enhanced by the 
election of a majority Labour administration for the first time in the 
City's history. 
As yet no firm proposals are in existence with respect to new office 
policies. However, interviews with planners suggested that apart from 
simply relaxing the policy there may well be moves to drop the 
unsuccessful aspects of the policy relating to promoting suburban 
office centres and new policies designed to concentrate office 
development in and around a redefined central area. Some of the 
office complexes that have evolved on the edge of the city centre are 
to be encouraged, probably through a relaxation of car parking 
controls in the vicinity whilst other areas remain tightly controlled. 
However, control over the effects of development on the townscape are 
still in existence. Dobson (1984) notes that: 
"planners (in Edinburgh) have been adamant that 
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Summary 
The estate agent is usually seen and theorized as a gatekeeper responsible for directing certain people to 
certain parts of the city (Williams, 1976). However, estate agents are capable of performing many more 
functions other than simple house agency. This paper presents results from a series of structured interviews 
with housebuilders and estate agents carried out in Hertfordshire by a recent research project (Elson, 1982) 
which reveals the extent to which certain estate agents are involved with organizing land purchases for 
builders and negotiating development proposals through the planning system. 
Keywords: Residential development, estate agents. 
1. Introduction 
There are two basic variants in the modelling of the land development process. One type 
concentrates on the `actors' involved in the process and views the passage of sites through the 
development `pipeline' (Barrett et at., 1978), as they move from one actor to the next (Massey 
and Chandler, 1973; Chapman, 1978). The second type concentrates on the distinct pattern that 
the circulation of capital has in the land development form of commodity production (Boddy, 
1981). Since both models are concerned with revealing the general characteristics of the land 
development process, they are, of necessity, abstractions of reality. However, as this paper will 
show, the structure of actors involved in the land development process is not general but varies 
across both time and space with respect to identifiable features of the development process. 
When cataloguing the stages which comprise the land development process, the passage from 
one stage to another is rarely considered to be problematic. However, in some parts of the UK 
the act of finding sites and obtaining planning permission can be extremely difficult. These 
difficulties have led to the emergence of a variety of intermediate agents in certain parts of the 
country who specialize in helping developers stay in business and make profits through 
`unlocking' difficult sites. The role of these agents is not usually considered in models of the land 
Note: Paul McNamara is a research associate at Oxford Polytechnic. 
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development process. This therefore results in an incomplete understanding of: (a) how the land 
development process actually works, (b) the variable range of actors involved, and (c) how 
private sector agencies involved with land development interact with local planning authorities. 
This paper examines the variety of agents involved in finding sites and negotiating 
development proposals through the planning system in an area where developers experience 
acute difficulties in getting sites released. Particular attention is paid to the `local' estate agent 
who is more usually seen as a gatekeeper directing certain types of people to certain types of 
housing but who is increasingly found performing both site find and planning consultancy 
functions for residential developers in parts of the outer south east of England. Other forms of 
agent are discussed where appropriate. The information upon which this paper is based comes 
from a series of interviews carried out with housebuilders, estate agents, planners and council 
members in late 1981. As a result, the findings are largely descriptive, but some tables are 
included to show the extent to which local estate agents are used by various types of residential 
developer to perform specific functions. As a means of introduction, the next section briefly 
outlines the nature and history of estate agency in England and Wales in order to put the more 
recent trends in the profession into perspective. 
2. The development of estate agency 
Estate agency is a relatively new activity, emerging in the early nineteenth century with the 
growth of a land `market' based on the distinct and alienable rights which characterize the 
capitalist land tenure system. The definitive activities of the estate agent (as defined in the Estate 
Agency Act 1979; Card, 1979), are: 
(a) After receiving instructions from a client, (to) effect an interview with a third party for 
either the purchase or disposal of an interest in land. 
(b) To effect the sale or purchase of an interest in land, after a vendor and purchaser have 
already met and come to a decision over such an interest in land. 
The early estate agents were largely concerned with the transfer of rural land. As such, many 
surveyors, auctioneers, stewards and estate managers undertook estate agency (Stephens, 1981). 
The fragmentation of proprietary rights which accompanied urbanization in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Britain, helped to establish a major market in land and property. The 
growth of owner occupation from 10% in 1914 to 56% in 1974 (Stephens, 1981) has continued 
the dispersal of freehold land rights to a greater number of people than ever before. This has led 
to a concomitant growth in the need for agents to connect the growing number of buyers to the 
growing number of vendors. 
The growth of estate agency is therefore largely due to a proliferation of `urban' based agents 
who were often drawn from businesses with a knowledge of those wanting to buy and sell 
property, like furniture and upholstery companies, builders and, even, undertakers. From these 
small beginnings a major profession has developed. Williams (1976) estimated that, in 1974, 
estate agents dealt with over £4500 million of property in England and Wales. Some of these 
agents have become specialists in particular fields, operating across a region or county (e. g. 
industrial or commercial property agents) whilst others have remained active in a variety of 
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fields at the local level. As such, the present day profession of estate agency reveals extraordinary 
variation. Highly complex patterns of communication concerning properties have evolved 
between the various types of agent. These linkages are poorly understood by those outside the 
profession but are of critical importance in understanding how individual land users come to 
locate on particular sites. 
3. Estate agents, land and the planning process 
It is generally recognized that there are four conceptually distinct stages in the development 
process, namely, finding a site, obtaining social sanction (in the form of a planning permission) 
for the development of the site, constructing the buildings proposed and making use of the 
finished product (by selling, renting or owner occupation). The performance of any of these 
tasks will involve a developer (as opposed to an occupier) incurring a cost, which can be 
financial if another person or company is employed to perform the task or a labour cost if the 
task is performed by the developer. 
The true entrepreneurial developer borrows capital to hire skills for all four key sections of the 
process, whilst builders, by definition, are involved in the construction process at least. As such, 
builders might wish to concentrate on their principal activity and hire specialists to provide the 
other skills (finding sites, obtaining planning permission and selling the finished product). 
Estate agents are capable of helping builders in all the tasks other than construction, and the 
provision of this help forms the central theme of the paper. The full list of present day functions 
which one might expect an estate agent to perform are given in Table 1. 











Sources: Williams (1976), Ratcliffe 
(1978), Card (1979) and Stephens 
(1981). 
The full range of agents involved with the tasks of finding sites and negotiating planning 
permissions are shown in Table 2. The agents performing these functions tend to vary with 
respect to three variables, namely, the extent of the area they operate across, the range of 
expertise they possess and, finally, the extent to which their expertise is contained within the 
structure of a building company or not. 
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Table 2. Types of agents involved in the land development process. 
Finding sites for 
McNamara 
Obtaining planning 
Type of agent development' permissionb Selling property 
Local estate agent Local chains of estate 
agents 
Freelance agent Land agents working 
freelance 
Retained land Agents, working for a 
agent development company 
Incorporated Land agency 
agent departments within a 
development company 
Local agent Local chains of estate 
agents 
Agents specializing in a 
particular field 
Planning consultant - 
working freelance 
Planning consultant - 
working for a 
development company 
In-house planning Sales department within 
experts a development company 
From McNamara (1982b). 
" From Henderson et al. (1980). 
As can be seen, local estate agents have been identified by both Henderson et al. (1980) and 
McNamara (1982b) as being involved in all aspects of the land development process other than 
construction. It is also noticeable that there are large development companies who have the 
capacity similarly to carry out all these activities through specialist departments within their 
company structure. This internal specialization is indicative of the requirements of a large 
development company which needs to control the various aspects of its work closely. Between 
these two extremes there exists a wide range of specialists performing one function or another. 
4. Agents involved in finding sites for development 
This section explores the variations in the types and activities of agents involved in finding 
development sites for housebuilders. 
4.1. Local agents 
Although the primary source of income for local estate agents is, of course, the commission 
earned from the successful sale of interests in land, the local agent can be doubly rewarded by 
becoming involved in the land development process. Stephens (1981) lists the type of services 
that a local estate agent should be capable of providing for a builder as being: 
(a) To identify the ownership(s) on a site 
(b) To assess the value of those separate proprietary interests 
(c) To discuss the form of the development with planners 
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(d) To negotiate any acquisitions 
(e) To give detailed advice on design and planning matters such as the density of the site and 
the types of house that should be built to fit a local market 
but he also notes that (Stephens, 1981, p. 309): 
(F)or the (local) agent with the necessary enthusiasm, flair and knowledge, (involvement with the land 
development process) is perhaps the most rewarding and constructive field of activity. 
The nature of house agency work means that local estate agents are constantly travelling 
around their local areas looking at or valuing properties. In so doing, they come to know their 
`patches' intimately and, almost by a process of osmosis, identify the sites in those areas that 
have development potential at any given time. Some of these sites might be spotted whilst in 
transit, others (e. g. infill sites) can be spotted from the views afforded into secluded backland 
areas from the upstairs of properties being valued. Many sites of varying size and quality come 
to the attention of local agents through these rather haphazard methods. If the vendor's 
property has development potential then, by the ethics of the estate agency profession, this 
should be pointed out and the agent is rewarded by the enlarged commission resulting from the 
higher sale price of the property. However, if a site is spotted as having potential but is not for 
sale, then the agent might approach the relevant landowner to make that person aware of the 
value of the land. 
The ̀ double reward' for estate agents arises from a'gentleman's agreement' between a builder 
and agent to the effect that, if the agent introduces a builder to a site then the agent will receive 
the rights to advertise and sell the finished dwellings. Thus, the agent earns a form of secondary 
commission on the new houses over and above the normal commission obtained from the 
original land sale. 
Local estate agents interviewed in Hertfordshire saw their role in the land development 
process as being one of a catalyst, finding and matching sites with appropriate builders 
(McNamara, 1982b). The tight planning restraints on development in the county meant that 
any development sites that were found were of great value to builders. This encouraged local 
estate agents to become involved, and the importance of these local agents to local and medium- 
sized builders in areas like Hertfordshire cannot be underestimated. Nine of the ten 
Hertfordshire-based builders interviewed named local estate agents as their primary source of 
development sites. It is not surprising, therefore, that these builders deemed good personal 
relationships with local estate agents as 'essential' to their businesses, since to renege on the 
gentleman's arrangement could result in a builder struggling to find enough new development 
sites. 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that this relationship is specific to areas where 
planning policies are aimed at restraining development. Wood et al. (1982) noted that in 
Banbury (where the overall development situation is one where large residential land 
allocations have been made by the local planning authority, but in which little interest had been 
shown by developers), the locally based estate agents played only a minor role in finding sites for 
development. One agent indicated that he would only involve himself in site finding activities if 
he was especially commissioned to do so or he had a specific client in mind. 
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4.2. Freelance and retained agents 
Freelance land agents are concerned primarily with spotting sites that have development 
potential and putting the vendor in contact with a buyer. As with local agents, the freelance 
agent will receive remuneration in the form of a percentage of the sale price as well as an 
introduction fee from the developer. If, for instance, the agent was taking I% of the sale price 
from both the vendor and the residential developer, this could amount to as much as £3200 per 
acre in some of the restraint areas in the outer south east of England. Freelance agents, like local 
agents, also have an extremely detailed knowledge of their areas and all the factors likely to 
affect the development potential of land in their areas. Given their specialization in site finding, 
these freelance agents tend to operate across quite extensive areas. 
A'retained' land agent performs a similar range of functions to that of a freelance agent except 
that in this case the agent is paid a retainer to direct sites to particular builders. The ability of a 
builder to pay such fees implies that the company has a relatively large turnover and is capable 
of building in widely dispersed locations. 
4.3. Land agents within development companies 
The last type of agent is found within the land agency departments of volume builders. Although 
there is not enough information to generalize, it is possible to discern that in some volume 
building companies, specialist departments are created to progress sites efficiently through the 
stages of the development process. Site find is one such specialized stage and many volume 
builders have developed specialist land departments to identify sites with potential. 
Given the scale of activity with which volume builders are involved, the need to ensure a 
steady flow of sites is essential. By internalizing the function to their own company structure 
they gain more control over their future flow of sites. Obviously, this is not to say that sites do 
not come from other sources. As in the case with all builders, great numbers of sites are offered 
directly to volume builders by proprietors. In larger companies these are evaluated by a separate 
land purchasing or negotiating department. Information from Hertfordshire suggests that over 
three-quarters of sites offered in this way were immediately dismissed and only one-fifth of the 
rest were likely to have any potential. 
Volume builders also obtain sites from local estate agents who cannot find interested builders 
in their local area. However, interviews in Hertfordshire indicate that a certain level of antipathy 
exists between large builders and local agents over introductions to development sites. A 
problem arises from the different methods used by the two groups for selling finished houses. 
Several local estate agents who were interviewed (McNamara, 1982b) preferred to be offered the 
right to sell finished houses than to receive a site-introduction fee from the volume builders. In 
contrast, many large builders have their own sales departments which are geared to selling large 
numbers of houses quickly. Hence they would prefer to pay a site-introduction fee than to 
depend on sales through local estate agents over whose actions they have no control. This 
conflict leads some larger builders to view local estate agents as `interfering' and `grasping', 
whereas many local agents believe themselves to have been maltreated by large builders having 
provided development sites for minimal returns with respect to furthering their house agency 
business. 
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5. Estate agents and the local planning authority 
Apart from finding sites for developers, the other essential role which an agent can play in the 
land development process is to help in the realization of development potential by obtaining 
planning permission for development proposals. As with agents involved in finding sites, agents 
which interact with the planning system vary considerably in form and function. This 
interaction can occur for a variety of reasons and is, for many local agents, a regular occurrence. 
However, there are specialist agencies which only contact a particular local authority over 
specific issues, normally for the sole purpose of securing a specific planning permission. As 
shown in Table 2, Henderson et al. (1980), listed the agents involved in planning applications as 
varying from local agents through specialist and freelance agents to'in-house' planning experts. 
This range exactly parallels that for site-finding. 
In some areas, the complexity of local planning issues and the potential rewards from 
obtaining residential planning permission are such that many individuals or small companies 
can profit from helping developers realize the development potential of sites. As a result, the 
evolution of ever more complex restraint policies to control the rate and location of 
development in areas like south-east England has led to a growing number of planning 
consultancies. The professional origins of these specialists is varied but often they come from 
development companies deprived of operating finance, professions attached to the building 
industry (architects and surveyors) and, most importantly, local authority planning 
departments. 
5.1. Local estate agents 
Local estate agents need to have a reasonable knowledge of local planning policy in the normal 
course of their business to inform clients of planning proposals affecting the value of a property. 
However, a more extensive knowledge of local planning policy is required for evaluating the 
development potential of a site accurately or for becoming involved with the landowner or 
developer in realizing that potential. 
Interviews with local agents and builders in Hertfordshire established that most small 
builders were largely ignorant of the nuances of planning policy. Some did not possess any 
planning documents whilst others kept only the relevant maps (see McNamara, 1982b). The 
local estate agents acted as planning consultants for local builders experiencing difficulties with 
local planners over certain sites. They also acted as intermediaries between builders and 
planners in negotiating applications through the planning system. To illuminate these 
important interactions more closely, the next two sections examine how local agents interact 
with local authorities and the extent to which they are used by builders. The evidence is again 
taken from interviews in Hertfordshire. 
5.1.1. Communication with the local authority. Local agents were very conscious of the need for 
good personal relationships with the local planning authority. As such it was rare for them to 
press overly hard for applications which they considered had little worth or chance of success. 
McNamara (1982b) has listed four distinct forms of contact that private sector development 
interests had with local planning authorities. These are shown below. 
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(a) Informal-general: This is characterized by discussion between those with development 
interests and planners on general matters of policy, general land availability and development 
opportunities. 
The close personal interconnections that characterize the land development process at the local 
level ensure an enforced etiquette of public politeness in all interactions. It is in everybody's 
interests that it should be so. There is also a tendency for many of the leading council officers and 
members, local builders and local estate agents to be involved in the same organizations and 
clubs in the local area. In the course of these nondevelopment-related activities, opinions on 
general issues can be aired and the private sector view made known. 
(b) Informal-specific: This is characterized by negotiations between the local planning 
authority and developer held before a planning application is submitted, or whilst it is being 
processed, to iron out problems likely to cause a refusal of planning permission. 
Most major planning applications are generally discussed informally by agents and local 
planning officers before submission. In this way, various forms of compromise can be reached 
between the local planning authority and the developer which enable potential problems which 
might lead to a refusal of planning permission, to be circumvented. Given the expertise of some 
local agents in local planning matters, these discussions are generally well informed and have a 
high rate of success. Another `informal-specific' channel of communication is for the agent to 
lobby council members directly over an application. 
(c) Formal-general: This is characterized by formal meetings to discuss general planning 
policies, such as plan inquiries. 
In Hertfordshire, local estate agents were quite active at local plan inquiries but were largely 
inactive at the more general Structure Plan Examination-in-Public. This reflects their interest 
with site specific issues, which only local plans can address. Wood (1982) noted in another 
restraint area (High Wycombe) that a major local agent there believed that informal contacts 
and lobbying were more `cost-effective' in terms of influencing policy than formal planning 
inquiries. 
(d) Formal-specific: This is characterized by the formal submission of planning applications, 
the site specific activities concerning planning appeals or site specific issues that arise at 
planning inquiries. 
In terms of formal meetings to discuss specific applications, two different estate agents 
mentioned that it was common for them to attend, as members of the public, planning 
committee meetings considering applications they were dealing with. It was also common for a 
local estate agent to advise a local builder on the possibilities of appealing against a refusal of 
planning permission and to represent that builder at appeal proceedings. 
Therefore, by a combination of informal, often personal, pressures and formal debate in 
statutorily defined planning arenas, the local estate agent is capable of influencing the overall 
attitudes of the local planning authority with regard to development on specific sites or 
development in general. 
The role of local estate agents in the residential development process 
Table 3. Use of agents in applications for residential planning permission in the 
Dacorum District, Hertfordshire, 1974-79. 
Number of dwellings Percentage of applications Number of 
applied for using an agent cases 
More than 50 57 14 
10-50 77 65 
2-9 85 33 
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5.1.2. The use of local agents. The use of local agents by building companies seems to vary 
inversely with the size of building companies. Table 3 shows that a higher proportion of large- 
scale applications are made by developers not using an agent (i. e. who internalize that function) 
than is the case with small-scale developments, presuming that there is a high level of correlation 
between the size of a building company and the size of development proposals. 
Table 4 indicates the type of agents used for different sizes of proposal in Dacorum 
District, Hertfordshire, and the extent to which local applicants make use of local agents in 
seeking planning permissions. As can be seen, local agents are used more than twice as often for 
small proposals than for large proposals. There is also a tendency for larger applications to be 
negotiated without any agent at all and, finally, a very strong link between local builders and 
local agents is implied. When larger developers do use an agent, they are less likely than a local 
builder to use a local agent. This is corroborated by Table 5 which shows that the most common 
pattern to emerge in the builder-agent relationship is that, when used, the agent tends to 
originate from the same area as the builder. 
To summarize, the local estate agent can be viewed as an important channel of 
communication and as an interpreter acting between local builders and the local planning 
authority. The activities of such agents can help to influence the attitude of the authority over 
development in general or on individual sites to one more favourable to builders' interests. The 
increased turnover of sites and houses forms the reward to the agent. Obviously, the more 
difficult the planning stance is towards development, the more valuable the services of the local 
agent might be. 
Table 4. Use of agents on different sized applications: residential development, Dacorum 




Origin of agent (%) applicants. 
dwellings Hertfordshire Non- No District and Number of 
applied for (Dacorum) % local agent Total county cases 
More than 50 29 (14) 29 43 100 21 14 
10-50 45 (28) 32 23 100 55 65 
2-9 67 (48) 18 15 100 76 33 
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Table 5. The relationship between the origin of estate agent and planning applicant: 
residential development, Dacorum District, Hertfordshire, 1974-79. 
Agent and Agent more 
Agent closer applicant from distant from 
Number of to site than the same the site than No 
dwellings applicant district the applicant agent Total 
More than 50 14 36 7 43 100 
10-50 18 39 20 23 100 
2-9 18 52 15 15 100 
5.2. Freelance and retained agents 
As seen in Table 2, Henderson et al. (1980) noted two types of freelance agent. One specializing 
in some specific field related to planning. The other with a more general knowledge of planning 
and the logic behind planning policy at strategic and local levels, as well as an extensive 
knowledge of planning law and recent precedents in planning practice which can be used to 
support any particular application. Both types of freelance agent have only minimal contact 
with any individual local authority and, given that this formidable set of specialist or general 
skills is very expensive to hire, it is usually only in an `arena of last resort' such as a planning 
appeal that builders use them. 
Specialized consultants are normally contracted by more general experts to tackle specific 
aspects of planning appeals. For example, McNamara (1982a) noted that one particular 
specialist agent in Hertfordshire was contracted regularly by different planning consultancies, 
working in different local authority areas, to assess the quality of soil on development proposal 
sites. This evidence was then used to counter local planning authority decisions to refuse 
residential development on the grounds of good agricultural land being lost. Similar specialist 
agents can be hired to look at transportation-based objections or design-based objections. 
Many of the planning consultants who organize appeal cases have a legal background 
(Queen's Counsels are used frequently by those who can afford them). Their training in legalistic 
debate can make them formidable opponents against an understaffed or busy local planning 
authority. Their general experience in dealing with a wide variety of different areas gives them a 
greater overall view of a particular development situation than is generally available to a local 
planning authority officer or solicitor (for whom planning appeals or inquiries are just a small 
part of his or her job). As a result, the planning consultants can normally be expected to employ 
far more resources in researching the case for a specific site than the local planning authority. 
These services are extremely expensive to hire but the potential rewards from obtaining 
planning permission are often high enough that developers are more than willing to pay the 
price. 
The use of such freelance consultancies is limited by their cost, and they tend to be contracted 
only in situations where both the developer and the consultant feel that they can win their case. 
Consultants do not like to worsen their `track record' by taking on cases that cannot be won. 
When they are used they can prove formidable opponents to the local planning authority. 
Although some large development firms do possess similar expertise within their company 
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structure, it might be suggested that such `in-house' skills are likely to be less potent than 
freelance skills since successful freelance activity is so attractive and lucrative that it takes many 
of the good consultants from individual development companies. However, there is insufficient 
evidence available to comment substantively on this. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has shown the importance of intermediate agents to the current functioning of the 
residential development process in one part of the UK. It has shown a wide variety of agents at 
work. They can either be specialists or generalists, free from building companies or incorporated 
into them, and they can operate across limited or wide areas. It has been suggested that the 
importance of these intermediate agents varies through time and space, depending on the 
difficulties experienced by builders in obtaining planning permission for residential develop- 
ment. Increasingly, restrictive policies are leading to fewer acceptable sites for development and 
a greater level of conflict and negotiation with the local planning authority over particular sites. 
Since builders are rarely able to allocate sufficient resources to performing these functions 
adequately, a variety of agents has evolved to assist them. 
In theoretical terms, variations in the `diameter of the development pipeline' (i. e. the 
availability of developable sites) can therefore affect the range of actors involved in the 
development process and, ultimately, the distribution of profits from that process. Information 
and expertise about land development and land-use planning have become marketable 
commodities in some parts of the UK and, in contrast to conventional wisdom, estate agents are 
not simply involved with the last, marketing, stage of commodity production. They are seen as 
being heavily involved in facilitating profit-making activities. The estate agents are not only 
gatekeepers directing buyers to houses, but they also direct builders to sites. 
We also see variations in time and space when viewing the relationship between local 
planning authorities and the development industry. In some areas the locally based estate 
agents are capable of influencing the attitudes of the local authority towards specific 
applications and general policy matters. In other areas, they are only of minor importance. The 
reasons behind these variations need to be explored further. 
A further aspect of the relationship between agents and the development process which has 
not been covered in this paper is how different types of agents interact to pass information about 
sites between each other. This is of extreme importance when trying to explain why certain 
investors or industries locate in specific areas, since potential users approach agents to find sites 
meeting their requirements and, by the vagaries of this communications' network, eventually 
find sites. As such, we need to know more about the complex networks of agents, developers and 
land users in order to understand more fully why particular employers and developers locate, or 
are active in, certain locations. Similarly, we need to know more about the extent to which 
agents can influence planning policy in its formulation and implementation in order to 
understand more fully the process of urban growth and the specific forms it takes in various 
towns. 
Finally, this paper has only looked in detail at residential development in one part of the 
country. In order to understand the land development process in general we need to look at the 
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activities of the full range of agents actively organizing all the other aspects of 
land-use change 
across the country. 
An understanding of the complex networks between different types of agents and 
builders is 
essential to comprehending the patterns of who is building where. Similarly, a knowledge of the 
interaction between agents and planners is essential to understanding where and why sites 
emerge and the specific forms that urban growth takes. Hence, our present knowledge of how 
sites come to be developed in certain locations, is incomplete. There is, therefore, a need for more 
detailed empirical research into both the interagency and interdeveloper information networks 
and agent-local authority interaction. It is hoped that this paper has, at least, demonstrated 
such a need and helped to close this gap in our knowledge. 
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TOWARDS A CLASSIFICATION OF LAND DEVELOPERS 
Paul Francis McNAMARA * 
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Increased research activity focusing on the process of land development has generated a multiplic- 
ity of models describing the acts, actions and activities of developers. Most classifications of land 
developers have been generated from the modelling of the development process and reflect the 
minutia of those models. This article attempts to produce a typology of developers from a closer 
examination of the meaning of development, using some empirical work from research in 
Edinburgh. It is hoped that the typology of developers presented will aid the conceptualisation of 
the land development process and aid future theorisation. 
1. Introduction 
The processes involved behind the development of land have increasingly 
become an area for study over the last decade. Frustrated with the large scale 
modelling of land use and land users [1,2], many critical analyses of the way 
urban development is conceptualised were started [3,4]. In parallel to this drive 
towards more detailed understanding of the development process there has 
also been a growing concern to investigate the impact of the land use planning 
system on the development of land. So widespread are the issues involved and 
so fragmented are the studies that, as yet, it is difficult to identify areas of 
common interest and thought with any ease. 
One of the major causes of the fragmentation in the field is that many of the 
researchers in the field have tried, in their own way, to represent the process of 
land development. These attempts have varied from inductive interpretation 
from empirical studies of the residential property development industry [5,6] 
and case studies of the commercial property development industry [7], to the 
production of complex models of the development process [8,9] and a variety 
of different theoretical perspectives on the process of land development 
[10-13]. 
Models of the process have tended to result in large and highly complex 
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systems models being produced [14]. As such they have proved too complex to 
provide a way in which to both view development and provide any adequate or 
simple typology of developers. It is the intention of this article to try and 
generate a classification of developers from an investigation of the nature of 
the development process itself. By analysing the components of the land 
development process, a classification of developers should follow logically. 
Past attempts at classifying developers have emerged from the minutae of 
models [15] or from the superficial features of available data [16]. As a result 
the classifications produced have tended to be useful for the analysis of the 
data from which they emerged. It is hoped that the classification produced in 
this article can be used as a base for any analysis of the land development 
process since it is based on the components of the process itself. 
The classification of developers presented in this article is based on the 
changing property rights held by developers throughout the period of a site 
development. Illustrations from data on office development in Edinburgh will 
show that many, superficially similar developers act differently when devel- 
oping land and that many superficially different types of developer act in a 
similar way. It is hoped that the new classification produced will aid planners 
to more thoroughly assess the types of developers active in their areas and 
thereby gauge more accurately the likely effects of their actions on the process 
of land development. 
2. Defining development 
The base from which to start a search of classificatory tools is a working 
definition of development. One such definition is given in the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1971, section 22, which sees a development as being: 
"the carrying out of buildings, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, 
over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any 
buildings or other land". By such a definition the government separates off 
those developments which require governmental sanction from those which do 
not. This is done by fixing a set of size or use criteria to the notion of what 
constitutes a material change. Therefore this definition is inadequate since it 
merely sets out to define the physical reality of development for the purposes 
of defining the boundary of government activity. A fuller definition of a 
development might be: "Land development is a purposive and premeditated 
material change in, or intensification of, the use of a parcel of land, brought 
about by an investment of labour and capital in land. " 
As such, the following elements that constitute a development can be listed: 
(a) there is a material change in the use of land; 
(b) there is an "investment" of land, capital and labour; and 
(c) there is a purpose behind the act. 
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In a society based on the concept of private property rights (which pertain 
as much to real property as any other type of property), one must obtain 
certain rights over land before being able to develop it. For many developers 
the purchase of rights in land is part of their investment and the sale of those 
rights is their return on that investment. Therefore, development forms a 
fusion of land rights, labour and capital. If any one of these elements is 
missing, then only the simplest and most minor developments can be per- 
formed. 
Development is also an act that is fixed in time and space. It occurs at a 
location at a given date (or between dates). However, since the orchestration of 
land rights, labour and capital into the necessary fusion takes time, and the 
product of the fusion generally has a long life, then it might be said that a 
development can be viewed at a number of points through time. 
In examining the transference of rights to and from the body organising the 
development, one can view the land rights of the developer at various stages. 
Intuitively three stages can be identified as being before, during and after the 
development has taken place. 
3. An illustration 
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate data received about the gathering and dispersal of land 
rights that took place during the various stages of certain office developments 
in Edinburgh between 1959 and 1978 [17]. The types of developments chosen 
for illustration are those carried out by property companies and those carried 
out by insurance companies. All available data on the land rights purchases 
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Fig. 1. Office development in central Edinburgh, 1959-1978. Applicant's interest in property: 
insurance companies (four years before to four years after). 
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Fig. 2. Office development in central Edinburgh, 1959-1978. Applicant's interest in property: 
property companies (four years before to four years after). (] - ten transactions). 
The figures represent the changing level of interest that developers have in 
parcels of land through the course of developments. The boxes (full, majority, 
minority and none) indicate the level of a developer's interest in the develop- 
ment site at a given time relative to the act of the development. As can be seen, 
the level of a developer's interest changes throughout the course of a develop- 
ment. These changes can be represented by flows. The completed diagrams 
illustrate the various attitudes that different developers have towards the 
timing of the purchase and dispersal of land rights in the development process. 
It will be appreciated that the four-year periods before and after the act of 
development, used to reveal the developers interest throughout the develop- 
ment, have been selected arbitrarily. However, it is also clear from these figures 
that, given adequate data, the purpose of various developments can be re- 
vealed. Fig. 1 shows that, in developments completed by insurance companies 
in central Edinburgh, the developers did not usually own the development site 
four years before application (t - 4). This has completely changed by the time 
the application is submitted to the planning authority (t). Four years after the 
application was made, nearly all the development sites were still in the hands 
of the same insurance companies. 
Property companies, active in exactly the same kind of development pro- 
cess, in the same location, contrast vividly with the pattern described above 
with respect to their "tactics" of land rights purchase and disposal. They rarely 
own the property to be developed four years before application. Even at the 
time they make an application for planning permission, many of them do not 
have any rights in the land and very few properties are kept by them after they 
have made an application. 
This article relates to a method of investigation rather than to a detailed 
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analysis of results, and as such the significance of the diagrams lies in the fact 
that they illustrate two very different patterns of purchase and sale between 
two different groups of developers operating in exactly the same area. In- 
surance companies "buy short" and hold properties; property companies tend 
to "buy short" and "sell short". Equally important is that there exists a wide 
variation in development tactics between various members of the same group. 
It will be appreciated that "Insurance Companies" and "Property Compa- 
nies" illustrate the, type of arbitrary classification of developers that is both 
difficult to establish or defend. The present author does not endorse such a 
classification but rather has used it to show that one "type of developer" can 
represent several different attitudes towards land and its purchase and devel- 
opment. 
4. A possible classification 
What figs. 1 and 2 show then is that the whole set of actions that could be 
described as developments can first be cut up into types of land use change 
(e. g. offices) and secondly that classifications of developers can relate, indeed 
should be related, to the purpose of a develpment. An attempt to classify 
developers in terms of their purpose of development (i. e. their tactics of 
purchasing and selling land rights throughout the development process) is 
given in fig. 3. 
There have been attempts to classify developers in relation to their source of 
finance [18]. Researchers desiring to follow such a classification might well 
consider one based on relatively abstract notions of "the purpose of develop- 
ment", to have fundamental details missing. However it is argued that there are 
acute problems for any classification that tries to take such a feature as finance 
into consideration. Nearly all developments of any substance will require a 
Before dev After dev 
SHORT TERM LONG TERM LONG TERM 
(leasing out) (owning & occupying) 
Short term Entrepreneurial Land Developer- Developer- 
builder investor user 
Long term Asset clearing, Property improv- Expanding 
(leasing out) probably in- er/rentier 
developer- 
vestment switch user 
Long term Capitalising Change in returns Owner-occupier/ 
(owning & assets from property 
developer 
occupying) 
Fig. 3. Classification of developers by purpose of development. 
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developer to seek outside finance. The larger companies and financial institu- 
tions can often generate their own capital, but for most developers this 
is not 
possible. To try and categorise developers or developments by their source of 
finance neglects the reality of the searches that many developers make 
for 
sources of credit, often moving from one financial sector to another. To state 
that property and finance are integrally interrelated is true but unhelpful for 
empirical work [19]. 
Finance is often sought in both the short and long term, resulting in a 
double problem for classification. Financial involvement in property develop- 
ment is best included only as it interacts with land rights purchase. If financial 
assistance results in some form of land rights transfer, then the classification 
outlined above will record it. If there is not transfer of such rights, then 
financial capital is being used in its normal way, facilitating production and 
securing its return from such a task. 
In the past crude attempts have been made to try and classify developers by 
their "external" appearances. The classification in fig. 3 deliberately avoids 
such rudimentary categories as "property companies" and "investment trusts". 
As illustrated by figs. 1 and 2, such groupings are relatively meaningless. In 
many cases it is very difficult to identify exactly who the developer is when the 
complex interrelations between agents, investors and creditors are appreciated. 
Consideration of the purpose of development circumvents these problems. A 
further problem for these crude "feature" classifications is that, for example, a 
property company is very difficult to classify when it is 20,40, or 60% owned 
by an insurance company. 
State development is deliberately omitted from the classification as pre- 
sented. Obviously any classification of developers by "purpose" of develop- 
ment will keep the profit-oriented private sector agent from the community- 
oriented public sector. However, an exactly parallel classification could be 
created to examine the purposes to which the state puts land since, in the 
system of private property rights exhibited in the U. K., land rights are 
generally vested in a "person", whether an individual, property company or 
local authority. 
It might be claimed that there is no adequate mention of speculators in land 
who operate before a development takes place. However, the classification is 
aimed at illustrating the types of developer that exist. Developers have been 
described as "impressarios" orchestrating development [20], bringing the land 
rights, labour and capital together at a particular place and time. The classifi- 
cation seeks to follow this interpretation of a developer and since such 
speculators as mentioned, like contract builders or estate agents, are adjuncts 
to the development process, they cannot be included for classification. This in 
no way implies a lack of importance for these groups or an acknowledgement 
that they are not affected by planning policy. 
The classification differentiates "long-term" and "short-term" holding of 
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land on the basis of whether or not the finished development is immediately 
sold by the developer after completion. Obviously there is a problem relating 
to the definition of "long-term" holding for investment purposes, since long- 
term for, say, a property company may well be relatively short-term (in 
absolute terms) for an insurance company. Therefore in this particular case it 
is important for researchers to come to some accepted notion of what is 
"short-term investment holding" and "long-term investment holding". It is 
suggested that this is most adequately done by assessing the yields required by 
the developer from his investment. The higher the yield, the more short-term is 
the developer's view of his investment. Naturally any consideration of yields 
would also require a knowledge of whether the property was considered prime 
property or not, yields tending to be lower on "safer" prime developments. 
5. Conclusion 
By examining the fundamental features of the process of land development as 
it operates through time, this article has sought to establish a classification of 
developers for use in future investigations into the field. Land development 
was seen as a fusion of land, labour and capital at a particular place at a 
particular time. It was considered that these three essential elements had to be 
retained if any meaningful or useful classification was to be made. Conse- 
quently, the resultant classification relates solely to the act of development. 
Evidence from the land dealings of certain arbitrarily chosen groups of 
developers, operating in the office development market of central Edinburgh, 
was used to show that within such groups different "purposes for develop- 
ment" exist. For example, insurance companies tend to retain finished develop- 
ments, showing a tendency to make investment in land via the process of 
development. Property company activity was mixed between retaining and 
selling finished developments. Hence, there was variation within the groups of 
developers chosen. As such, these arbitrary classifications were seen to hide as 
much as they reveal. Analyses of the development process or the effects of 
planning policy on developers would be grossly misled by such classifications 
and as a result of this a first step was taken towards a classification of 
developers by their purpose of development. 
By recognising that all developments, by definition, are purposive acts, a 
classification by purpose becomes possible. A ninefold classification was then 
suggested, based on the purchasing, holding and selling of land rights by 
developers throughout the timespan of a development. This represents a very 
elementary first step towards a full classification, recognising that more 
information on the land assembly and land disposal activities of developers 
would assist the advancement of this whole area of study. However it is hoped 
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that this basis will 
be of use, either practically or conceptually, to researchers 
active at the moment. 
Finally, it is hoped that, by establishing a classification of 
developers, 
planning policies will be more able to 
identify the characteristics of the 
development industry in their area and thereby calculate more fully the 
likely 
impact of their policies on the land development process. A policy 
is far more 
likely to affect similar development (by purpose) groups than 
it is to affect 
artificially derived groups. 
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